{"title":"U.S. Public Agricultural Research: Changes in Funding Sources and Shifts in Emphasis, 1980-2005","authors":"D. Schimmelpfennig, P. Heisey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1371213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1371213","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, proposals have recommended shifting the focus of public agricultural research from applied to basic research, and giving higher priority to peer-reviewed, competitively funded grants. The public agricultural research system in the United States is a Federal-State partnership, with most research conducted at State institutions. In recent years, State funds have declined, USDA funds have remained fairly steady (with changes in the composition of funding), but funding from other Federal agencies and the private sector has increased. Efforts to increase competitively awarded funds for research have fluctuated over time, as have special grants (earmarks). Along with shifts in funding sources, the proportion of basic research being undertaken within the public agricultural research system has declined. This report focuses on the way public agricultural research is funded in the United States and how changes in funding sources over the last 25 years reflect changes in the type of research pursued.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130294782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Proposal to Replace True and Fair View with Acceptable Risk of Material Misstatement","authors":"Wally J. Smieliauskas, R. Craig, J. Amernic","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00261.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6281.2008.00261.x","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines argumentation factors which affect the truth of an audit opinion. We propose that the auditor's report be revised to replace the words ‘true and fair view’ with ‘acceptable risk of material misstatement’. This would better align the communication of auditors with the characteristics of accounting information upon which they report. Adoption of the wording ‘acceptable risk of material misstatement’ will facilitate a better appreciation by users of financial statements of the accounting estimates in financial statements.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"30 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124653713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Welfare Improving Trade in Marginal Tax Rates","authors":"M. Dudek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1185577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1185577","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we extend the dimensionality of the standard income taxation problem. Specifically, we allow agents to purchase at a price, from the government, discounts on their marginal tax rates. Consequently agents have two decision variables: the level of income they choose to earn and the magnitude of discount they want to purchase at a given price. By rationally choosing to purchase discounts agents face lower effective marginal tax rates, which enhances efficiency. At the same time agents pay a price for the discounts, which can compensate for a shortfall in revenue resulting from lower e?ective marginal tax rates. We show, in the case of the CRRA utility function, that for any tax function it is always possible to construct the corresponding discount price function that leads to a strict Pareto improvement through trade in discounts and that ensures that revenue collected is unaffected when trade in discounts is permitted. In addition, we show that a fat tax or a piece-wise linear tax function are never optimal in the Mirrlees's sense. Similarly, we argue that trade in discounts can lead to a Pareto improvement over the allocation induced by any tax function, including Mirrlees's solutions, that has an existing inverse and is differentiable. We also show that the standard asymptotic result of zero marginal tax rate at the top of income distribution can be extended to an open set. It is shown in the dynamic context that no tax function can be optimal unless it is conditioned on the entire income history.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130064913","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cardinal Voting: The Way to Escape the Social Choice Impossibility","authors":"S. Vasiljev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1116545","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1116545","url":null,"abstract":"In the article it is called the universality of the ordinal theory of social choice in question. It is shown that a voting exists that cannot be described on the base of ordinal theory, and to describe it the cardinal point of view is demanded. In absence of cardinal formalization of basic axioms of the social choice theory it is offered new formal mathematical machinery. It is proved that cardinal voting can satisfy Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternative, unrestricted domain, and at the same time it can be nondictatorship in disproof of Arrow's impossibility theorem.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131412648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why do Cities Hoard Cash? Determinants and Implications of Municipal Cash Holdings","authors":"Angela K. Gore","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.913425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913425","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT: This study examines the determinants of municipal cash holdings and the implications of holding high levels of cash. The first part of the analysis investigates municipal manager incentives to accumulate cash as part of normal operations. Results indicate that municipalities with a higher variation in revenues, fewer sources of revenues, and higher growth accumulate more cash. Larger governments and those receiving relatively more state revenue accumulate less cash. Further analysis considers whether high levels of cash indicate agency problems, and finds municipalities with high cash holdings spend more on administrative expenses, city manager salaries, and bonuses. I find no evidence that municipalities with excess cash reduce taxes. The presence of staggered councils and councils that are not independent tend to exacerbate excessive cash holdings. These results are consistent with the proposition that municipalities with high cash levels have agency problems relative to those with lower cash ...","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133154491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Local Broadcasting in Extremis","authors":"W. Kenneth Ferree","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1124037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1124037","url":null,"abstract":"A piece of legislation recently introduced by Representatives Anna Eshoo (D-CA 14th) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI 2nd) that they call the \"Broadcast Licensing in the Public Interest Act\" (HR 4882), might deserve a better appellation as the \"Eradication of Broadcasting Act.\" At the heart of HR 4882 is a desire that broadcasters carry more of the content Representatives Eshoo and Baldwin favor: local public affairs programming and political coverage. In their view, the public interest is served by such programming and not by other fare that is more popular with viewers. The bill would also make broadcast license renewals conditioned on a showing of, among other things, a dedication to local news gathering [and] local production of programming. In actuality HR 4882 threatens to choke off the resources available for local broadcast service in medium and larger markets. By requiring broadcasters to ignore market demands and instead carry programming to meet political demands, HR 4882 would enervate local broadcasters and undermine the very thing it purports to promote - local broadcast service. The goal of re-energizing and revitalizing local commercial broadcast service, if it ever is to be realized, will come only when Congress removes the shackles that bind broadcasters' ability to respond to new competitive pressures.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129914917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Whose Airwaves are They Anyway?","authors":"W. Kenneth Ferree","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1124002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1124002","url":null,"abstract":"Whatever happened to: Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech? In the context of broadcasting, representatives Anna Eshoo (D-CA 14th) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI 2nd) are the latest to transgress, offering this year their \"Broadcast Licensing in the Public Interest Act\" (HR 4882). Congressional critics of broadcasting often begin their attacks by asserting that the airways belong to the public. The Eshoo/Baldwin bill is no exception. But one must ask why these selfsame critics deem themselves better qualified to determine how \"the public\" would like its airwaves used than are broadcasters whose livelihoods depend on their ability to deliver content with broad appeal. Broadcast licensees, after all, compete with an increasingly diverse variety of other media for a share of a highly fragmented market. As such they have an economic imperative to deliver that programming which will most interest \"the public.\" Broadcasters no more need the government to tell them what that programming is than Macy's needs bureaucratic direction on the styles of women's shoes to sell. Divining what the public wants carried on its airwaves is therefore no more difficult than switching on your television. If broadcasters really are to serve the public, they cannot be held hostage to the individual programming tastes of any one person or group of people - even if that group is known as Congress.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127330606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Tourism in the Caribbean Competitiveness, Upgrading, Linkages and the Role of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Public Policy","authors":"Bineswaree Bolaky","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1159120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1159120","url":null,"abstract":"The main purpose of this paper is to explore and analyze the contributions that public-private partnerships and public policy have made in the development of tourism in the Caribbean as tools for enhancing competitiveness in the Caribbean tourism industry. The paper explores these contributions mainly in the context of the upgrading strategies that Caribbean countries have pursued over the past 15 years or so and using the lens of the tourism value chain and tourism cluster approach. The paper also analyzes the potential roles that public-private partnerships and public policy will continue to play in the future especially in the process of building linkages between the tourism sector and other sectors in order to increase net benefits from tourism to the Region. This paper is divided into five sections. In Section I, we define public-private partnerships (PPP) and describe the areas in tourism where PPP are most widely used, the tools used to implement PPP in tourism and the various forms of PPP. Economic arguments are then laid to motivate PPP as a determinant of tourism competitiveness using the tourism value-chain and tourism cluster approach. Specific case examples illustrating the contributions of PPP and public policy towards increasing tourism competitiveness are provided at a regional level and for specific areas in Sections II and III respectively. Section IV summarizes findings from the previous two sections and discusses ways to enhance the effectiveness of PPP and public policy in Caribbean tourism for increased competitiveness. Section V analyzes a few of the challenges that the Caribbean tourism sector is facing. The final section proposes new areas of intervention for PPP and public policy as tools for enhancing competitiveness in the Caribbean tourism sector in order to assist the region in addressing these challenges.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133690139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Good Provision in Large Groups: Olson Was (Almost Always) Right!","authors":"Paul Pecorino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1016772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1016772","url":null,"abstract":"It is well established that the provision of a pure public good is increasing in group size if the good is normal. What I show is that if the good exhibits even a small degree of rivalry, then the individual level of consumption of the public good falls to 0 in a large group. Thus, a strong version of the Olson hypothesis applies to anything other than an pure public good. Technically, what is important is the nature of the public good as the group size grows large. If the good approaches a pure public good in the limit, we will not obtain a strong version of the Olson hypothesis, but if the commodity exhibits any degree of rivalry in the limit, then we do obtain a strong version of his hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125513229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can International Law Be a Law of Resistance? Ten Steps for a Renewal of International Normative Ambition (Le droit International peut-il etre un droit de resistance? Dix conditions pour un renouveau de l'ambition normative internationale)","authors":"F. Mégret","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1212542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1212542","url":null,"abstract":"International law has traditionally been above all a law aimed at reinforcing sovereignty and, secondarily, of taming it via the emergence of an international community. What is typically excluded from this encounter is a whole series of efforts undertaken by civil society, individuals, or social movements, even when those objectively reinforce international law's goals. International law as a normative project could gain significantly from a greater recognition of the striking role played by non-state actors in its implementation. A case can be made that if international law increasingly casts itself substantively as a law of human beings, then its modes of implementation should follow suit. The idea of resistance as a rehabilitation of the role human agency can provide the missing link. The article suggests ten preliminary conditions before such a utopia could take root.","PeriodicalId":413544,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130357846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}