{"title":"Is Protestant Interpretation an Acceptable Attitude Toward Normative Social Practices? An Analysis of Dworkin and Postema","authors":"Thomas Bustamante","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Gerald Postema raised a powerful challenge to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of interpretation. By allowing each interpreter to make her own judgment about the content of a social norm, Dworkinian interpretation becomes insufficiently intersubjective and insufficiently political. In previous work, I argued that this criticism must be rejected because Postema’s own account of law, analogical reasoning, and the rule of law requires one to make a reflected judgment and hold other actors accountable to the law. Nevertheless, a powerful objection claims that protestant interpretation is incompatible with the first person-plural reasoning that an intersubjective social practice requires. In response to the objection, I argue that no such incompatibility exists. On closer examination, protestant interpretation is part of the attitude that a rational agent must adopt if she is to acquit her moral responsibilities as a participant in a social practice.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60655027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Separation of Powers in The Principles of Constitutionalism","authors":"P. Sales","doi":"10.1093/AJJ/AUAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/AJJ/AUAB008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Focusing on Barber’s account of the separation of powers, this essay questions the solidity of the foundations for the constitutional principles he articulates. It argues that his attempt at universalism and his account of the substantive content of the principles come apart. Barber’s attempt to ground universal principles in an account of the nature of the state is questionable, because that account is too thin. In making the conception of the state thick enough to ground the substantive content of his principles, Barber implicitly draws upon particularistic aspects of western liberal constitutional culture. Specific constitutional principles are inevitably grounded in particular legal and constitutional cultures. A primary object of a state is to maintain legitimacy as regards its citizens and an object of the institutions which comprise the state is to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of each other. In a complex and changing world there is no simple or single recipe for this.","PeriodicalId":39920,"journal":{"name":"American Journal of Jurisprudence","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/AJJ/AUAB008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44880727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
