透明度

Robin C. Feldman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

美国专利制度是一个典型的通知制度。它的设计隐含着这样一个概念,即试图授权一项专利的人可以识别那些拥有必要权利的人,以及专利持有人声称属于自己的领域。然而,随着系统的发展,它与理想的形式几乎没有相似之处。很少有学术研究涉及现代专利制度中与通知相关的问题,很大程度上是因为这些问题是最近才出现的。在过去的五到七年里,整个霍比特人的世界在树叶下被创造出来。此外,历史上关于通知的学术讨论通常集中在政府行为者在确保专利可以被正确理解和解释方面的作用。与此相反,本文认为市场信息是专利通知功能的关键要素。人们可以把提供市场信息的机制看作是“透明度”。为了解决透明度不足的问题,人们不需要在一张白纸上写字。相反,本文建议借鉴有关公司证券领域披露的大量完善的原则和文献,并探讨如何将这些原则塑造为专利问题。专利资产充满了公共利益,因为它是一项政府拨款,是出于宪法目的而授予的。与公共证券交易一样,必须对涉及公共利益的资产的交易进行充分监管,以确保该交易市场的正常运作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Transparency
The United States patent regime is a quintessential notice system. Implicit in its design is the concept that one attempting to license a patent can identify those who hold the requisite rights and the territory that the patent holders claim as their own. As the system has evolved, however, it bears little resemblance to the idealized form. Little scholarship has addressed problems related to notice within the modern patent system, largely because these problems have sprung up so recently. In the last five to seven years, an entire Hobbit’s world has been created under the foliage. Moreover, historic scholarly discussions of notice generally have focused on the role of governmental actors in ensuring that a patent can be properly understood and interpreted. In contrast, this article argues that market information is a critical element of the notice function of patents. One can think of the mechanisms for providing that market information as “Transparency.” To address transparency insufficiencies, one need not write on a blank slate. Rather, this article suggests borrowing from the substantial body of well-developed doctrine and literature concerning disclosure in the realm of corporate securities and explores how these doctrines could be molded to patent concerns. The patent asset is imbued with public interest by virtue of the fact that it is a government grant, bestowed for constitutional purposes. As with the trading of public securities, the trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that trading market.
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