{"title":"Privacy-preserving billing for e-ticketing systems in public transportation","authors":"F. Kerschbaum, Hoonwei Lim, I. Gudymenko","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517848","url":null,"abstract":"Many electronic ticketing systems for public transportation have been deployed around the world. Using the example of Singapore's EZ-Link system we show that it is easy to invade a traveller's privacy and obtain his travel records in a real-world system. Then we propose encrypted bill processing of the travel records preventing any kind of privacy breach. Clear advantages of using bill processing instead of electronic cash are the possibility of privacy-preserving data mining analyses by the transportation company and monthly billing entailing a tighter customer relation and advanced tariffs. Moreover, we provide an implementation to demonstrate the feasibility of our solution.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122568885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure genomic testing with size- and position-hiding private substring matching","authors":"Emiliano De Cristofaro, Sky Faber, G. Tsudik","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517849","url":null,"abstract":"Recent progress in genomics and bioinformatics is bringing complete and on-demand sequencing of human (and other) genomes closer and closer to reality. Despite exciting new opportunities, affordable and ubiquitous genome sequencing prompts some serious privacy and ethical concerns, owing to extreme sensitivity and uniqueness of genomic information. At the same time, new medical applications, such as personalized medicine, require testing genomes for specific markers that themselves represent sensitive (e.g., proprietary) material. This paper focuses on privacy challenges posed by such genetic tests. It presents a secure and efficient protocol called: Size- and Position-Hiding Private Substring Match- ing (SPH-PSM). This protocol allows two parties -- one with a digitized genome and the other with a set of DNA markers -- to conduct a test, such that the result is only learned by the former, and no other information is learned by either party. In particular, the genome owner does not even learn the size or the position of the markers, which makes SPH-PSM the first of its kind. Finally, we report on a prototype of the proposed technique which attests to its practicality.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126983578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"No surprises: measuring intrusiveness of smartphone applications by detecting objective context deviations","authors":"Frances Zhang, Fuming Shih, D. Weitzner","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517864","url":null,"abstract":"We address the challenge of improving transparency for smartphone applications by creating tools that assesses privacy risk. Specifically, we invented a framework for qualitatively assessing and quantitatively measuring the intrusiveness of smartphone applications based on their data access behaviors. Our framework has two essential components. The first component is the Privacy Fingerprint, a novel visualization that is concise yet holistic. It captures each app's unique access patterns to sensitive personal data, including which types of behaviors and under which privacy-relevant usage contexts the data are collected. The second component is a new Intrusiveness Score that numerically measures out-of-context data collection, based on real data accesses gathered from empirical testing on 33 popular Android apps across 4 app categories. Specific attention is paid to the proportion of data accesses that occurs while the user is idle, raising the perceived level of intrusiveness and exposing the profiling potential of an app. Together, these components will help smartphone users decide whether to install an app because they will be able to easily and accurately assess the relative intrusiveness of apps. Our study also demonstrates that the Intrusiveness Score is helpful to compare apps that exhibit similar types of data accesses.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116057335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miltiadis Kandias, V. Stavrou, Nick Bozovic, D. Gritzalis
{"title":"Proactive insider threat detection through social media: the YouTube case","authors":"Miltiadis Kandias, V. Stavrou, Nick Bozovic, D. Gritzalis","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517865","url":null,"abstract":"Insider threat is a major issue in cyber and corporate security. In this paper we study the psychosocial perspective of the insider via social media, Open Source Intelligence, and user generated content classification. Inductively, we propose a prediction method by evaluating the predisposition towards law enforcement and authorities, a personal psychosocial trait closely connected to the manifestation of malevolent insiders. We propose a methodology to detect users holding a negative attitude towards authorities. For doing so we facilitate the use of machine learning techniques and of a dictionary-based approach, so as to detect comments expressing negative attitude. Thus, we can draw conclusions over a user behavior and beliefs via the content the user generated within the limits a social medium. We also use an assumption free flat data representation technique in order to decide over the user's attitude. Furthermore, we compare the results of each method and highlight the common behavior manifested by the users. The demonstration is applied on a crawled community of users on YouTube.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116460949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thinking inside the BLAC box: smarter protocols for faster anonymous blacklisting","authors":"Ryan Henry, I. Goldberg","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517855","url":null,"abstract":"We present BLACRONYM, a suite of new communication- and computation-efficient protocols for anonymous blacklisting without trusted third parties. Our protocols improve on Tsang et al.'s Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials (BLAC) system and its variants by incorporating novel batch zero-knowledge proof and verification techniques. BLACRONYM provides comparable functionality and security guarantees to those of BLAC and its derivatives, but it is substantially faster and consumes much less bandwidth. At the heart of BLACRONYM is the first batch zero-knowledge protocol in the literature for proofs of partial knowledge over non-monotone access structures; we suspect that our new techniques will find applications in speeding up other cryptographic constructions that require proofs of similar statements.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"307 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114865284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","authors":"A. Sadeghi, S. Foresti","doi":"10.1145/2517840","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840","url":null,"abstract":"This volume contains the papers selected for presentation at the 12th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2013), held in Berlin, Germany, on November 4, 2013, in conjunction with the ACM CCS conference. \u0000 \u0000In response to the workshop's call for papers, 103 papers were submitted to the conference from 27 different countries. Each paper has been reviewed by three members of the program committee, who considered its significance, novelty, technical quality, and interest for the research and industrial community in their evaluation. The program committee's work was carried out electronically, yielding intensive discussion. Of the submitted papers, the program committee accepted 20 full papers (resulting in an acceptance rate of 19.4%) and 10 short papers for presentation at the workshop. Due to the record number of submissions received this year and to their high technical level, many top quality papers were not selected for publication.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"31 15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123953134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"You cannot hide for long: de-anonymization of real-world dynamic behaviour","authors":"G. Danezis, C. Troncoso","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517846","url":null,"abstract":"Disclosure attacks against anonymization systems have traditionally assumed that users exhibit stable patterns of communications in the long term. We use datasets of real traffic to show that this assumption does not hold: usage patterns email, mailing lists, and location-based services are dynamic in nature. We introduce the sequential statistical disclosure technique, which explicitly takes into account the evolution of user behavior over time and outperforms traditional profiling techniques, both at detection and quantification of rates of actions. Our results demonstrate that despite the changing patterns of use: low sending rates to specific receivers are still detectable, surprisingly short periods of observation are sufficient to make inferences about users' behaviour, and the characteristics of real behaviour allows for inferences even in secure system configurations.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116876228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Outsourced private information retrieval","authors":"Yizhou Huang, I. Goldberg","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517854","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a scheme for outsourcing Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to untrusted servers while protecting the privacy of the database owner as well as that of the database clients. We observe that by layering PIR on top of an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) data layout, we provide the ability for the database owner to perform private writes, while database clients can perform private reads from the database even while the owner is offline. Our system is compatible with existing PIR access control and pricing schemes on a per-record basis for these reads. This extends the usual ORAM model by allowing multiple database readers without requiring trusted hardware; indeed, almost all of the computation in our scheme during reads is performed by untrusted cloud servers. We make a second observation that the database owner can always conduct a private read as an ordinary database client, and the private write protocol does not have to provide a \"read\" functionality as a standard ORAM protocol does. Based on the two observations, we construct an end-to-end system that privately updates a 1 MB record in a 1 TB database with an amortized end-to-end response time as low as 300 ms when the database owner has a fast network connection to the database servers, and about 1 minute over a slow ADSL connection. Private read times by the database readers are on the order of seconds in either case.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125184606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the limits of provable anonymity","authors":"Nethanel Gelernter, A. Herzberg","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517850","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517850","url":null,"abstract":"We study provably secure anonymity. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity against wide range of computationally bounded attackers, including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destinations, and their combinations. Following [hevia2008indistinguishability], our definition is generic, and captures different notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity). We then study the feasibility of ultimate anonymity: the strongest-possible anonymity requirements and adversaries. We show there is a protocol satisfying this requirement, but with absurd (although polynomial) inefficiency and overhead. We show that such inefficiency and overhead are unavoidable for 'ultimate anonymity'. We then present a slightly-relaxed requirement and present feasible protocols for it.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116744649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Conscript your friends into larger anonymity sets with JavaScript","authors":"Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, B. Ford","doi":"10.1145/2517840.2517866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2517840.2517866","url":null,"abstract":"We present the design and prototype implementation of ConScript, a framework for using JavaScript to encourage casual Web users to participate in an anonymous communication system. When a Web user visits a cooperative Web site, the site serves a JavaScript application that instructs the browser to create and submit \"dummy\" messages into the anonymity system. Users who want to send non-dummy messages through the anonymity system use a browser plug-in to replace these dummy messages with real messages. Creating such conscripted anonymity sets can increase the anonymity set size available to users of remailer, e-voting, and verifiable shuffle-style anonymity systems. We outline ConScript's architecture, we address a number of potential attacks against ConScript, and we discuss the ethical issues related to deploying such a system. Our implementation results demonstrate the practicality of ConScript: a workstation running our prototype ConScript JavaScript client generates a dummy message for a mix-net in 81 milliseconds and it generates a dummy message for a DoS-resistant DC-net in 156 milliseconds.","PeriodicalId":406846,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126613125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}