Pension Risk Management eJournal最新文献

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Equilibrium Strategies in a Defined Benefit Pension Plan Game 固定收益养老金计划博弈中的均衡策略
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-10-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2852349
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida, J. P. Rincón-Zapatero
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引用次数: 10
Cooperative Investment in Incomplete Markets Under Financial Fairness 金融公平条件下不完全市场中的合作投资
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2460649
J. Pazdera, J. Schumacher, B. Werker
{"title":"Cooperative Investment in Incomplete Markets Under Financial Fairness","authors":"J. Pazdera, J. Schumacher, B. Werker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2460649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2460649","url":null,"abstract":"Groups of agents, such as participants in a collective pension fund, can decide to undertake a joint investment and to define, ex ante, a rule for the division of proceeds. The collective investment decision and the allocation rule together form a risk sharing scheme. Such a scheme defines a contingent claim for each participant. Given a proposed risk sharing scheme and an agreed-upon pricing functional, the values of these claims can be determined and can be compared to the values of the contributions made by the agents. A risk sharing scheme is said to be financially fair if, for each agent, the value of the agent’s claim as defined by the scheme is equal to the value of the agent’s contribution. The paper provides conditions under which there exists a unique risk sharing scheme that is both Pareto efficient (in the sense of expected utility) and financially fair. Furthermore, an iterative algorithm is presented by which this scheme can be computed. The theory is illustrated by a simple example which shows that, in an incomplete financial market, agents may benefit substantially from forming a collective.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115611430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
What Does Consistent Participation in 401(k) Plans Generate? Changes in 401(k) Plan Account Balances, 2010-2014 持续参与401(k)计划会产生什么?2010-2014年401(k)计划账户余额的变化
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-09-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3251547
Jack L. VanDerhei, S. Holden, Luis Alonso, S. Bass
{"title":"What Does Consistent Participation in 401(k) Plans Generate? Changes in 401(k) Plan Account Balances, 2010-2014","authors":"Jack L. VanDerhei, S. Holden, Luis Alonso, S. Bass","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3251547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251547","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an annual update of the longitudinal analysis of 401(k) plan participants drawn from the EBRI/ICI 401(k) database -- the largest participant-level database of its kind -- with about 24.9 million 401(k) participants at year-end 2014. Because the annual cross sections cover participants with a wide range of participation experience in 401(k) plans, meaningful analysis of the potential for 401(k) participants to accumulate retirement assets must examine the 401(k) plan accounts of participants who maintained accounts over all of the years being studied (“consistent participants”). The main body of the paper focuses on consistent participants for the 2010-2014 period, while the appendix addresses the 2007-2014 period. The average 401(k) plan account balance for consistent participants rose each year from 2010 through year-end 2014. Overall, the average account balance increased at a compound annual average growth rate of 17.3 percent from 2010 to 2014, to $138,553 at year-end 2014. The median (mid-point) 401(k) plan account balance for consistent participants increased at a compound annual average growth rate of 19.7 percent over the period, to $56,653 at year-end 2014. At year-end 2014, the average account balance among consistent participants was almost twice the average account balance among all participants in the EBRI/ICI 401(k) database. The consistent group’s median balance was more than three times the median balance across all participants at year-end 2014. Three primary factors affect account balances: contributions, withdrawal and loan activity, and investment returns. The percent change in average account balance of participants in their 20s was heavily influenced by the relative size of their contributions to their account balances and increased at a compound average growth rate of 44.1 percent per year between year-end 2010 and year-end 2014. The asset allocation of the 8.8 million 401(k) plan participants in the consistent group was broadly similar to the asset allocation of the 24.9 million participants in the entire year-end 2014 EBRI/ICI 401(k) database. On average at year-end 2014, about two-thirds of 401(k) participants’ assets were invested in equities, either through equity funds, the equity portion of target-date funds, the equity portion of non-target-date balanced funds, or company stock. Younger 401(k) participants tend to have higher concentrations in equities than older 401(k) participants.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117173268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
A Penny Saved is a Penny Earned: Less Expensive Zero Coupon Bonds 省一分钱就是赚一分钱:更便宜的零息债券
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2824564
Alessandro Gnoatto, M. Grasselli, E. Platen
{"title":"A Penny Saved is a Penny Earned: Less Expensive Zero Coupon Bonds","authors":"Alessandro Gnoatto, M. Grasselli, E. Platen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2824564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2824564","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a more general modeling world than available under the classical no-arbitrage paradigm in finance. New research questions and interesting related econometric studies emerge naturally. To explain in this paper the new approach and illustrate first important consequences, we show how to hedge a zero coupon bond with a smaller amount of initial capital than required by the classical risk neutral paradigm, whose (trivial) hedging strategy does not suggest to invest in the risky assets. Long dated zero coupon bonds we derive, invest first primarily in risky securities and when approaching more and more the maturity date they increase also more and more the fraction invested in fixed income. The conventional wisdom of financial planners suggesting investor to invest in risky securities when they are young and mostly in fixed income when they approach retirement, is here made rigorous. The main reason for the existence of less expensive zero coupon bonds is the strict supermartingale property of benchmarked savings accounts under the real world probability measure, which the calibrated parameters identify under the proposed model. We provide intuition and insight on the strict supermartingale property. The less expensive zero coupon bonds provide only one first example that is indicative for the changes that the new approach offers in the much wider modeling world. The paper provides a strong warning for life insurers, pension fund managers and long term investors to take the possibility of less expensive products seriously to avoid the adverse consequences of the low interest rate regimes that many developed economies face.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117283653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Super Behaviour: A Note on Young Australian Adults’ Engagement with their Superannuation Accounts 超级行为:关于澳大利亚年轻人参与他们的退休金账户的说明
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-10 DOI: 10.14453/AABFJ.V10I4.5
M. Anderson, M. Clark, I. Ramsay, C. Shekhar
{"title":"Super Behaviour: A Note on Young Australian Adults’ Engagement with their Superannuation Accounts","authors":"M. Anderson, M. Clark, I. Ramsay, C. Shekhar","doi":"10.14453/AABFJ.V10I4.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14453/AABFJ.V10I4.5","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the behaviour and attitudes towards superannuation of 25-34 year old Australians. Our results suggest that they are generally uninterested in their superannuation accounts. They seldom read the information provided by their funds, rarely change their fund, and a majority of them do not make voluntary contributions. Overall the results suggest significant lack of interest in, and engagement and concern with issues related to their retirement planning.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123265620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
401(K) Plans: DOL Could Take Steps to Improve Retirement Income Options for Plan Participants 401(K)计划:劳工部可以采取措施改善计划参与者的退休收入选择
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-08-09 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2855726
Charles A. Jeszeck, Tamara Cross, Ted Leslie, Tom Moscovitch, David Lin
{"title":"401(K) Plans: DOL Could Take Steps to Improve Retirement Income Options for Plan Participants","authors":"Charles A. Jeszeck, Tamara Cross, Ted Leslie, Tom Moscovitch, David Lin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2855726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2855726","url":null,"abstract":"What GAO Found: Workers relying in large part on their 401(k) plan in retirement may not always have a feasible way to make their savings last throughout retirement. Responses to GAO’s non-generalizable questionnaire from 11 401(k) plan record keepers — entities that manage participant account data and transactions for plans — showed that most plans covered by the questionnaire had not adopted products and services that could help participants turn their savings into a retirement income stream (referred to as lifetime income options in this report). Responses to the questionnaire represented more than 40 percent of all 401(k) assets and about a quarter of plans at the end of 2014. GAO found that of the plans covered by the questionnaire, about two-thirds did not offer a withdrawal option — payments from accounts, sometimes designed to last a lifetime — and about three-quarters did not offer an annuity — arrangements that can guarantee set payments for life. \u0000Concerns about legal risks and record keeper constraints may deter many plan sponsors — typically employers that provide 401(k) plans and establish investment and distribution options — from offering lifetime income options. The Department of Labor (DOL) issues regulations and guidance for plan sponsors and is responsible for educating and assisting them to help ensure the retirement security of workers. For example, DOL has prescribed steps plan sponsors can take to satisfy their fiduciary duties (i.e. act prudently and in the best interest of participants) when selecting an annuity provider for a 401(k) plan. However, according to industry stakeholders GAO interviewed, those steps are not often used because they include assessing “sufficient” information to “appropriately” conclude that the annuity provider will be financially able to pay future claims without definitions for those terms. Without clearer criteria to select an annuity provider, fear of liability may deter plan sponsors from offering annuities. Further, GAO found that a mix of lifetime income options to choose from is not usually available. DOL provides an incentive in the form of limited liability relief to plan sponsors who, among other things, provide participants at least three diversified investment options. However, no such incentive exists for plan sponsors offering a mix of lifetime income options. Without some degree of liability relief, plan sponsors may be reluctant to offer a diverse mix of lifetime income options to their participants. Lastly, stakeholders told GAO that record keepers may make only their own annuities available to the plans they service. DOL provides guidance on selecting service providers, but it does not encourage plan sponsors to seek choices from their service providers, which may prevent plans from having appropriate annuity options available to offer participants. \u0000Required minimum distributions (RMD) can offer a default for those who do not choose a lifetime income option by setting a mini","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117011416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Made Poorer by Choice: Worker Outcomes in Social Security vs. Private Retirement Accounts 因选择而变穷:社会保障与私人退休账户中的工人结果
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-07-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2154628
Javed Ahmed, B. Barber, Terrance Odean
{"title":"Made Poorer by Choice: Worker Outcomes in Social Security vs. Private Retirement Accounts","authors":"Javed Ahmed, B. Barber, Terrance Odean","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2154628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154628","url":null,"abstract":"Can the freedom to choose how retirement funds are invested leave workers worse off? Via simulation, we document that choice in stock v. bond allocation and type of equity investments in private accounts leads to lower utility and greater risk of income shortfalls relative to private accounts without choice. We also compare private account outcomes to currently promised Social Security benefits to demonstrate that a representative worker (an average wage earner) benefits more from private-account alternatives—with or without choice—than do most workers. Thus, representative worker outcome should not be used to assess population-wide benefits of private account alternatives.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114190582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Regression Sensitivities for Initial Margin Calculations 初始保证金计算的回归敏感性
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-06-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2763488
C. Albanese, Simone Caenazzo, Oliver L Frankel
{"title":"Regression Sensitivities for Initial Margin Calculations","authors":"C. Albanese, Simone Caenazzo, Oliver L Frankel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2763488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2763488","url":null,"abstract":"Implementations of the Standard Initial Margin Model (SIMM) and the Sensitivity Based Approach (SBA) in the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), both call for the calculation of sensitivities with respect to a standardised set of risk factors. Since standard factors are generally collinear and pricing functions are possibly rough, finding sensitivities qualifies as a mathematically ill-posed problem for which analytical derivatives do not provide a robust solution. Numerical instabilities are particularly problematic since they hamper reconciliation and make collateral optimisation strategies inefficient.In this article, we introduce a method for calculating sensitivities based on ridge regressions to keep sensitivities small and stable. We find that a drift term and FX cross-gammas significantly improves the accuracy of the P&L explain achieved in the SIMM methodology. The method implies rigorous upper bounds on errors in P&L explain, on which basis we adjust Initial Margin conservatively in order to pass back-testing benchmarks.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"763 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123278672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
DC Plans and the ORPP: Why Fees Matter DC计划和ORPP:为什么费用很重要
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-05-11 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2778676
James Pierlot, Barry Gros
{"title":"DC Plans and the ORPP: Why Fees Matter","authors":"James Pierlot, Barry Gros","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2778676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2778676","url":null,"abstract":"A flaw in the design of the Ontario Retirement Pension Plan (ORPP) could unfairly penalize employers as well as the people the plan intends to help, according to a new C.D. Howe Institute report. In “DC Plans and the ORPP: Why Fees Matter,” authors James Pierlot and Barry Gros show how employers who pay pension plan expenses, such as investment management and regulatory compliance costs, could be unfairly excluded from having their plans deemed ORPP-comparable and therefore excused from making ORPP contributions.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125724250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Worse Than It Looks: The True Burden and Risks of Federal Employee Pension Plans 比看起来更糟:联邦雇员养老金计划的真正负担和风险
Pension Risk Management eJournal Pub Date : 2016-05-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2776200
W. Robson, A. Laurin
{"title":"Worse Than It Looks: The True Burden and Risks of Federal Employee Pension Plans","authors":"W. Robson, A. Laurin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2776200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2776200","url":null,"abstract":"Federal government employees enjoy pure defined-benefit pensions that promise relatively generous benefits to a large current and former workforce. Being largely unfunded, these plans impose on taxpayers obligations running into the hundreds of billions of dollars. What is worse, misleading accounting understates the true burden and risks these plans create for Canadian taxpayers. This Commentary provides more economically meaningful estimates of the value of federal employee pensions to their participants, and the cost to taxpayers. Its goal is twofold: to alert Canadians to the fiscal burdens and risks created by these plans; and to prompt discussion of reforms that could produce more durable and affordable pensions for federal employees. Official figures on the current cost of these plans and their accumulated obligation use notional interest rates to calculate their value. Because their pension promises are guaranteed by taxpayers and indexed to inflation, the appropriate discount rate is the yield on federal-government real-return bonds (RRBs), which for years has been much lower than the assumed rate in official figures. Correcting this distortion produces a fair-value estimate for Ottawa’s unfunded pension liability of $269.3 billion at the end of 2014/15 – around $30,000 per family of four, and $117.9 billion higher than the reported number. Because the unfunded pension liability is part of Ottawa’s debt, the fair-value adjustment also raises the net public debt by $117.9 billion: from the $612.3 billion reported at the end 2014/15 to an adjusted $730.2 billion. The authors note that recent changes will raise the share of these plans’ costs that their participants must fund, but object that the reported current costs of these plans – and therefore the total contribution rates that determine employer and employee shares – are too low. With RRB yields at recent levels, even the higher employee contributions anticipated by the reforms would leave the taxpayers’ true share far above 50 percent. A fair-value approach to the current service cost can ensure that participants and taxpayers equally share the cost of accruing benefits. The authors further note, however, that even 50:50 sharing of the true current service cost of federal pensions would leave taxpayers exposed. This exposure would apply not only to fluctuations in the annual costs as interest rates, experience, and plan provisions changed but – far more important– to fluctuations in the value of previously earned benefits as well. Ottawa could protect taxpayers from this risk by capping employer contributions at a fixed share of pensionable pay. To relieve taxpayers of their current sole responsibility for risks in the federal plan, Ottawa would need to switch to a shared-risk, target-benefit model already common in much of the provincial public sector, which calculates benefits with reference not only to salary and years of service but also to the plans’ funded status.","PeriodicalId":407792,"journal":{"name":"Pension Risk Management eJournal","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115683823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
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