Philosophy Compass最新文献

{"title":"Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism","authors":"David Builes","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12959","url":null,"abstract":"According to First‐Person Realism, one's own first‐person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged in some way. After clarifying First‐Person Realism by reference to parallel debates in the metaphysics of modality and time, I survey eight different arguments in favor of First‐Person Realism.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"130 30","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138953620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Predictive coding I: Introduction","authors":"Mark Sprevak","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12950","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Predictive coding – sometimes also known as ‘predictive processing’, ‘free energy minimisation’, or ‘prediction error minimisation’ – claims to offer a complete, unified theory of cognition that stretches all the way from cellular biology to phenomenology. However, the exact content of the view, and how it might achieve its ambitions, is not clear. This series of articles examines predictive coding and attempts to identify its key commitments and justification. The present article begins by focusing on possible confounds with predictive coding: claims that are often identified with predictive coding, but which are not predictive coding. These include the idea that the brain employs an efficient scheme for encoding its incoming sensory signals; that perceptual experience is shaped by prior beliefs; that cognition involves minimisation of prediction error; that the brain is a probabilistic inference engine; and that the brain learns and employs a generative model of the world. These ideas have garnered widespread support in modern cognitive neuroscience, but it is important not to conflate them with predictive coding.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"29 17","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135041576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Transformative Power of Social Movements","authors":"Sahar Heydari Fard","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12951","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Social movements possess transformative and progressive power. In this paper, I argue that how this is so, or even if this is so, depends on one's explanatory framework. I consider three such explanatory frameworks for social movements: methodological individualism, collectivism, and complexity theory. In evaluating the various appeals and weaknesses of these frameworks, I show that complexity theory is uniquely poised to capture the complex and dynamic reality of the social world.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"118 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135138215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemic Aims of Democracy","authors":"Robert Weston Siscoe","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12954","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy CompassEarly View e12954 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemic Aims of Democracy Robert Weston Siscoe, Corresponding Author Robert Weston Siscoe [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7804-9651 University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA Correspondence Robert Weston Siscoe. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Robert Weston Siscoe, Corresponding Author Robert Weston Siscoe [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-7804-9651 University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, USA Correspondence Robert Weston Siscoe. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 October 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12954 This guide accompanies the following article: Siscoe, R.W. (2023). “The Epistemic Aims of Democracy”, Philosophy Compass, e12941. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12941 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issuee12954 RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135092829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Personal Beauty and Personal Agency","authors":"Madeline Martin‐Seaver","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12953","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We make choices about our own appearance and evaluate others' choices – every day. These choices are meaningful for us as individuals and as members of communities. But many features of personal appearance are due to luck, and many cultural beauty standards make some groups and individuals worse off (this is called “lookism”). So, how are we to square these two facets of personal appearance? And how are we to evaluate agency in the context of personal beauty? I identify three ways of responding to these questions: beauty advocacy, beauty skepticism, and beauty revisionism. Advocates connect an honorific sense of beauty with personal character. Skeptics focus on beauty standards, and primarily offer a social critique of beauty standards. Some skeptics suggest embracing other aesthetic ideals – even ugliness. Revisionists critique beauty standards, but retain an honorific sense of beauty. Each position offers tools to evaluate personal agency as aesthetic agency, whether first‐personally or through our appreciation of others' appearance.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135146542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Norms of Inquiry","authors":"Eliran Haziza","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12952","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article provides an overview of recent work on norms of inquiry. After some preliminaries about inquiry in §1, I discuss in §2 the ignorance norm for inquiry, presenting arguments for and against, as well as some alternatives. In §3, I consider its relation to the aim of inquiry. In §4, I discuss positive norms on inquiry: norms that require having rather than lacking certain states. Finally, in §5, I look at questions about the place of norms of inquiry within normative epistemology.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134944653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Justice in Theory and Practice: Debates about Utopianism and Political Action","authors":"B. Laurence","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12945","url":null,"abstract":"This essay provide an overview of debates about the method of political philosophy that have recently gripped the field, focusing on the relationship of theory to practice. These debates can be usefully organized using two oppositions that together carve the field into three broad families of views. Call “practicalism” the view that the theory of justice exists to guide political action. Call “utopianism” the view that reflection on the idea of a just society plays an important role in the theory of justice. Call the view that combines the two positions, “utopian practicalism”. On this view, reflection on the nature of a just society has an important role to play in guiding action. There would appear to be two ways to depart from this position: by rejecting the view's utopianism or its practicalism. So we find in the literature three broad camps: utopian practicalists, anti‐utopians, and anti‐practicalists. This essay provide an opinionated overview the ongoing debates between these three broad positions. It touches on the recent cases against practicalism by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund, the comparativist methodologies advocated by anti‐utopians such as Amartya Sen and Gerry Gaus, and systems failure approaches of Elizabeth Anderson and David Wiens. It also considers the recent development of novel utopian practicalist perspectives in the work of theorists including Erik Wright, Tommie Shelby, Lea Ypi, Pablo Gilabert, and Ben Laurence.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43953383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border’","authors":"Sam Clarke, Jacob Beck","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12949","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12949","url":null,"abstract":"The idea that perception is distinct from cognition is not just intuitive, it is central to countless debates in philosophy and psychology. For example, when researchers ask which properties can be visually represented or visually experienced? They are assuming that there is a difference between properties being represented in (visual) perception, and them merely being represented in post-perceptual thought and cognition. Indeed, many researchers define their careers in terms of this distinction, identifying as philosophers of perception or vision scientists rather than decision theorists or researchers studying human reasoning. With these points in view, it is prudent to ask: What does the distinction between perception and cognition actually amount to? How exactly might a perception-cognition border be drawn, and how much indeterminacy between the categories of perception and cognition should a satisfactory account permit? Perhaps there are, in fact, many perception-cognition borders, each of which is perfectly objective and demands to be recognised by a completed science of the mind – how would we know? Or perhaps the notion of a perception-cognition border is simply confused – a relic of pre-scientific thought, that ought to be eliminated from our scientific ontology? In our main article, we considered recent work which seeks to answer these questions. Here, we provide resources for teaching that material. Firestone, Chaz & Scholl, Brian J. (2016). Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72. Currently, the most sophisticated empirical defence of the claim that perception is cognitively impenetrable. (For some important precursors, see Jerry Fodor's classic [1983] The Modularity of Mind, MA: MIT Press, and Zenon Pylyshyn's [1999] ‘Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22(3): 366-423.) Macpherson, Fiona (2012). Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62. An influential argument that perception can be cognitively penetrated. (Important precursors include the work of new look psychologists, like Jerome Bruner, and philosophical discussions by Thomas Kuhn in his [1962] The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Paul Churchland in his [1988] Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor, Philosophy of Science 55, 167-87.) Green, E. J. (2020). The Perception–Cognition Border: A Case for Architectural Division. Philosophical Review 129 (3):323-393. Defends a version of the modularity thesis which is compatible with certain forms of cognitive penetration. Block, N. (2023). The Border Between Seeing and Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University press. Offers a sustained defence of a perception-cognition border and argues that perception is ‘constitutive","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136248845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Beauvoir and Sartre's “disagreement” about freedom","authors":"K. Kirkpatrick","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12942","url":null,"abstract":"The French existentialists Simone de Beauvoir and Jean‐Paul Sartre are renowned philosophers of freedom. But what “existentialist freedom” is is a matter of disagreement amongst their interpreters and, some argue, between Beauvoir and Sartre themselves. Since the late 1980s several scholars have argued that a Sartrean conception of freedom cannot justify the ethics of existentialism, adequately account for situations of oppression, or serve feminist ends. On these readings, Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about freedom—making existentialist ethics, resistance to oppression, and feminism coherently defensible. This article identifies four conceptions of freedom in order to clarify the questions of whether and how they disagreed, arguing that some incompatibilist readings of Sartre and Beauvoir conflate or confuse these conceptions in ways that render their conclusions unconvincing. However, there are stronger grounds on which to claim that Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about morality—and the conditions of its possibility.","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42394343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Teaching & Learning Guide for: Theorizing Social Change","authors":"Robin Zheng","doi":"10.1111/phc3.12948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12948","url":null,"abstract":"How do we remake our world into a new and better one? Philosophers have been surprisingly reticent on this question. Theories of justice tell us what an ideally justsociety would look like. Ethical theories tell us the morally right thing to do. But philosophers have virtually no such comparably systematic theories of social change, that is, theories telling us the right way to bring about a just society. An underlying interest in social change animates the growing number of what Sally Haslanger (2013) calls “ameliorative” projects that have taken root in the so-called ’core’ areas of metaphysics, epistemology, and language, just as it has promoted greater attention to real-world oppression within ethics, moral psychology, aesthetics, social and political philosophy. This article shows that social change deserves to be recognized as an area of philosophical study in its own right. “The Causes and Patterns of Change” (pp. 14-44) in Charles Harper and Kevin Leicht, (2018) Exploring Social Change, Taylor and Francis, Milton Park. An accessible chapter that provides the social scientific perspective on processes of social change, and is useful for illustrating the scale and depth of transformative social change needed. Wright, Erik Olin (2010) Envisioning Real Utopias, Verso, London. One of the few texts in analytic philosophy that directly addresses the problem of social change, laying out a taxonomy of three main strategies (ruptural, interstitial, symbiotic) for change. Marx, Karl, & Friederich Engels. “The Communist Manifesto” (1848) In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), (2018) The Marx-Engels Reader, W. W. Norton & Company, New York. The classic expression of why transformative social change is needed, along with a theory of how it can and will be brought about. Freire, Paolo (1970/2000) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Bloomsbury, New York. A canonical text drawing on Marxist and postcolonial theory to develop a model of the consciousness-raising that is key to processes of transformative change. hooks, bell (1984) Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, South End Press, Cambridge MA. One of the founding texts of Black feminist theory, presenting a theory of how to end sexist oppression, with emphasis on how it intersects with racist oppression and class exploitation. Collins, Patricia Hill (1990/2000) Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, Routledge, New York. Another foundational text in Black feminist theory, which includes a model of the four domains of oppression and how they form an overarching matrix of domination. Jaggar, Alison M. (1983) Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham MA. A highly comprehensive overview of feminist political theory, with sections outlining four distinct feminist strategies for transformative social change. Young, Iris Marion (2011). Responsibility for Justice. Oxford University Press, New York. An extremely influential text arguing that individual agents bear for","PeriodicalId":40011,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy Compass","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135816782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}