Sumit Agarwal, Wenlan Qian, Tianyue Ruan, B. Yeung
{"title":"Supporting Seniors: How Low-Income Elderly Individuals Respond to a Retirement Support Program","authors":"Sumit Agarwal, Wenlan Qian, Tianyue Ruan, B. Yeung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3611637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611637","url":null,"abstract":"Insufficient savings for retirement expose individuals to financial vulnerability in the post-retirement years and prompt governments to consider support measures. We study a government cash subsidy program for the low-income elderly population in Singapore. Using comprehensive, high-frequency transaction data, we find that elderly individuals increase spending by 0.7 dollars per dollar of subsidy received. We also show that they increase food expenditure and the variety of retail purchases. The subsidy program increases spending more for those more liquidity constrained, regardless of their income level. We also provide evidence that a cash transfer is more effective than a voucher transfer in stimulating consumption.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124971448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Entry in Tax Competition and Intergovernmental Transfer","authors":"Yuya Kikuchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3885080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3885080","url":null,"abstract":"This paper derives an efficient intergovernmental transfer system within tax competition settings under the endogenization of the number of regions that engage in tax competition. In our theoretical model, two externalities arise. These include fiscal externalities and the externalities resulting from the endogenization of the number of regions. If a system is a full equalization system, inefficiency in the public input supply and the number of competing regions is resolved because two externalities can be internalized.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130143125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"COVID-19, Fiscal Stimulus, and Credit Ratings","authors":"A. Balajee, Shekhar Tomar, Gautham Udupa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3577115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577115","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 pandemic has rattled the global economy and has required governments to undertake massive fiscal stimulus to prevent the economic fallout of social distancing policies. In this paper, we compare the fiscal response of governments from around the world and its main determinants. We find sovereign credit ratings as one of the most critical factors determining their choice. First, the countries with one level worse rating announced 0.3 percentage points lower fiscal stimulus (as a percentage of their GDP). Second, these countries also delayed their fiscal stimulus by an average of 1.7 days. We identify 22 most vulnerable countries, based on their rating and stringency, and find that a stimulus equal to 1 percent of their GDP adds up to USD 87 billion. In order to fight the pandemic, long term loans from multilateral institutions can help these stimulus starved economies.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114315963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The VAT at 100: A Comprehensive Health Assessment, With a Plan of Care and Suggestions for Diagnostic Tests","authors":"J. Slemrod, Tejaswi Velayudhan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3580907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580907","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes stock of what is known about the efficacy of actual Value Added Tax (VAT) systems, nearly 100 years since the tax was conceived. Existing VAT systems fall short of the idealized version on many dimensions, some by design and others unintended. Actual VATs might therefore have different equity and efficiency implications than an ideal VAT, although new technologies could bring practice closer to the ideal. Throughout the paper, we find a useful benchmark is the tax that the VAT most often replaced – the Retail Sales Tax (RST). Like the RST, the VAT is weak at the final consumer stage and technological advances that ameliorate VAT issues could also be applied to the RST. In addition, the VAT introduces some new opportunities for evasion not possible in an RST. A research agenda for the VAT should consider the efficiency and equity implications of real-life, imperfect VATs.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133564925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Distributional Implications of Fiscal Devaluations","authors":"Marta Giagheddu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3651258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3651258","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the distributional implications of a fiscal devaluation acquired through a shift from labor to consumption taxes in an open-economy Heterogeneous Agents New Keynesian model with incomplete markets and uninsurable income risk. A permanent fiscal devaluation perfectly mimicking a nominal devaluation in aggregate implies an increase in transfers balanced by lower profits. This leaves the representative agent unaffected. However, as the higher transfers affect all agents symmetrically, while decreased profits impact agents according to their wealth, distributional effects arise. The implicit insurance provided by higher transfers benefits wealth-poor agents and mitigates the equity concerns associated with fiscal devaluations.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115719550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Policies Against Tax Evasion Through Ocupational Choice","authors":"X. Ruiz del Portal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561516","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a model of tax evasion with endogenous labor supply in which underreporting in one sector is possible but impossible in another. In addition, there is an unregistered sector where no one reports their earnings to the tax office. We found that the effects on the number of evaders and tax ghosts become more robust and conclusive than those on hours of unreported work usually considered by the literature. Moreover, our results are supported by abundant econometric studies, thereby eliminating current discrepancies between the theoretical framework in the tradition of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and empirical evidence. Surprisingly, most of the measures that are effective against tax evasion in the registered sectors expand the unregistered sector. To solve this we propose both coercive measures to be applied mainly in the unregistered sector and policies aimed at improving moral attitudes against evasion and productivity rates in the aboveground economy.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126415708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Oil Price Shocks, Protest and the Shadow Economy: Is there a Mitigation Effect?","authors":"Phoebe W. Ishak, U. Fritsche","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3551976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551976","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we study the impact of exogenous variations of international oil prices on the incidence of protest, while exploring the role of the shadow economy as a mitigating factor. We find that oil price shocks are negatively associated with protests, but the effect is less severe the higher the initial size of the shadow economy. To explain these results, we show that the size of the shadow economy responds counter-cyclically to oil-price-driven income shocks. In particular, we find that the decline in the GDP per capita growth following a negative oil price shock leads to an increase in the size of the shadow economy. This suggest that the shadow economy’s capacity to absorb persistent oil price fluctuations without provoking political unrest, should regard it as a mitigation tool rather than an economic burden.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124250073","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Audit Publicity and Tax Compliance: A Natural Experiment","authors":"P. Battiston, D. Duncan, Simona Gamba, A. Santoro","doi":"10.1111/sjoe.12330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12330","url":null,"abstract":"We use confidential data on value‐added tax payments at the sector level, in two large Italian cities, to estimate the effect of audit publicity on the tax compliance of local sellers. By employing a difference‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find that such publicity has a positive effect on fiscal declarations made shortly thereafter. The results suggest that increasing awareness on future audits via the media can be an important instrument in the hands of tax authorities.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129151185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The (Subjective) Well-Being Cost of Fiscal Policy Shocks","authors":"Kodjovi M. Eklou, Mamour Fall","doi":"10.5089/9781513525846.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513525846.001","url":null,"abstract":"Do discretionary spending cuts and tax increases hurt social well-being? To answer this question, we combine subjective well-being data covering over half a million of individuals across 13 European countries, with macroeconomic data on fiscal consolidations. We find that fiscal consolidations reduce individual well-being in the short run, especially when they are based on spending cuts. In addition, we show that accompanying monetary and exchange rate policies \u0000(disinflation, depreciations and the liberalization of capital flows) mitigate the well-being cost of fiscal consolidations. Finally, we investigate the well-being consequences of the two well-knowns expansionary fiscal consolidations episodes taking place in the 80s (in Denmark and Ireland). We find that even expansionary fiscal consolidations can have well-being costs. Our results may therefore shed some light on why some governments may choose to consolidate through taxes even at the cost of economic growth. Indeed, if spending cuts are to generate a large well-being loss, they can trigger an opposition and protest against a fiscal consolidation plan and hence making it politically costly.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128751206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Decentralization, Fiscal Independence, and Poverty in the Philippines","authors":"Tristan Canare, J. P. Francisco","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12241","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralization is a common public sector reform in developing countries. Its basic rationale is that local governments have an informational advantage regarding the needs and preferences of consumers. However, decentralization also has drawbacks. Foremost is the efficiency advantage of the central government in providing public services because of economies of scale and better access to resources. This study looked at the relationship between decentralization and poverty using data from Philippine cities and municipalities. Results suggest that decentralization, as represented by fiscal independence and measured by the share of locally sourced revenues to total local government revenues, is indeed associated with lower poverty. However, this effect is not linear—the marginal effect of decentralization on poverty diminishes as decentralization increases. Moreover, decentralization moderates the positive effect of good governance on poverty reduction and the magnitude of the relationship between poverty and decentralization is stronger in poorer municipalities than in richer ones.","PeriodicalId":403078,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal","volume":"162 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128749931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}