{"title":"适当的功能主义与金属层面:对蒂莫西和莉迪亚·麦克格鲁的友好答复","authors":"T. McNabb","doi":"10.5840/QD2018829","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows:","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":"242 1","pages":"155 - 164"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew\",\"authors\":\"T. McNabb\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/QD2018829\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows:\",\"PeriodicalId\":40384,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quaestiones Disputatae\",\"volume\":\"242 1\",\"pages\":\"155 - 164\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-08-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quaestiones Disputatae\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018829\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quaestiones Disputatae","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/QD2018829","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew
Over the years, Alvin Plantinga has developed an epistemological system that allows beliefs to be warranted1 without requiring the subject to have internal access to those properties conferring warrant. Plantinga’s epistemology, known as proper functionalism, allows a subject’s belief to be warranted, insofar as the right conditions relating to cognitive proper function are in place.2 Plantinga’s theory of warrant can be summarized as follows: