Microeconomics: Information最新文献

{"title":"Estimating Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information Under Median Restrictions","authors":"Xun Tang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1431493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431493","url":null,"abstract":"I estimate a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information where players' private information are only required to be median independent of observed states and can be correlated with observable states. This median restriction is weaker than other assumptions on players' private information in the literature (e.g. perfect knowledge of its distribution or its independence of the observable states). I show index coefficients in players' utility functions are point-identified under an exclusion restriction and fairly weak conditions on the support of states. This identification strategy is fundamentally different from that in a single-agent binary response models with median restrictions, and does not involve any parametric assumption on equilibrium selection in the presence of multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria. I then propose a two-step extreme estimator for the linear coefficients, and prove its consistency.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116334143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Does the Risk Attitude of a Purchasing Manager Affect the Selection of Suppliers?","authors":"G. Harrison, Sebastian Moritz, Richard Pibernik","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1396169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1396169","url":null,"abstract":"Recently researchers have integrated aspects of supply risk management into decision models for determining the optimal design of supply networks. A purchasing manager faces a fundamental trade-off when designing the supply network and deciding upon the allocation of purchasing volumes across a set of selected suppliers: additional suppliers may act as insurance against disruptions to supply and therefore safeguard supply. However, additional suppliers may also increase the purchasing and overhead costs. One important dimension of this trade-off has not been taken into consideration when evaluating different supplier network options: supplier selection constitutes a decision problem under risk, and so it is reasonable to assume that a purchasing manager’s risk attitude will significantly affect the final outcome. The research presented in this paper intends to provide insights into the potential impact of purchasing managers’ risk attitudes on their supplier selection decisions. We present the results of an artefactual field experiment with 54 managers from 12 industrial companies, and analyze which latent decisionmaking process and which risk attitude best characterizes the behavior of purchasing managers. We find that Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory provide complementary information on the risk attitudes of purchasing managers. Moreover, we illustrate the implications that risk attitudes other than risk neutrality may have on purchasing managers’ supplier selection decisions. We show that even for very conservative estimates of risk aversion it is not appropriate to assume a risk-neutral decision maker when applying a formal model to support supplier selection. We also highlight that the choice of a specific theory of decision making under risk is decisive for determining the optimal number of suppliers and their corresponding volume allocation when developing and applying supplier selection models under risk. In particular, we show why the choice of a purchasing budget for purchasing manager is so important: if it is too high it induces risk-loving behavior, and if it is too low it induces risk-averse behavior. Neither may accurately reflect the preferences of the overall company with respect to supply management decisions.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122040434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Incomplete Information, Higher Order Beliefs, and Price Inertia","authors":"G. Angeletos, Jennifer La'O","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1414443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1414443","url":null,"abstract":"The question that motivates this paper is how incomplete information impacts the response of prices to nominal shocks. Our baseline model is a variant of the Calvo model in which firms observe the underlying nominal shocks with noise. In this model, the response of prices is pinned down by three parameters: the precision of available information about the nominal shock, the frequency of price adjustment, and the degree of strategic complementarity in pricing decisions. This result synthesizes the broader lessons of the pertinent literature. However, this synthesis provides only a partial view of the role of incomplete information. Once one allows for more general information structures than those used in previous work, one cannot quantify the degree of price inertia without data on the dynamics of higher-order beliefs, or of the agents’ forecasts of inflation. We highlight this with three extensions of our baseline model, all of which break the tight connection between the precision of information and higher-order beliefs featured in previous work.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117323960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hierarchical Information and the Rate of Information Diffusion","authors":"Yi Xue, R. Gencay","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1365972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1365972","url":null,"abstract":"The rate of information diffusion and consequently price discovery, is conditional upon not only the design of the market microstructure, but also the informational structure. This paper presents a market microstructure model showing that an increasing number of information hierarchies among informed competitive traders leads to a slower information diffusion rate and informational inefficiency. The model illustrates that informed traders may prefer trading with each other rather than with noise traders in the presence of the information hierarchies. Furthermore, we show that momentum can be generated from the predictable patterns of noise traders, which are assumed to be a function of past prices.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131547841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interactive and Common Knowledge in the State-Space Model","authors":"Ivan Moscati","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1362605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362605","url":null,"abstract":"This paper deals with the prevailing formal model for knowledge in contemporary economics, namely the state-space model introduced by Robert Aumann in 1976. In particular, the paper addresses the following question arising in this formalism: in order to state that an event is interactively or commonly known among a group of agents, do we need to assume that each of them knows how the information is imparted to the others? Aumann answered in the negative, but his arguments apply only to canonical, i.e., completely specified state spaces, while in most applications the state space is not canonical. This paper addresses the same question along original lines, demonstrating that the answer is negative for both canonical and not-canonical state spaces. Further, it shows that this result ensues from two counterintuitive properties held by knowledge in the state-space model, namely Substitutivity and Monotonicity.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116416387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulatory Trust","authors":"Rebecca M. Bratspies","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1364314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364314","url":null,"abstract":"When regulators make decisions in the face of uncertainty, what gives legitimacy to their decisions? Trust clearly plays a role in bridging regulatory uncertainty, but what is the relationship between law and trust? This article offers framework for thinking about trust in regulatory contexts by developing a broad-based, multi-dimensional conception of the roles that trust plays in regulatory systems. Positing that \"regulatory trust\" is unique kind of social trust, this framework traces the reflexive relationship among regulatory trust's components, and explores means to cultivate the regulatory trust necessary to to allow regulatory agencies to govern effectively in the face of fundamental uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"990 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123317849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Rule of Thumb for the Optimal Number of Runs in Monte Carlo Simulations","authors":"J. Gustafsson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1352642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352642","url":null,"abstract":"In general, the understanding of risk could be distinguished in three possible ways; known-knowns, known-unknowns and unknown-unknowns. The known-known risk would certainly refers to the one we know we know, the one we accept. This falls under the daily operations in an risk organization. Further, there are several known-unknowns in risk management. Thoose can be accounted for in some extent in our analysis and strategic decisions, by e.g diversification, investing and improved project management. The unknown-unknown risk would refer to the information of risk we are not aware of, and even worse, are not aware that we are not aware of it. It is almost impossible to mitigate the unknown-unknown risks, however by understanding the known-unknown risks would certainly reduce this uncertainty. This paper discusses one of the most famous known-unknown risk in operational risk modelling, the optimal number of Monte Carlo simulations. We develop and reveals a formula that will upfront make the known-unknown process to a known-known fact.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114692000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Combining Imprecise or Conflicting Probability Judgments: A Choice-Based Study","authors":"A. Baillon, Laure Cabantous","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1352405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1352405","url":null,"abstract":"Sources of uncertainty appear to affect attitude towards ambiguity. For instance, when two advisors agree on a range of probabilities and, when they disagree - one advisor predicting the upper bound of the range while the other predicts the lower bound of the range †decision-makers might have different beliefs about the risk although in both case the mean probability is the same. This study draws upon prospect theory and ambiguity research to empirically test how sources of uncertainty affect decision-makers†beliefs. It contrasts revealed beliefs †the precise probability leading to the same choice as an uncertain probability forecast †with judged beliefs †decision-makers†best estimate of the probability of the risk. It also equips beliefs with two properties - pessimism and likelihood sensitivity†to allow them to vary as a function of the source of uncertainty. Two experiments compare beliefs across sources of uncertainty and across elicitation methods (judged vs. revealed beliefs). Findings support the predictions that the source of ambiguity matters in particular for low and high probability events and that revealed and judged beliefs differ.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115041292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beef Up Your Competitor: A Model of Advertising Cooperation Between Internet Search Engines","authors":"Geza Sapi, Irina Suleymanova","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1371447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1371447","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a duopoly model of competition between internet search engines endowed with different technologies and study the effects of an agreement where the more advanced firm shares its technology with the inferior one. We show that the superior firm enters the agreement only if it results in a large enough increase in demand for advertising space at the competing .rm and a relatively small improvement of the competitor's search quality. Although the superior firm gains market share, the agreement is beneficial for the inferior firm, as the later firm's additional revenues from a higher advertising demand outweigh its losses due to a smaller user pool. The cooperation is likely to be in line with the advertisers' interests and to be detrimental to users' welfare.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123137864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lobbying Under Asymmetric Information","authors":"B. Karabay","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00334.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00334.x","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy-maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy-maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy-maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy-maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.","PeriodicalId":400873,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Information","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124185793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}