Public Choice (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Strengthening Performance in Public Sector Management in Asia","authors":"C. Wescott, L. R. Jones","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.885860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.885860","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years many developing countries are choosing to follow patterns that have emerged in businesses and in some developed country governments over the last several decades of establishing results-oriented monitoring frameworks that report on progress against strategic plans, budgets and sector strategies. This paper addresses five key elements of this new orientation: (i) clarifying the language of performance, (ii) defining indicative performance indicators, (iii) exploring tools for performance measurement, (iv) making changes to improve performance, and (v) creating the performance and knowledge culture in organizations. It then gives examples of these elements from Asia.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130280883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Crime and Uncertain Punishment","authors":"B. Katz, Joel Owen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.878451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.878451","url":null,"abstract":"We consider agents in a country in an early stage of transition from a planned to a market economy. As the transition is in progress, the nature of the government's policies are unknown to the agents. Property rights once held by the state have already been transferred to the agents, with each agent owning one firm. However, the agents are uncertain of the level of law enforcement the government will provide. Specifically, they are unsure of the tax and confiscation consequences of both legal and illegal acts. Each agent, having a different cost of stealing, must decide how much of the firm to divert to himself. The agents believe the government may become either a traditional democratic government that supplies law enforcement as well as infrastructure leading to positive firm growth, or a corrupt government that may or may not provide law enforcement, does not provide a climate for firm growth, and may be confiscatory. All agents presume the government will choose its behavior as a function of the tax revenue it will collect under each scenario; however, the tax revenue results from the collective decisions of the agents. This interaction between tax revenue and agents decisions, together with the uncertainty of law enforcement and tax policy, forms the framework within which the agent chooses his level of honesty. By calculating the percentage of agents who steal some amount from the firm, we investigate the relationship between the level of criminality and the various uncertainties facing the agents. We show how expectations of the agents about the future behavior of their government induce the degree of criminality in society.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128485095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of Income, Geography and Institutions","authors":"Matthew E. Kahn","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.391741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.391741","url":null,"abstract":"Using a new data set on annual deaths from disasters in 73 nations from 1980 to 2002, this paper tests several hypotheses concerning natural-disaster mitigation. Though richer nations do not experience fewer natural disasters than poorer nations, richer nations do suffer less death from disaster. Economic development provides implicit insurance against nature's shocks. Democracies and nations with higher-quality institutions suffer less death from natural disaster. Because climate change is expected to increase the frequency of natural disasters such as floods, these results have implications for the incidence of global warming. © 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"144 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123817933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Believing in Economic Theory: Sex, Lies, Evidence, Trust and Ideology","authors":"D. Austin, N. Wilcox","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.845513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.845513","url":null,"abstract":"People's beliefs about how well economic theory predicts outcomes may affect policy through democratic processes. Knowing what determines those beliefs is then important. We investigate how individual attitudes and characteristics correlate with those beliefs using a classroom Double Auction experiment, combined with a survey and ex-ante and ex-post elicitations of student beliefs. We find that Sex is a robust correlate of both ex-ante and ex-post beliefs: women are more skeptical than men in both instances. An index of socially desirable responding is positively related to prior belief in the theory: subjects who manage their image by telling Lies to please others also claim less skepticism on the ex-ante survey about the economic theory's predictive power. Subjects respond to Evidence in a minimally reasonable way: those who saw prediction errors in their experimental demonstration change their beliefs less between the ex-ante and ex-post surveys than those who saw none. While Trust-specifically, trust of authority-strongly correlates with Ideology, it is an insignificant predictor of beliefs. Finally, Ideology has complex effects on beliefs. As expected, the relatively liberal respondents are relatively more skeptical about economic theory in the ex-ante belief elicitation. Surprisingly, however, the relatively conservative respondents update beliefs in response to evidence much less strongly than their more liberal counterparts and, as a result, are actually relatively more skeptical than them in the ex-post belief elicitation. Acknowledgments. We have benefited from comments and help from Sarah Austin, Thilo Bodenstein, Dirk Engelmann, Jan Kmenta, Kathleen Knight, John Matsusaka, Andreas Ortmannand Christopher Wlezien, as well as seminar participants at the Public Choice/Economic Science Association meetings in San Antonio, Economic Science Association meetings in Barcelona and Tucson, the European Economic Association meetings in Venice, the California Institute of Technology, Technische Universität Chemnitz and the Max Planck Institut Strategic Interaction Group in Jena. Of course, none of these people are responsible for remaining errors or ambiguities.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"2020 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114909291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Term Limits and Electoral Accountability","authors":"M. Smart, D. Sturm","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1077756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1077756","url":null,"abstract":"This Paper analyses the impact of term limits in a political agency model. We find that term limits reduce the value of holding office. This reduction in the re-election incentive can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their own private preferences. Such ‘truthful’ behaviour by incumbents will in turn result in better screening of incumbents whose preferences do not correspond to voters’ preferences. We show that these effects can make a two-term limit, which is the empirically most frequent restriction on tenure, ex ante welfare-improving from the perspective of voters. We present evidence from gubernatorial elections that the model’s main empirical implication is supported by the data.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129512844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"'Thank God We're Here': Judicial Exclusivity in Charter Interpretation and its Consequences","authors":"G. Huscroft","doi":"10.60082/2563-8505.1065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.60082/2563-8505.1065","url":null,"abstract":"Given the inevitability of good faith disagreement when it comes to interpreting the rights and freedoms in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the way in which the Supreme Court, Parliament, and the provincial legislatures perceive their roles under the Charter is obviously of crucial importance. At the outset of our second generation under the Charter, the Court's role is clear: it has claimed the role of guardian of the constitution. For their parts, however, neither Parliament nor the provincial legislatures have asserted any claim to interpretive authority where the Charter is concerned. On the contrary, judicial exclusivity in Charter interpretation is a norm that has been factored into political deliberations.Political inertia on rights-based issues is indeed a problem, but Court is as much part of the problem as the solution. By being helpful or more grandly purporting to do its duty in Charter cases, the Court diminishes not only the importance of political resolution of rights questions but the likelihood that it will occur.The author discusses the federal government's strategy in Canadian same-sex marriage litigation, and the way in which the government used the reference procedure in an attempt to shift responsibility for the issue to the Supreme Court of Canada. (Note: The Court's subsequent decision in the same-sex marriage reference is discussed by the author in \"Political Litigation and the Role of the Court\", also available on SSRN.)","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"265 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134544803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Mix between Pay-as-You-Go and Funded Pensions and What Demography Has to Do with it","authors":"B. V. Van Praag, P. Cardoso","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.385106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.385106","url":null,"abstract":"A model is presented that explains the mix between funded and unfunded pension systems. It turns out that total pension and the relative shares of the two systems may be explained and are determined by the population growth rate, technological growth, the time-preference discount rate, that relative risk aversion, the production function, and the political representation of the old. A fall in the population growth rate, even to negative values, will imply a reduction of the interest rate and an increase in the capital-output ratio. Whether the pension system will shift to more or less funding depends on the political weight of the elderly. If the elderly succeed in getting more weight in the political process if their population share increases, which is likely when the population shrinks, the accent on the PAYG- system will increase. A fall in the population growth rate will result in a reduction of average welfare. This reduction is more severe, the larger the political power of the elderly.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115715739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are Chads Democrats? An Analysis of the Florida Presidential Recount","authors":"M. Spiegel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.252330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.252330","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results from a statistical analysis of the first Florida recount. The findings indicate that it is highly unlikely that the relative increase in Gore's vote total can be explained by mechanical reading errors. Rather it appears partisan biases influenced the outcome. Estimates indicate that on average if a ballot's status changed from no vote to a vote, the chance that it went to Gore was about 15% higher than one would expect given his fraction of that county's vote. Overall then, controlling for each candidate's vote in a county and the type of ballot used, this paper estimates that Gore picked up 903 \"too many\" votes in the recount relative to what would have been expected by chance machine read errors. If humans influenced the results how did they do it? During the recount the ballots were put through the tabulating machines several times. However, machine readings tend to vary from run to run and this means humans, partisan humans, have to decide which of several tallies to report. Potentially, this discretion allowed the preferences of those conducting the recount to impact the reported totals.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"159 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133939470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Framework for Assessing Fiscal Vulnerability","authors":"R. Hemming, M. Petrie","doi":"10.5089/9781451847246.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451847246.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"Fiscal vulnerability describes a situation where a government is exposed to the possibility of failure to meet its aggregate fiscal policy objectives. The suggested framework for assessing vulnerability highlights four macro-fiscal aspects of vulnerability: incorrect specification of the initial fiscal position; sensitivity of short-term fiscal outcomes to risk; threats to longer-term fiscal sustainability; and structural or institutional weaknesses affecting the design and implementation of fiscal policy. Fiscal vulnerability indicators are suggested.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125853207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Efficiency of Education Expenditure in Portugal","authors":"Benedict Clements","doi":"10.5089/9781451859010.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451859010.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the efficiency of education expenditure in Portugal and delineates a possible agenda for reform. Portugal's low educational performance has coincided with the highest level of primary and secondary education expenditure to GDP in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), suggesting considerable inefficiency. Empirical results from the application of a nonparametric technique for production frontier estimation (Free Disposable Hull analysis) support this view. Among the reforms that could be considered to raise educational efficiency are the adoption of a goal-oriented management and incentive system; establishment of minimum student/teacher ratios; and an easing of employment and work rules governing public school teachers.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125152003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}