Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference最新文献_第5页

On automated image choice for secure and usable graphical passwords 关于自动图像选择的安全和可用的图形密码

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2420965

Paul Dunphy, P. Olivier

{"title":"On automated image choice for secure and usable graphical passwords","authors":"Paul Dunphy, P. Olivier","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420965","url":null,"abstract":"The usability of graphical passwords based upon recognition of images is widely explored. However, it is likely that their observed high memorability is contingent on certain attributes of the image sets presented to users. Characterizing this relationship remains an open problem; for example, there is no systematic (and empirically verified) method to determine how similarity between the elements of an image set impacts the usability of the login challenge. Strategies to assemble suitable images are usually carried out by hand, which represents a significant barrier to uptake as the process has usability and security implications. In this paper, we explore the role of simple image processing techniques to provide automated assembly of usable login challenges in the context of recognition-based graphical passwords. We firstly carry out a user study to obtain a similarity ranked image set, and use the results to select an optimal per-pixel image similarity metric. Then we conduct a short-term image recall test using Amazon Mechanical Turk with 343 subjects where we manipulated the similarity present in image grids. In the most significant case, we found that our automated methods to choose decoy images could impact the login success rate by 40%, and the median login duration by 35 seconds.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117228525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Down to the bare metal: using processor features for binary analysis 深入到裸机:使用处理器特性进行二进制分析

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2420980

Carsten Willems, R. Hund, Andreas Fobian, Dennis Felsch, Thorsten Holz, Amit Vasudevan

{"title":"Down to the bare metal: using processor features for binary analysis","authors":"Carsten Willems, R. Hund, Andreas Fobian, Dennis Felsch, Thorsten Holz, Amit Vasudevan","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420980","url":null,"abstract":"A detailed understanding of the behavior of exploits and malicious software is necessary to obtain a comprehensive overview of vulnerabilities in operating systems or client applications, and to develop protection techniques and tools. To this end, a lot of research has been done in the last few years on binary analysis techniques to efficiently and precisely analyze code. Most of the common analysis frameworks are based on software emulators since such tools offer a fine-grained control over the execution of a given program. Naturally, this leads to an arms race where the attackers are constantly searching for new methods to detect such analysis frameworks in order to successfully evade analysis.\u0000 In this paper, we focus on two aspects. As a first contribution, we introduce several novel mechanisms by which an attacker can delude an emulator. In contrast to existing detection approaches that perform a dedicated test on the environment and combine the test with an explicit conditional branch, our detection mechanisms introduce code sequences that have an implicitly different behavior on a native machine when compared to an emulator. Such differences in behavior are caused by the side-effects of the particular operations and imperfections in the emulation process that cannot be mitigated easily. Motivated by these findings, we introduce a novel approach to generate execution traces. We propose to utilize the processor itself to generate such traces. Mores precisely, we propose to use a hardware feature called branch tracing available on commodity x86 processors in which the log of all branches taken during code execution is generated directly by the processor. Effectively, the logging is thus performed at the lowest level possible. We evaluate the practical viability of this approach.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117040074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 51

Transforming commodity security policies to enforce Clark-Wilson integrity 转变商品安全政策以执行克拉克-威尔逊原则

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2420991

D. Muthukumaran, S. Rueda, Nirupama Talele, H. Vijayakumar, Jason Teutsch, T. Jaeger

{"title":"Transforming commodity security policies to enforce Clark-Wilson integrity","authors":"D. Muthukumaran, S. Rueda, Nirupama Talele, H. Vijayakumar, Jason Teutsch, T. Jaeger","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420991","url":null,"abstract":"Modern distributed systems are composed from several off-the-shelf components, including operating systems, virtualization infrastructure, and application packages, upon which some custom application software (e.g., web application) is often deployed. While several commodity systems now include mandatory access control (MAC) enforcement to protect the individual components, the complexity of such MAC policies and the myriad of possible interactions among individual hosts in distributed systems makes it difficult to identify the attack paths available to adversaries. As a result, security practitioners react to vulnerabilities as adversaries uncover them, rather than proactively protecting the system's data integrity. In this paper, we develop a mostly-automated method to transform a set of commodity MAC policies into a system-wide policy that proactively protects system integrity, approximating the Clark-Wilson integrity model. The method uses the insights from the Clark-Wilson model, which requires integrity verification of security-critical data and mediation at program entrypoints, to extend existing MAC policies with the proactive mediation necessary to protect system integrity. We demonstrate the practicality of producing Clark-Wilson policies for distributed systems on a web application running on virtualized Ubuntu SELinux hosts, where our method finds: (1) that only 27 additional entrypoint mediators are sufficient to mediate the threats of remote adversaries over the entire distributed system and (2) and only 20 additional local threats require mediation to approximate Clark-Wilson integrity comprehensively. As a result, available security policies can be used as a foundation for proactive integrity protection from both local and remote threats.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127971445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Malicious PDF detection using metadata and structural features 恶意PDF检测使用元数据和结构特征

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2420987

Charles Smutz, A. Stavrou

{"title":"Malicious PDF detection using metadata and structural features","authors":"Charles Smutz, A. Stavrou","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420987","url":null,"abstract":"Owed to their versatile functionality and widespread adoption, PDF documents have become a popular avenue for user exploitation ranging from large-scale phishing attacks to targeted attacks. In this paper, we present a framework for robust detection of malicious documents through machine learning. Our approach is based on features extracted from document metadata and structure. Using real-world datasets, we demonstrate the the adequacy of these document properties for malware detection and the durability of these features across new malware variants. Our analysis shows that the Random Forests classification method, an ensemble classifier that randomly selects features for each individual classification tree, yields the best detection rates, even on previously unseen malware.\u0000 Indeed, using multiple datasets containing an aggregate of over 5,000 unique malicious documents and over 100,000 benign ones, our classification rates remain well above 99% while maintaining low false positives of 0.2% or less for different classification parameters and experimental scenarios. Moreover, the classifier has the ability to detect documents crafted for targeted attacks and separate them from broadly distributed malicious PDF documents. Remarkably, we also discovered that by artificially reducing the influence of the top features in the classifier, we can still achieve a high rate of detection in an adversarial setting where the attacker is aware of both the top features utilized in the classifier and our normality model. Thus, the classifier is resilient against mimicry attacks even with knowledge of the document features, classification method, and training set.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"65 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134640056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 262

Separation virtual machine monitors 分离虚拟机监视器

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2421011

J. McDermott, B. Montrose, Margery Li, J. Kirby, Myong H. Kang

引用次数: 14

Using automated model analysis for reasoning about security of web protocols 使用自动模型分析对web协议的安全性进行推理

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2012-12-03 DOI: 10.1145/2420950.2420993

Apurva Kumar

{"title":"Using automated model analysis for reasoning about security of web protocols","authors":"Apurva Kumar","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420993","url":null,"abstract":"Interoperable identity and trust management infrastructure plays an important role in enabling integrations in cloud computing environments. In the past decade or so, several web-based workflows have emerged as de-facto standards for user identity and resource access across enterprises. Establishing correctness of such web protocols is of immense importance to a large number of common business transactions on the web. In this paper, we propose a framework for analyzing security in web protocols. A novel aspect of our proposal is bringing together two contrasting styles used for security protocol analysis. We use the inference construction style, in which the well-known BAN logic has been extended to reason about web protocols, in conjunction with, an attack construction style that performs SAT based model-checking to rule out certain active attacks. The result is an analysis method that shares simplicity and intuitive appeal of belief logics, at the same time covers a wider range of protocols, along with an ability to automatically find attacks. To illustrate effectiveness, case study of a leading web identity and access management protocol is presented, where application of our analysis method results in a previously unreported attack being identified.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121566992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Distilling critical attack graph surface iteratively through minimum-cost SAT solving 通过最小代价SAT求解迭代提取临界攻击图面

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2011-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/2076732.2076738

Heqing Huang, Su Zhang, Xinming Ou, A. Prakash, K. Sakallah

{"title":"Distilling critical attack graph surface iteratively through minimum-cost SAT solving","authors":"Heqing Huang, Su Zhang, Xinming Ou, A. Prakash, K. Sakallah","doi":"10.1145/2076732.2076738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2076732.2076738","url":null,"abstract":"It has long been recognized that it can be tedious and even infeasible for system administrators to figure out critical security problems residing in full attack graphs, even for small-sized enterprise networks. Therefore a trade-off between analysis accuracy and efficiency needs to be made to achieve a reasonable balance between completeness of the attack graph and its usefulness. In this paper, we provide an approach to attack graph distillation, so that the user can control the amount of information presented by sifting out the most critical portion of the full attack graph. The user can choose to see only the k most critical attack paths, based on specified severity metrics, e.g. the likelihood for an attacker to carry out certain exploit on certain machine and the chance of success. We transform an dependency attack graph into a Boolean formula and assign cost metrics to attack variables in the formula, based on the severity metrics. We then apply Minimum-Cost SAT Solving (MCSS) to find the most critical path in terms of the least cost incurred for the attacker to deploy multi-step attacks leading to certain crucial assets in the network. An iterative process inspired by Counter Example Guided Abstraction and Refinement (CEGAR) is designed to efficiently guide the MCSS to render solutions that contain a controlled number of realistic attack paths, forming a critical attack graph surface. Our method can distill critical attack graph surfaces from the full attack graphs generated for moderate-sized enterprise networks in only several minutes. Experiments on various sized network scenarios show that even for a small-sized critical attack graph surface (around 15% the size of the original full attack graph), the calculated risk metrics are good approximation of the values computed with the full attack graph, meaning the distilled critical attack graph surface is able to capture the crucial security problems in an enterprise network for further in-depth analysis.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124445417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 64

ASIDE: IDE support for web application security 旁白:IDE支持web应用程序安全性

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2011-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/2076732.2076770

Jing Xie, Bill Chu, H. Lipford, J. T. Melton

引用次数: 74

PhorceField: a phish-proof password ceremony PhorceField:一个防网络钓鱼密码仪式

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2011-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/2076732.2076755

M. Hart, C. Castille, Manoj Harpalani, Jonathan Toohill, Rob Johnson

{"title":"PhorceField: a phish-proof password ceremony","authors":"M. Hart, C. Castille, Manoj Harpalani, Jonathan Toohill, Rob Johnson","doi":"10.1145/2076732.2076755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2076732.2076755","url":null,"abstract":"Many widely deployed phishing defense schemes, such as SiteKey, use client-side secrets to help users confirm that they are visiting the correct website before entering their passwords. Unfortunately, studies have demonstrated that up to 92% of users can be convinced to ignore missing client-side secrets and enter their passwords into phishing pages. However, since client-side secrets have already achieved industry acceptance, they are an attractive building block for creating better phishing defenses. We present PhorceField, a phishing resistant password ceremony that combines client-side secrets and graphical passwords in a novel way that provides phishing resistance that neither achieves on its own. PhorceField enables users to login easily, but forces phishers to present victims with a fundamentally unfamiliar and onerous user interface. Victims that try to use the phisher's interface to enter their password find the task so difficult that they give up without revealing their password. We have evaluated PhorceField's phishing resistance in a user study in which 21 participants used PhorceField for a week and were then subjected to a simulated phishing attack. On average, participants were only able to reveal 20% of the entropy in their password, and none of them revealed their entire password. This is a substantial improvement over previous research that demonstrated that 92% of users would reveal their entire password to a phisher, even if important security indicators were missing[27].\u0000 PhorceField is easy to deploy in sites that already use client-side secrets for phishing defense -- it requires no client-side software and can be implemented entirely in javascript. Banks and other high value websites could therefore deploy it as a drop-in replacement for existing defenses, or deploy it on an \"opt-in\" basis, as Google has done with its phone-based \"2-step verification\" system.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133607841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Facing the facts about image type in recognition-based graphical passwords 面对基于识别的图形密码中图像类型的问题

Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference Pub Date : 2011-12-05 DOI: 10.1145/2076732.2076754

Max Hlywa, R. Biddle, Andrew S. Patrick

引用次数: 33