DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic)最新文献

Ideological Motives and Group Decision-Making 意识形态动机与群体决策

DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2021-02-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3738759

F. Engl

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引用次数: 0

The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Mining-Pool Games and Related Stability of Gap Games Behaviors in Blockchain Ecosystems 区块链生态系统中矿池博弈的共识均衡框架及缺口博弈行为的相关稳定性

DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-10 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3551829

George Xianzhi Yuan

{"title":"The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Mining-Pool Games and Related Stability of Gap Games Behaviors in Blockchain Ecosystems","authors":"George Xianzhi Yuan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3551829","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551829","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of this paper is to establish the general framework of consensus equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems, and in particular to explain the stable in the sense for the existence of consensus equilibria related to mining gap game’s behaviors by using one new concept called “consensus games (CG)” in Blockchain Ecosystems, here, the Blockchain ecosystem mainly means the economic activities by taking into the account of three types of different factors which are expenses, reward mechanism and mining power for the work on blockschain by applying the key consensus called “Proof of Work” due to Nakamoto in 2008.<br><br>In order to do so, we first give an outline how the general existence of consensus equilibria for Mining-Pool Games is formulated, and then used to explain the stable for Gap Games for Bitcoin in the sense by the existence of consensus equilibria under the framework of Blockchain consensus, we then establish a general existence result for consensus equilibria of general mining gap games by using the profit functions for miners as the payoffs in game theory. As applications, the general existence results for consensus equilibria of Gap games are established, which not only help us to claim the existence for the general stability for Gap games under the general framework of Blockchain ecosystems, but also allow us to illustrate a number of different phenomenons on the study of mining- pool games with possible impacts due to miners’ gap behaviors with scenarios embedded in Bitcoin economics. Our study on the explanation for the stability of mining gap game for Blockchain ecosystems shows that the concept of consensus equilibria may play a important role for the development of fundamental theory for consensus economics.","PeriodicalId":401252,"journal":{"name":"DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic)","volume":"11 7","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133621493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Ultimatum Heuristic in Mixed-Motive Noncooperative Games 混合动机非合作博弈中的最后通牒启发式

DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-07-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3403673

Dreux Sutcliffe

引用次数: 0

N-Non-Cooperative Games Under a Dynamic Multidimensional Graphical Prism 动态多维图形棱镜下的n-非合作博弈

DecisionSciRN: Cooperative & Non-Cooperative Games (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2019-05-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3391701

Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada, Evangelos Koutronas

引用次数: 0