{"title":"Banking Crises and Transparency","authors":"Erlend W. Nier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567052","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses empirically the effect of disclosure on bank stability. In doing so it offers a new approach for assessing the marginal effect of structural factors on the likelihood of crises that involves panel-data techniques applied to bank-level data. Our dataset covers more than 500 banks in 32 different countries over the years 1994-2000. Using this dataset we assess the likelihood of a bank experiencing a dramatic fall in its stock price in any given year and relate the likelihood of such a bank crisis for any particular bank and in any particular year to both the existence of a deposit insurance scheme and to bank transparency, while controlling for macro- as well as bank-level factors that might also play a role in affecting the likelihood of such an event. We find evidence that bank transparency reduces the likelihood of bank crises, while the effect of deposit insurance depends on the particular design features of the regime. All errors or omissions are those of the author. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of England.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116851192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Benefits and Costs of Having Bank and Trade Credit Simultaneously","authors":"Jochen Bigus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567043","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides a rationale for the question whether to have bank debt only or bank and trade credit simultaneously. In the two creditors case a special incentive problem might occur prior to bankruptcy if the bank loan is secured by external collateral. In order to save her private fortune, the entrepreneur may be tempted to repay the bank by liquidating the firm's assets before bank debt becomes due. Even the bank might benefit. The unsecured supplier will lose. With pure bank financing - thus, paying the supplier via the bank account - the problem does not occur. However, then the supplier may have poor incentives to provide nonverifiable services later on. Collateral and short-term dates of payments mitigate the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129213415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are 'Market Neutral' Hedge Funds Really Market Neutral?","authors":"Andrew J. Patton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.557096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.557096","url":null,"abstract":"One can consider the concept of market neutrality as having \"breadth\" and \"depth\": \"Breadth\" reflects the number of market risks to which the hedge fund is neutral, while \"depth\" reflects the \"completeness\" of the neutrality of the fund to market risks. We focus on market neutrality depth, and propose five different neutrality concepts for hedge funds. \"Mean neutrality\" nests the standard correlation-based defnition of neutrality. \"Variance neutrality\", \"Value-at-Risk neutrality\" and \"tail neutrality\" all relate to the neutrality of the risk of the hedge fund to market risks. Finally, \"complete neutrality\" corresponds to independence of the fund to market risks. We suggest statistical tests for each neutrality concept, and apply the tests to a combined database of monthly \"market neutral\" hedge fund returns from the HFR and TASS hedge fund databases. We find that between one-quarter and one-third of these funds exhibit some significant exposure to market risk.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115655275","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Term Structure Estimation in Low-Frequency Transaction Markets: A Kalman Filter Approach with Incomplete Panel-Data","authors":"G. Cortazar, Eduardo S. Schwartz, Lorenzo Naranjo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567090","url":null,"abstract":"There are two issues that are of central importance in term structure analysis. One is the modeling and estimation of the current term structure of spot rates. The second is the modeling and estimation of the dynamics of the term structure. These two issues have been addressed independently in the literature. The methods that have been proposed assume a sufficiently complete price data set and are generally implemented separately. However, when the methods are applied to markets with sparse bond price, results are unsatisfactory. We develop a method for jointly estimating the current term structure and its dynamics for markets with low-frequency transactions. We propose solving both issues by using a dynamic term structure model estimated from incomplete panel data. To achieve this, we modify the standard Kalman filter approach to deal with the missing-observation problem. In this way, we can use historic price data in a dynamic model to estimate the current term structure. With this approach we are able to obtain an estimate of the current term structure even for days with an arbitrary low number of price observations. The proposed methodology can be applied to a broad class of continuous-time term-structure models with any number of stochastic factors. To show the implementation of the approach, we estimate a three-factor generalized-Vasicek model using Chilean government bond price data. The approach, however, may be used in any market with low-frequency transactions, a common characteristic of many emerging markets.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125936369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Financial Crises Indeed 'Crises?' Evidence from the Emerging Adr Market","authors":"P. Pasquariello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.557093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.557093","url":null,"abstract":"The recent episodes of financial turmoil in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina are often dubbed financial crises. However, the severe downturns in equity markets, abrupt currency devaluations, and massive capital flight that characterize these events can still be deemed compatible with efficient and functioning financial markets. Thus, why is a financial crisis a \"crisis?\" To answer this question, we conduct an empirical investigation of the efficiency and pricing of the emerging ADR market. More specifically, using a non-parametric technique, we test for regime shifts in two basic structural relationships for ADR returns in 20 emerging countries, identified via arbitrage and capital mobility considerations. We find that \"normal\" market conditions were violated in proximity of financial crises: The law of one price often ceased to hold, and domestic sources of risk became more important for many depositary receipts in our sample. We also find that some popular explanations for the occurrence of financial crises in emerging economies, in particular uncertainty among investors, exchange rate volatility, economic integration, and liquidity (but not financial integration, currency devaluations, or capital flight) made their equity markets less efficient as well. Based on this evidence, we can state with greater confidence that those episodes of financial turmoil were indeed \"crises.\"","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129484082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Harald Benink, J. Gordillo, Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, Christopher R. Stephens
{"title":"A Study of Neo-Austrian Economics Using an Artificial Stock Market","authors":"Harald Benink, J. Gordillo, Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra, Christopher R. Stephens","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567125","url":null,"abstract":"An agent-based artificial financial market (AFM) is used to study market efficiency and learning in the context of the Neo-Austrian economic paradigm. Efficiency is defined in terms of the 'excess' profits associated with different trading strategies, where excess for an active trading strategy is defined relative to a dynamic buy and hold benchmark. We define an Inefficiency matrix that takes into account the difference in excess profits of one trading strategy versus another ('signal') relative to the standard error of those profits ('noise') and use this statistical measure to gauge the degree of market efficiency. A one-parameter family of trading strategies is considered, the value of the parameter measuring the relative 'informational' advantage of one strategy versus another. Efficiency is then investigated in terms of the composition of the market defined in terms of the relative proportions of traders using a particular strategy and the parameter values associated with the strategies. We show that markets are more efficient when informational advantages are small (small signal) and when there are many coexisting signals. Learning is introduced by considering 'copycat' traders that learn the relative values of the different strategies in the market and copy the most successful one. We show how such learning leads to a more informationally efficient market but can also lead to a less efficient market as measured in terms of excess profits. It is also shown how the presence of exogeneous information shocks that change trader expectations increases efficiency and complicates the inference problem of copycats.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117203797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Loss Functions in Option Valuation: A Framework for Model Selection","authors":"D. Bams, T. Lehnert, Christian C. P. Wolff","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.567092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.567092","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we investigate the importance of different loss functions when estimating and evaluating option pricing models. Our analysis shows that it is important to take into account parameter uncertainty, since this leads to uncertainty in the predicted option price. We illustrate the effect on the out-of-sample pricing errors in an application of the ad-hoc Black-Scholes model to DAX index options. Our empirical results suggest that different loss functions lead to uncertainty about the pricing error itself. At the same time, it provides a first yardstick to evaluate the adequacy of the loss function. This is accomplished through a data-driven method to deliver not just a point estimate of the pricing error, but a confidence interval.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"152 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129416161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dynamic Hedging Incentives, Debt, and Warrants","authors":"C. Hennessy, Yuri Tserlukevich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.559409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.559409","url":null,"abstract":"In a static setting, Green (1984) shows that a warrant contract can eliminate the asset substitution problem created by debt. In contrast, we show that when the firm chooses volatility dynamically, no warrant can eliminate asset substitution, as equity is always risk-loving when the firm is near default. The hedging incentive produced by a warrant is weakest when the option is out of the money, precisely when the speculative incentive due to limited liability is strongest. Although warrants mitigate dynamic asset substitution, we show that they exacerbate the agency problem of premature default (underinvestment). Indeed, unless a firm has sufficient volatility discretion, the costs of premature default dominate. For firms with sufficient volatility discretion, where warrants potentially increase value, they do so only if they grant large equity stakes. The optimal warrant contract entails \"maximum deterrence,\" fully diluting existing shareholders upon conversion.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116365879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Many Facets of Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases","authors":"U. Peyer, Theo Vermaelen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.472200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.472200","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate the causes and consequences of 737 privately negotiated share repurchases in the years 1984-2001. In contrast to the negative announcement returns and positive repurchase premiums reported by past research, we find positive announcement returns and premiums that are not significantly different from zero. Only when we investigate the 60 \"greenmail\" events separately, we find results similar to past research. However, for this sub-sample, we find long-horizon excess return that are comparable to the average 18% repurchase premium, challenging the widely accepted opinion that managers overpay in \"greenmail\" repurchases. Moreover, we also find that our understanding of the event improves when we split the non-greenmail repurchases according to the price paid. Repurchases at a premium can be modeled as signals, while other repurchases are mere wealth transfers between the corporation and the selling stockholders the extent of which is determined by the relative bargaining power of the seller and the repurchasing firm.","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122505060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say?","authors":"Ilya A. Strebulaev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.556697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.556697","url":null,"abstract":"In the presence of frictions, firms adjust their capital structure infrequently. As a consequence, in a dynamic economy the leverage of most firms is likely to differ from the “optimum” leverage at the time of readjustment. This paper explores the empirical implications of this observation. I use a calibrated dynamic trade‐off model to simulate firms' capital structure paths. The results of standard cross‐sectional tests on these data are consistent with those reported in the empirical literature. In particular, the standard interpretation of some test results leads to the rejection of the underlying model. Taken together, the results suggest a rethinking of the way capital structure tests are conducted. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)","PeriodicalId":411978,"journal":{"name":"EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings (Archive)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127466234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}