{"title":"The Splendor of Truth in Fides et Ratio","authors":"E. Echeverria","doi":"10.5840/QD20189115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20189115","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:The lack of what may be termed \"metaphysical authority\" in [e.g., liberation theology, narrative theology, and hermeneutical theology] makes them ill equipped to render the theological totality of Catholic Christianity, which needs to speak about being as well as meaning and about eternity as well as time. . . . They must find ways of making space for other kinds of theological discourse, and above all, for those which, in their cherishing of ontology, enable the expression of Catholic doctrine as a description of reality—in its two poles, finite and infinite, and the relation between them. At the same time, such other kinds of theology, of which Thomism may stand as the paradigm by presenting human intelligence as above all the capacity for intake of the real, highlight in an irreplaceable fashion the Church's fundamental intuition about truth: namely, that it is not first and foremost an action to be done (cf. liberation theology) or a story to be told (cf. narrative theology) or a text to be interpreted (cf. hermeneutical theology), though it may indeed also be all of these. Primordially, truth is an encounter with what is not humanity's work: the deed of God in creation and salvation.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"2 1","pages":"49 - 78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2019-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79064536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Myth of a Pure Virtue Epistemology","authors":"Joshue Orozco","doi":"10.5840/QD20188211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20188211","url":null,"abstract":"G. E. M. Anscombe’s trenchant critique of consequentialist and deontological moral theories helped bring virtues back into moral philosophy.1 Ethicists committed to consequentialist or deontological frameworks gave virtues renewed attention by developing theories of moral virtue that assimilated virtue into their prior and more fundamental moral commitments.2 Others, rather than assimilating moral virtue, developed a pure virtue ethic that gives virtue and related aretaic notions of excellence and admirability a fundamental role in one’s moral framework. Some pure virtue ethicists address the traditional problems and questions (e.g., giving an account of right action) asked by consequentialists and deontologists, some argue that there is something flawed or importantly deficient with these traditional projects and questions addressed by the other moral frameworks. Virtue epistemology has experienced similar developments since Ernest Sosa’s “The Raft and the Pyramid.”3 Some virtue epistemologists offer theories of intellectual virtue that assimilate virtue into some more fundamental epistemic framework (e.g., reliabilism or evidentialism). Some, however, argue for a pure virtue epistemology that takes intellectual virtues as personally excellent or admirable intellectual character traits analogous to Aristotelian moral virtues, which purportedly play a fundamental role in one’s epistemic framework. As in the moral realm, some pure virtueepistemic","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"12 1","pages":"180 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79230635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The World, the Deceiver, and The Face in the Frost","authors":"L. McGrew","doi":"10.5840/QD2018827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018827","url":null,"abstract":"In an appendix to The Foundations of Knowledge, Timothy McGrew provides the outline of a solution to the problem of the external world.1 McGrew argues that the probability of the existence of a deceiver who makes it appear that we live in a real external world must be lower than the probability of a real external world itself because the ontological commitments of the latter hypothesis will always necessarily be greater than those of the former. In the latter hypothesis, we posit a mental state of the deceiver as a cause of each of the apparently real things that seem to exist in the external world, but the deceiver himself also exists as an entity who is not merely the sum of all of these mental states. McGrew argues, further, that any time we conditionalize on some particular mental state of our own that we normally take to be caused by real objects in the external world, the gap in probability between realism and the deceiver hypothesis grows larger. He bases this argument on the probabilistic fact that if one theory is strictly simpler than some other theory, the confirmation a given piece of evidence affords to the simpler theory is always greater than the confirmation it affords to the more complex theory— the difference between the old probability of the simpler theory and its new probability is always greater than the comparable difference between the old and new probabilities of the more complex theory.2 McGrew’s argument thus shows, if we take it to be successful, that the prior probability of a deceiver scenario is lower than the prior probability of realism and also that, as we gradually conditionalize on more and more everyday evidence, the gap in probability between the two will continue to grow. This set of conclusions would seem to mean (since we have a great deal of sensory evidence that we normally","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"18 1","pages":"112 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85286853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew","authors":"T. McNabb","doi":"10.5840/QD2018829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018829","url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows:","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"242 1","pages":"155 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80511710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can Experience Fulfill the Many Roles of Evidence?","authors":"L. Gage","doi":"10.5840/QD2018826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018826","url":null,"abstract":"It is still a live question in epistemology and philosophy of science as to what exactly evidence is. In my view, evidence consists in experiences called “seemings.” This view is a version of the phenomenal conception of evidence, the position that evidence consists in nonfactive mental states with propositional content.1 This conception is opposed by sensedata theorists, disjunctivists, and those who think evidence consists in physical objects or publicly observable states of affairs (what I call the courtroom conception of evidence). Thomas Kelly has recently argued that the phenomenal conception cannot play all the roles evidence plays and is thus inadequate.2 Having first explained the nature of seemings, in this essay I utilize Kelly’s own understanding of the four major roles of evidence and argue that the phenomenal conception can play each one. Experience is a good candidate for evidence.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"38 1","pages":"111 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74170922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fine-Tuning and the Search for an Archimedean Point","authors":"T. McGrew","doi":"10.5840/QD2018828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018828","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"35 1","pages":"147 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74630588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Complexly Based Beliefs and the Generality Problem for Reliabilism","authors":"Max Baker-Hytch","doi":"10.5840/QD2018823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018823","url":null,"abstract":"This essay argues that certain cases involving what I shall term complexly based belief, where a belief is formed via complex inference to the best explanation, pose a serious difficulty for reliabilist theories of epistemic justification or warrant. Many of our most important beliefs appear to be of this character. The problem, in short, is that in such cases we cannot identify any beliefforming process type that is such as to yield an intuitively correct verdict on the epistemic status of the agent’s belief. If this is correct, then no proposed solution to the generality problem can succeed.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"36 1","pages":"19 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81077371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defeating Objections to Bayesianism by Adopting a Proximal Facts Approach","authors":"Calum Miller","doi":"10.5840/QD20188210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD20188210","url":null,"abstract":"One major line of attack against probabilistic approaches to the philosophy of science has been to argue that certain results of theirs are in conflict with intuitive notions of confirmation. Thus for example, some have suggested not only that the Hempelian raven paradox1 counts against standard, preprobabilistic notions of scientific confirmation but also that it demonstrates a problem with approaches based on confirmation theory: since P(nonblack object being a nonraven|all ravens are black) is 1, it follows from Bayes’s theorem that the observation of a nonblack nonraven constitutes evidence that all ravens are black.2 Those who find the raven paradox persuasive, and who retain their intuition that such an observation does not even slightly confirm the black raven thesis, ought to find this a compelling argument against Bayesianism, for the probabilistic account contradicts the ostensible commonsense intuition. Others see this as a strength of Bayesianism— that Bayesianism accepts the otherwise plausible equivalence condition3 yet also accounts for the fact that we do not hold such observations to significantly confirm the black raven thesis. The reason for this is that the probability of a nonblack object being a nonraven given that not all ravens are black is trivially close to 1, even though it is not 1. This means that the observation— a nonblack nonraven— is to be expected with a high degree of probability regardless of whether all ravens are black. So the increase in the epistemic probability of the black raven thesis is negligible.","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"44 1","pages":"165 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86931528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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