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Analisis Filosofico最新文献

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Problema de la adopción: ¿un problema para un pluralismo respecto de la negación lógica? 收养问题:关于逻辑否定的多元主义问题?
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.446
Eliana Franceschini
{"title":"Problema de la adopción: ¿un problema para un pluralismo respecto de la negación lógica?","authors":"Eliana Franceschini","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.446","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.446","url":null,"abstract":"Partiendo de una serie de tesis respecto del significado de la negación lógica, se ofrece una reflexión acerca de la relación entre el pluralismo lógico y el estatus de ciertos principios lógicos fundamentales. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que el Problema de la Adopción, tal como se encuentra formulado por Kripke-Padró, no representa un conflicto para una visión antiexcepcionalista de la lógica. Las leyes lógicas no poseen un status privilegiado, independientemente de que existan algunas que no podemos adoptar, porque sí podemos decidir abandonar principios lógicos y es abandonando reglas y no adoptándolas como se revisa una teoría lógica; en consecuencia es aceptable un tipo de pluralismo lógico que parta de considerar que más de un conjunto de principios capturan de manera adecuada el significado de la negación.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41955492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Adopción, presuposición lógica y práctica inferencial 采用、逻辑假设和推理实践
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.689
Bruno Muntaabski
{"title":"Adopción, presuposición lógica y práctica inferencial","authors":"Bruno Muntaabski","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.689","url":null,"abstract":"El problema de la adopción, desarrollado por Kripke (2021) y elaborado por Padró  (2015, 2021), ha generado considerable debate en la filosofía del lenguaje y de la lógica  debido a sus consecuencias para las teorías de la racionalidad y la naturaleza de los principios lógicos. Se ha propuesto que existe una íntima relación entre este problema  y el tipo de argumento de inconsistencia metarreferencial dirigido contra la defensa  monista de una lógica no clásica. Esto ha llevado a pensar que la postura de Kripke  contra la adopción de una lógica implica una crítica al monismo lógico no clásico. El presente trabajo evalúa las dificultades de interpretar de este modo el problema  de la adopción, en la forma en que ha sido presentado por Barrio, Fiore y Pailos (2021). Se busca argumentar que esta interpretación ignora elementos clave tanto del argumento como de la conclusión de Kripke. Se avanza una lectura alternativa al  problema, y se argumenta que reviste ventajas interpretativas y filosóficas. Se espera con esto aportar a la comprensión del complejo problema kripkeano, así como a su  relación con las discusiones contemporáneas en torno al monismo lógico. ","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47353187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Punishment, Consent, Value and Respect: 惩罚、同意、价值和尊重：
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.416
M. Parmigiani
{"title":"Punishment, Consent, Value and Respect:","authors":"M. Parmigiani","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.416","url":null,"abstract":"The present paper constitutes a critique of David Alm’s article “Punishment, Consent and Value”, in which it is argued that the consensual theory of punishment defended by C. S. Nino is false. Whilst Alm believes that this theory is grounded on an inadequate model of normative relations, here I will defend the hypothesis that such an assessment derives from an insufficient conception of human value and respect.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41392279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism 论收养问题与元逻辑一元论
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.407
Mauro Santelli, Joaquín Toranzo Calderón, Jonathan Erenfryd
{"title":"On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism","authors":"Mauro Santelli, Joaquín Toranzo Calderón, Jonathan Erenfryd","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.407","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Adoption Problem (AP) certain basic logical principles cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn presents an argument against logical pluralism: Modus Ponens (MP) and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure shared by every logical rule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every meta-logic for any logical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to logical pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a “meta-logical monism”. We find a tension in the dual role that the “unadoptable rules” must play in Finn’s “meta-logical monism” rendering it ineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. Consequently, we argue they cannot be both analogues of MP and UI and inferentially productive. We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a more satisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43955772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
La justificación de los principios lógicos y el “problema de la adopción” 逻辑原则的论证与“收养问题”
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.410
Javier Castro Albano
{"title":"La justificación de los principios lógicos y el “problema de la adopción”","authors":"Javier Castro Albano","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.410","url":null,"abstract":"Saul Kripke cuestionó el enfoque de la justificación de la lógica provisto por el modelo de Quine de la red de creencias sobre la base de un resultado que Romina Padró llamó “Problema de la adopción”. Sugiero una solución al problema de la adopción y una defensa de la estrategia quineana para la justificación de la lógica.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47348449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
El problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas 采用逻辑规则的问题
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.542
Romina Padró, E. Barrio
{"title":"El problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas","authors":"Romina Padró, E. Barrio","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.542","url":null,"abstract":"¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferencia constituye un desafío para todo aquel que proponga que podemos seguir nuevos patrones inferenciales a partir del reconocimiento de reglas. En esta sección temática se exploran diversos asuntos conectados a si podemos seguir un nuevo patrón inferencial en virtud de una regla.   ","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41417636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Aplicación y adopción de reglas lógicas 逻辑规则的应用和采用
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.401
Camila Gallovich
{"title":"Aplicación y adopción de reglas lógicas","authors":"Camila Gallovich","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.401","url":null,"abstract":"El excepcionalismo de la lógica asume que la lógica tiene un estatus epistemológico privilegiado, es normativa y no es revisable. El antiexcepcionalismo, en cambio, rechaza ese carácter excepcional. Recientemente, se ha sugerido que el problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas es transversal a la discusión que se da entre excepcionalistas y antiexcepcionalistas. En este trabajo defiendo la tesis contraria. En particular, sostengo que, si el problema de la adopción de reglas es un problema central para la lógica como disciplina, el antiexcepcionalismo debe ser incorrecto. En caso contrario, debe ser incorrecta la postura excepcionalista. Evalúo, además, consecuencias directas del análisis presente sobre la discusión en torno al monismo y el pluralismo de la lógica.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49035176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What the Adoption Problem Does Not Show 收养问题没有表现出什么
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.402
Camillo Fiore
{"title":"What the Adoption Problem Does Not Show","authors":"Camillo Fiore","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.402","url":null,"abstract":"Saul Kripke proposed a skeptical challenge that Romina Padró defended and popularized by the name of the Adoption Problem. The challenge is that, given a certain definition of adoption, there are some logical principles that cannot be adopted—paradigmatic cases being Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens. Kripke has used the Adoption Problem to argue that there is an important sense in which logic is not revisable. In this essay, I defend two independent claims. First, that the Adoption Problem does not entail that logic is never revisable in the sense that Kripke addresses. Second, that, to assess whether an agent can revise their logic in the sense that Kripke addresses, it is best to consider a different definition of adoption, according to which Universal Instantiation and Modus Ponens are sometimes adoptable.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41998530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Bilateralism and Probabilism 双边主义和概率主义
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.387
Mariela Rubin
{"title":"Bilateralism and Probabilism","authors":"Mariela Rubin","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.387","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical interpretation of bilateralism in terms of probabilism. In particular, to interpret the main concepts of bilateralism –acceptance, rejection and incoherence– in terms of the probabilistic notions of degree of belief and coherence. According to bilateralism, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by the acceptance and rejection conditions of the sentences in which they are involved, where acceptance and rejection cannot be reduced to one another. I will focus on a variant of bilateralism that understands logical consequence as the statement that it is incoherent to accept all the premises of a valid argument while rejecting all its conclusions. On the other hand, probabilism states that it is possible to interpret our degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. The aim of this work is then to interpret the concept of incoherence in terms of probability functions and determine when it is coherent to accept or to reject a proposition according to some threshold defined in terms of degrees of belief. To achieve this goal, we need both an interpretation of the concept of incoherence coined by the bilateralists as well as an interpretation of acceptance and rejection. I will show that a good interpretation of coherence in probabilistic terms can already be found in the literature. Then, I will give an interpretation of acceptance and rejection in terms of degrees of belief. In particular, I will show that it is possible to interpret these concepts in accordance with Locke’s thesis, the thesis that states that there is some threshold r such that if you believe some sentence in degree equal or higher than r you should accept it, without falling into epistemic paradoxes.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49218233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Pidiendo un Harry en su contexto 在你的背景下请求哈利
IF 0.3
Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.2022.398
Miguel Álvarez Lisboa, Carlo Apablaza Ávila
{"title":"Pidiendo un Harry en su contexto","authors":"Miguel Álvarez Lisboa, Carlo Apablaza Ávila","doi":"10.36446/af.2022.398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2022.398","url":null,"abstract":"El Problema de la Adopción afirma que ciertas leyes lógicas no pueden ser adoptadas. El argumento constituye un desafío al antiexcepcionalismo lógico, en la medida en que este último debe poder justificar su afirmación de que la(s) teoría(s) lógica(s) en ejercicio puede(n) revisarse. El propósito de este artículo es responder al desafío, utilizando como unidad de análisis el concepto de Taxonomía Lexical propuesto por Kuhn. Como mostraremos, una visión sociológicamente enriquecida de las teorías científicas y la naturaleza de sus cambios permite dar cuenta de un antiexcepcionalismo lógico que evita el Problema de la Adopción.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41522962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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