Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal最新文献

A Unified Test for the European Ne Bis in Idem Principle: The Case Study of Digital Markets Regulation. 欧洲一事不再理原则的统一检验:数字市场监管案例研究。

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2021-10-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3951088

G. Colangelo, M. Cappai

引用次数: 4

Fake News, Personal Attacks, and Ideological Media Run Amok – It is Time for Fairness Doctrine 2.0 假新闻、人身攻击和意识形态媒体横行——是公平主义2.0的时候了

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2021-08-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3898941

M. Conrad

{"title":"Fake News, Personal Attacks, and Ideological Media Run Amok – It is Time for Fairness Doctrine 2.0","authors":"M. Conrad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3898941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898941","url":null,"abstract":"From 1949 to 1987, a regulation known as the “Fairness Doctrine” required radio and television stations to offer response time to those attacked by a broadcast editorial or commentary and required radio and television stations to offer differing views of issues of public concern. The Supreme Court upheld this rule against a First Amendment challenge, noting that the unique aspects of broadcasters justified this requirement. Ultimately, the rule was rescinded by the Federal Communications Commission on the ground that it was no longer needed because the growth of broadcasters rendered it outdated. The FCC determination also questioned its constitutionality. In more recent years, the expansion and influence of talk radio and cable news commentators coupled with the election of Donald Trump as president created a more toxic political environment with certain commentators employing distortions and even lies in their broadcasts and cablecasts. This paper advocates a return of the Fairness Doctrine, crafted to include cable television and streamed broadcasts deriving from cable as an effective way to allow opposing viewpoints for audiences that are effectively limited from access to those views because of the of ideological bent of the radio stations and cable services they watch. The article will demonstrate that a resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine is important for the future of the electorate and would be constitutionally valid.","PeriodicalId":412044,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133363176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Data Privacy Issues in West Virginia and Beyond: A Comprehensive Overview 西弗吉尼亚州及其他地区的数据隐私问题:全面概述

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2021-06-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3873301

Jena Martin

引用次数: 0

Digital Platforms and the New 19a Tool in the German Competition Act 数字平台和德国竞争法中的新工具

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2021-05-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3838759

J. Franck, M. Peitz

引用次数: 8

Transparency 透明度

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2021-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2402389

Robin C. Feldman

{"title":"Transparency","authors":"Robin C. Feldman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2402389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2402389","url":null,"abstract":"The United States patent regime is a quintessential notice system. Implicit in its design is the concept that one attempting to license a patent can identify those who hold the requisite rights and the territory that the patent holders claim as their own. As the system has evolved, however, it bears little resemblance to the idealized form. Little scholarship has addressed problems related to notice within the modern patent system, largely because these problems have sprung up so recently. In the last five to seven years, an entire Hobbit’s world has been created under the foliage. Moreover, historic scholarly discussions of notice generally have focused on the role of governmental actors in ensuring that a patent can be properly understood and interpreted. In contrast, this article argues that market information is a critical element of the notice function of patents. One can think of the mechanisms for providing that market information as “Transparency.” To address transparency insufficiencies, one need not write on a blank slate. Rather, this article suggests borrowing from the substantial body of well-developed doctrine and literature concerning disclosure in the realm of corporate securities and explores how these doctrines could be molded to patent concerns. The patent asset is imbued with public interest by virtue of the fact that it is a government grant, bestowed for constitutional purposes. As with the trading of public securities, the trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that trading market.","PeriodicalId":412044,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122147210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

A Legal Analysis of the Amendments to the Sixth Edition of the Nigeria Broacasting Code 尼日利亚广播法第六版修正案的法律分析

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2020-08-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3901868

Abdulrasheed Ijaodola, Israel Olawunmi

{"title":"A Legal Analysis of the Amendments to the Sixth Edition of the Nigeria Broacasting Code","authors":"Abdulrasheed Ijaodola, Israel Olawunmi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3901868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3901868","url":null,"abstract":"The National Broadcasting Commission (the “NBC”) is an agency of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, established by Section 1 of the National Broadcasting Commission Act, CAP NII, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (the “Act”). The NBC is saddled with the responsibilities of, inter alia, regulating and controlling the broadcasting industry in Nigeria. The NBC is vested with the power to establish and disseminate a National Broadcasting Code (the “Code”) pursuant to Section 2(h) of the Act. The Code is aimed at setting standards as regards the content and quality of materials for broadcast in Nigeria. In exercise of this power, the NBC published the 6th edition of the Code in 2019. On 26th March 2020, following the recommendations of the Committee on the reforms of the NBC and the approval given by President Muhammad Buhari, the NBC issued amendments (the “Amendments”) to the Code. Notwithstanding the seeming nobility of the intendment of the Amendments, some of its provisions have been arduously criticized by stakeholders in the broadcasting sector. Criticisms ranging from encroachment on the freedom of parties’ right to enter into contracts; restriction of licensees of the NBC and broadcasters largely; the exclusivity over their content; intellectual property rights; stifling of the works of creatives and so on. This article seeks to examine the Amendments, its objectives and the legal issues which may arise from enforcement of certain amendments to the Code, especially as it affects the Pay-Tv and movie industry in Nigeria, and other attendant issues.","PeriodicalId":412044,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129177569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Policy on Rapid Network Deployment 网络快速部署策略

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2020-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3667588

E. Sutherland

引用次数: 0

Platforms as Regulators 平台作为监管者

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2020-07-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3665007

N. Dunne

引用次数: 3

Competition in Colombian Telecommunications 哥伦比亚电信业的竞争

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2020-05-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3178352

J. Sidak

{"title":"Competition in Colombian Telecommunications","authors":"J. Sidak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3178352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178352","url":null,"abstract":"In November of 2015, the Colombian think tank Fedesarrollo published its report “Update on the Study of Competition in the Mobile Telephony Market in Colombia,” which purports to reveal a lack of competition in Colombian telecommunications. Fedesarrollo’s report also offers policy recommendations to remedy the supposed problems with competition in Colombian telecommunications that it identifies. However, Fedesarrollo’s simplistic empirical analysis is fundamentally flawed and uninformative. Moreover, the policy recommendations that the report’s sponsors — telecommunications operators Telefónica and Tigo — offer in the report and elsewhere would harm Colombian consumers. In this article, I evaluate the market for mobile voice services in Colombia, analyze Telefónica’s and Tigo’s policy recommendations, and critique Fedesarrollo’s empirical analysis. I conclude that there is no evidence of consumer-welfare loss in Colombian mobile markets. On the contrary, my empirical analysis of mobile voice services in Colombia using benchmark prices reveals consumer-welfare gains. Moreover, the policies that Telefónica and Tigo recommend — increased asymmetric regulations and restrictions on the offerings of their primary competitor, Claro Colombia — would harm consumers and competition in the markets for mobile voice and data services in Colombia, with a disproportionate share of that harm falling on Colombia’s poorest consumers. Those policies would shield Telefónica and Tigo from competition, which would increase prices in the short run and discourage investment and long-run growth. Telefónica’s and Tigo’s recommendation to delay new spectrum auctions could cost Colombian consumers billions of pesos in lost consumer surplus. Instead, Colombia should promote infrastructure-based competition, implement a symmetric regulatory regime, and hold open spectrum auctions without restriction or delay to encourage dynamic competition without any offsetting harm to static competition. Those policy initiatives will ensure that the markets for mobile services in Colombia remain competitive in both the short run and the long run.","PeriodicalId":412044,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124726146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Competition in Telecom Sector: The Jurisdictional Tussle between Competition Commission of India and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 电信行业的竞争:印度竞争委员会与印度电信监管机构的管辖权之争

Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal Pub Date : 2020-03-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3570496

Keyur Tripathi

{"title":"Competition in Telecom Sector: The Jurisdictional Tussle between Competition Commission of India and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India","authors":"Keyur Tripathi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3570496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3570496","url":null,"abstract":"From enjoying natural monopolies to witnessing tough competition for services, the telecom sector in India has come a long way. It is now characterized by one of the fastest-growing sectors of deploying the latest technology and driving the economic growth in India. With the rapid intervention of innovation and competition redefining the sector dynamics, there are new emerging challenges that force the telecom and competition authorities to rethink their role and function and adopt a collaborative approach in deciding intersecting issues. \u0000 \u0000In 2017, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL), a new entrant in the telecommunications market approached Competition Commission of India (CCI) against the incumbents for forming a cartel to deny market entry. Prior to that, it approached the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) against the incumbents for denying adequate points of interconnection. CCI passed an order in favour of the informant, which was challenged in the Bombay High Court and later appeared in the Supreme Court of India. The case that breathed fresh air at every level of Court in the country is a landmark decision in settling the role of CCI with respect to telecom sectoral regulators, particularly in issues that simultaneously fall within the jurisdiction of both the bodies. \u0000 \u0000The objectives of both legislation, when reading together, intend to create an environment that may facilitate fair competition. In fulfilling the concerned objective, the jurisdiction of TRAI and the CCI overlap. Although the watchdogs (CCI and TRAI) share a common goal, they differ in their mandate and approach. The difference in the approach adopted by the CCI and TRAI towards a similar objective leads to cases of jurisdictional conflicts. The Researcher aims to analyze the decision of the Supreme Court of India in terms of its far-reaching effects on CCI while touching base on developments in the case at every level of proceedings through the lens of optimal regulation and competition.","PeriodicalId":412044,"journal":{"name":"Telecommunications & Regulated Industries eJournal","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121569787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1