通过最小代价SAT求解迭代提取临界攻击图面

Heqing Huang, Su Zhang, Xinming Ou, A. Prakash, K. Sakallah
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引用次数: 64

摘要

人们早就认识到,即使对于小型企业网络,系统管理员要找出存在于完整攻击图中的关键安全问题可能是乏味的,甚至是不可行的。因此,需要在分析准确性和效率之间进行权衡,以在攻击图的完整性和有用性之间取得合理的平衡。在本文中,我们提供了一种攻击图蒸馏的方法,使用户可以通过筛选出整个攻击图中最关键的部分来控制所呈现的信息量。用户可以选择只查看k个最关键的攻击路径,基于指定的严重性指标,例如,攻击者在特定机器上执行某些漏洞的可能性和成功的机会。我们将依赖攻击图转换为布尔公式,并根据严重性度量为公式中的攻击变量分配成本度量。然后,我们应用最小成本SAT求解(MCSS),根据攻击者部署导致网络中某些关键资产的多步攻击的最小成本,找到最关键的路径。受反例引导抽象和细化(CEGAR)的启发,设计了一个迭代过程,以有效地引导MCSS呈现包含受控数量的现实攻击路径的解决方案,形成一个关键的攻击图面。我们的方法可以在几分钟内从中型企业网络生成的完整攻击图中提取出关键攻击图面。在各种规模的网络场景中进行的实验表明,即使对于较小规模的关键攻击图面(约为原始完整攻击图大小的15%),计算出的风险指标也很接近完整攻击图计算出的值,这意味着提炼出的关键攻击图面能够捕捉到企业网络中的关键安全问题,以便进一步深入分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Distilling critical attack graph surface iteratively through minimum-cost SAT solving
It has long been recognized that it can be tedious and even infeasible for system administrators to figure out critical security problems residing in full attack graphs, even for small-sized enterprise networks. Therefore a trade-off between analysis accuracy and efficiency needs to be made to achieve a reasonable balance between completeness of the attack graph and its usefulness. In this paper, we provide an approach to attack graph distillation, so that the user can control the amount of information presented by sifting out the most critical portion of the full attack graph. The user can choose to see only the k most critical attack paths, based on specified severity metrics, e.g. the likelihood for an attacker to carry out certain exploit on certain machine and the chance of success. We transform an dependency attack graph into a Boolean formula and assign cost metrics to attack variables in the formula, based on the severity metrics. We then apply Minimum-Cost SAT Solving (MCSS) to find the most critical path in terms of the least cost incurred for the attacker to deploy multi-step attacks leading to certain crucial assets in the network. An iterative process inspired by Counter Example Guided Abstraction and Refinement (CEGAR) is designed to efficiently guide the MCSS to render solutions that contain a controlled number of realistic attack paths, forming a critical attack graph surface. Our method can distill critical attack graph surfaces from the full attack graphs generated for moderate-sized enterprise networks in only several minutes. Experiments on various sized network scenarios show that even for a small-sized critical attack graph surface (around 15% the size of the original full attack graph), the calculated risk metrics are good approximation of the values computed with the full attack graph, meaning the distilled critical attack graph surface is able to capture the crucial security problems in an enterprise network for further in-depth analysis.
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