{"title":"The Resistance to Stoic Blending","authors":"Vanessa de Harven","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper rehabilitates the Stoic conception of blending from the ground up, by freeing the Stoic conception of body from three interpretive presuppositions. First, the twin hylomorphic presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an incorporeal. Then, the atomistic presupposition that body is absolutely full and rigid, and the attendant notion that resistance (antitupia) must be ricochet. I argue that once we clear away these presuppositions about body, the foundations of Stoic corporealism fall into place. Body is fundamental (not hylomorphic). The two fundamental principles (archai) are bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē); and these two bodies are two, not matter and form all over again, nor actual and potential, but agent and patient. The independence of the two archai is no threat to the unity of the cosmos, however, because the Stoic theory of body allows for the complete coextension of the archai. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of the wax and its shape? The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient completely coextended in a through and through blend.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80469916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Titelseiten","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-frontmatter1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-frontmatter1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"114 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76244578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why is the Cosmos Intelligent? (1)","authors":"R. Salles","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present paper studies a family of Stoic proofs of the intelligence of the cosmos, i. e. of the thesis that the cosmos is intelligent in the strong sense that it is, as a whole, something that thinks. This family, ‘F2’, goes back to a proof, ‘XP’, found in Philebus 29a9–30 a8 and Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8. F2 infers the intelligence of the cosmos, as XP does, from (i) the general idea that our intelligence proceeds from the cosmos, which is the ultimate cause of why we are intelligent, and (ii) the further claim that, since this is so, the cosmos itself must be intelligent. They differ from one another, however, in how they account for (i). In this paper, I present a new reason for why the accounts are different, that complements those given by David Sedley in a recent and important study of Stoic cosmology (Sedley 2007). Based on the analogy between intelligence and the four elements, XP puts forward the idea that the intelligence currently present in us is a portion of cosmic intelligence that has separated from it at some point in the past, and that has travelled from the outside cosmos to us. In contrast, the theory used by F2 to explain the generation of human intelligence is grounded not in the notions of separation and locomotion, but in that of transmission of a state. As I argue in some detail, the separation-locomotion model and the transmission model are not only different from each other, but also logically independent from one another: in general terms, neither entails the other. This transmission model used by the Stoics in a proof of the intelligence of the cosmos, I submit, is a major innovation in ancient cosmological and metaphysical thinking.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"40 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73913907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Stoics and Their Critics on Diachronic Identity","authors":"D. Sedley","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article is a return to a theme I first tackled in “The Stoic criterion of identity” (1982): the Academics’ ‘Growing Argument’ (auxanomenos logos) and the Stoic response to its attack on diachronic identity. This time my aim is to separate out approximately five different stages of the debate between the two schools. This will be done by shifting more of the focus onto developments that seem likely to belong to the late second and/or early first century BC.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"117 1","pages":"24 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77875707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Plato, the Medicine, and the Paraphrase on the Timaeus in the Anonymus Londiniensis Papyrus","authors":"Jordi Crespo Saumell","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This article aims to give a critical and up to date survey on the medical theories expounded in the Timaeus, trying to make clear to which extent Plato took an interest in medicine, which medical issues in the dialogue are original and which are not. In providing an extended treatment of the medical ideas contained in the Timaeus, the Anonymus Londiniensis papyrus is also of assistance in this sense. This paper highlights those points on which the papyrus differs from the Platonic text, providing thus insight into Plato’s etiological assumptions.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"59 1","pages":"148 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83694425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Divine Activity and Human Life","authors":"J. Jirsa","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (eudaimonia) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. It argues that eudaimonia is theōria in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, happy life (eudaimōn bios) is a complex way of life which includes not only theoretical activity but also the exercising of other virtues including the so-called moral or social ones. The article shows that Aristotle differentiates between eudaimonia on the one hand and the happy or fulfilled life (eudaimōn bios) on the other, and shows how this distinction clarifies Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"210 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74287411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aristotle on Nature, Human Nature and Human Understanding","authors":"M. Segev","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Aristotle is committed to three propositions which seem to be mutually inconsistent: (1) He thinks that natural phenomena occur either always or for the most part. Natural phenomena, and a fortiori the core properties determining the nature of an entire species, cannot be rarities; (2) He states that theoretical understanding is an essential, dominant component of human nature; (3) He observes that human theoretical understanding is rare. I evaluate possible alternative ways of solving the inconsistency, and show that they all involve considerable difficulties.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"28 1","pages":"177 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82415281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“What Kind of Death?”: On the Phaedo’s double topic","authors":"Panagiotis Thanassas","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The Socratic instruction (64b) to clarify “what kind of death” a philosopher would deserve suggests two different notions of “death” in the Phaedo: physical demise and philosophy. This double meaning makes it possible for the Platonic Socrates to address a dual audience with a dual purpose: His interlocutors will receive consolation, while the perceptive reader will focus on practicing philosophy on the basis of the hypothesis of Forms. Socrates’ final words can also be illuminated as a vindication of his adherence to logos: the cock to Asclepius has to be offered as a sign of gratitude for healing misology.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"113 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89080966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sunesis as Ethical Discernment in Aristotle","authors":"Attila Simon","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In this paper, I examine the concept of sunesis (comprehension) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Section I, I clarify the differences between phronēsis and sunesis, focusing on the roles they play in bouleusis (deliberation). I argue that sunesis is not directly involved in practical deliberation in the canonical sense of the notion. In Section II, I suggest an interpretation of sunesis as ethical discernment. We employ sunesis in cases without any immediate objects of practical deliberation, such as when we criticize an action in the past or give advice to others. In this function, discernment has a crucial role in the ethical life of individuals embedded in a community.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"6 1","pages":"79 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87832589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Eleatic Challenge in Aristotle’s Physics I.8","authors":"S. O’Connor","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In Physics I.8, Aristotle outlines and responds to an Eleatic argument against the reality of change. I defend a new reading according to which the argument assumes Predicational Monism, the claim that each being can possess only one property. In Phys. I.2, Aristotle responds to Predicational Monism, which he attributes to the Eleatics; I argue that he uses this response to distinguish coincidental from non-coincidental becoming, a distinction he employs in Phys I.8 to resolve the argument against the reality of change. The Eleatics’ acceptance of Predicational Monism, I argue, explains why this distinction is unavailable to them.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"25 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75191596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}