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Information, Market Power and Price Volatility 信息、市场力量和价格波动
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-09-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3454310
D. Bergemann, T. Heumann, S. Morris
{"title":"Information, Market Power and Price Volatility","authors":"D. Bergemann, T. Heumann, S. Morris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3454310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3454310","url":null,"abstract":"We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. Regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payo¤ shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade). By contrast, price volatility is always lower than the variance of the aggregate shock across all information structures. Alternative trading mechanisms lead to very distinct bounds as a comparison with Cournot competition establishes.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121897562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
On Selecting the Right Agent 关于选择正确的代理
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3527088
Geoffroy de Clippel, K. Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, Kareen Rozen
{"title":"On Selecting the Right Agent","authors":"Geoffroy de Clippel, K. Eliaz, Daniel Fershtman, Kareen Rozen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3527088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527088","url":null,"abstract":"Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of qualification and chooses whether to apply for the task. The principal wishes to appoint the most qualified agent and chooses which agent to assign as a function of the public history of profits. We fully characterize when the principal's first‐best payoff is attainable in equilibrium and identify a simple strategy profile achieving this first‐best whenever feasible. Additionally, we provide a partial characterization of the case with many agents and discuss how our analysis extends to other variations of the game.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"6 15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116869678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Managing Channel Profits When Retailers Have Profitable Outside Options 当零售商有有利可图的外部选择时，如何管理渠道利润
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2019-02-01 DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2953
R. Inderst, G. Shaffer
{"title":"Managing Channel Profits When Retailers Have Profitable Outside Options","authors":"R. Inderst, G. Shaffer","doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2017.2953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2953","url":null,"abstract":"The channel-coordination literature typically focuses on how a supplier canovercome channel inefficiencies stemming from misaligned pricing incentives. In contrast, we show that when an incumbent supplier faces competition from other suppliers to supply the downstream firms, it may want to create inefficiencies. Our analysis offers useful prescriptions for how incumbent suppliers should react to competitive threats by smaller competitors, how manufacturers should react to powerful retailers who can produce their own private-label brands, and how upstream firms should optimally treat downstream firms who may have different marginal costs of distribution. Our analysis also explains why wholesale prices and thus final-goods prices would be expected to decrease when there is an increase in upstream or downstream competition.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124375379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
A Model of Competing Narratives 竞争叙事的模型
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.1257/AER.20191099
K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler
{"title":"A Model of Competing Narratives","authors":"K. Eliaz, R. Spiegler","doi":"10.1257/AER.20191099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20191099","url":null,"abstract":"We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a “clash of narratives.” Drawing on the “Bayesian Networks” literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that people are drawn to hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain, and their contribution to political polarization. (JEL D72, D83, D85, F52)","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131518577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 67
Identifying the Discount Factor in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models 动态离散选择模型中贴现因子的识别
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3051326
J. Abbring, Øystein Daljord
{"title":"Identifying the Discount Factor in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models","authors":"J. Abbring, Øystein Daljord","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3051326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3051326","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical research often cites observed choice responses to variation that shifts expected discounted future utilities, but not current utilities, as an intuitive source of information on time preferences. We study the identification of dynamic discrete choice models under such economically motivated exclusion restrictions on primitive utilities. We show that each exclusion restriction leads to an easily interpretable moment condition with the discount factor as the only unknown parameter. The identified set of discount factors that solves this condition is finite, but not necessarily a singleton. Consequently, in contrast to common intuition, an exclusion restriction does not in general give point identification. Finally, we show that exclusion restrictions have nontrivial empirical content: The implied moment conditions impose restrictions on choices that are absent from the unconstrained model.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116544459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 59
Investment, Resolution of Risk, and the Role of Affect 投资、风险化解与情感的作用
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-05-01 DOI: 10.1016/J.JOEP.2011.07.007
F. van Winden, M. Krawczyk, Astrid Hopfensitz
{"title":"Investment, Resolution of Risk, and the Role of Affect","authors":"F. van Winden, M. Krawczyk, Astrid Hopfensitz","doi":"10.1016/J.JOEP.2011.07.007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JOEP.2011.07.007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128644194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 116
A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification 动态随机对策中的正则马尔可夫完美均衡理论:通用性、稳定性和纯化性
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-04-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1120819
U. Doraszelski, Juan F. Escobar
{"title":"A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification","authors":"U. Doraszelski, Juan F. Escobar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1120819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120819","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121398020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 89
Gasoline Prices Jump Up on Mondays: An Outcome of Aggressive Competition? 汽油价格周一飙升:激烈竞争的结果?
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1114762
Øystein Foros, Frode Steen
{"title":"Gasoline Prices Jump Up on Mondays: An Outcome of Aggressive Competition?","authors":"Øystein Foros, Frode Steen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1114762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1114762","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station-specific observations from March 2003 to March 2006. Whereas studies that have analyzed similar price cycles in other countries find support for the Edgeworth cycle theory (Maskin and Tirole, 1988), we demonstrate that Norwegian gasoline price cycles involve a form of coordinated behavior. We also show that gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, with prices increasing significantly every Monday at noon, and that gasoline companies appear to use the recommended price as a coordination device with a fixed link between the retail and recommended prices. Moreover, the weekly pattern changed in April 2004; whereas Thursday had been the high-price day, Monday now became the high-price day. The price–cost margin also increased significantly after the weekly pattern changed in April 2004.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"140 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125827367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 33
A Note on the Drivers of R&D Intensity 研发强度驱动因素研究述评
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-02-01 DOI: 10.5430/RWE.V1N1P56
A. Mathieu, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
{"title":"A Note on the Drivers of R&D Intensity","authors":"A. Mathieu, Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie","doi":"10.5430/RWE.V1N1P56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5430/RWE.V1N1P56","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which technological specialization influences the observed R&D intensity of countries, and hence would bias the well-known country rankings that consist in comparing aggregate R&D intensity. The econometric analysis performed on a cross-country cross-industry panel dataset (21 industrial sectors, 10 countries, from 1991 to 2002) suggests that accounting for the technological specialization of countries drastically reduces the differences in relative R&D efforts observed at the country level. The only exception is Sweden (and the USA, but to a lower extent), which has an ‘above-than-average’ R&D intensity in most industries. Countries like Finland, Japan or Germany do not have an R&D intensity that is particularly higher than their industrial structure would predict.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130550876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 78
R&D and Productivity: Estimating Production Functions when Productivity is Endogenous 研发与生产率:生产率内生时的生产函数估计
CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1080306
U. Doraszelski, J. Jaumandreu
{"title":"R&D and Productivity: Estimating Production Functions when Productivity is Endogenous","authors":"U. Doraszelski, J. Jaumandreu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1080306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1080306","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a simple estimator for production functions in the presence of endogenous productivity change that allows us to retrieve productivity and its relationship with R&D at the flrm level. Our dynamic investment model can be viewed as a generalization of the knowledge capital model (Griliches 1979) that has remained a cornerstone of the productivity literature for more than 25 years. We relax the assumptions on the R&D process and examine the impact of the investment in knowledge on the productivity of flrms. We illustrate our approach on an unbalanced panel of more than 1800 Spanish manufacturing flrms in nine industries during the 1990s. Our flndings indicate that the link between R&D and productivity is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, nonlinearity, and heterogeneity across flrms. Abstracting from uncertainty and nonlinearity, as is done in the knowledge capital model, or assuming an exogenous process for productivity, as is done in the recent literature on structural estimation of production functions, overlooks some of its most interesting features.","PeriodicalId":401540,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Industrial Organization (Topic)","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121640707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 98
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