{"title":"SensorSift: balancing sensor data privacy and utility in automated face understanding","authors":"Miro Enev, Jaeyeon Jung, Liefeng Bo, Xiaofeng Ren, Tadayoshi Kohno","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420975","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce SensorSift, a new theoretical scheme for balancing utility and privacy in smart sensor applications. At the heart of our contribution is an algorithm which transforms raw sensor data into a 'sifted' representation which minimizes exposure of user defined private attributes while maximally exposing application-requested public attributes. We envision multiple applications using the same platform, and requesting access to public attributes explicitly not known at the time of the platform creation. Support for future-defined public attributes, while still preserving the defined privacy of the private attributes, is a central challenge that we tackle.\u0000 To evaluate our approach, we apply SensorSift to the PubFig dataset of celebrity face images, and study how well we can simultaneously hide and reveal various policy combinations of face attributes using machine classifiers.\u0000 We find that as long as the public and private attributes are not significantly correlated, it is possible to generate a sifting transformation which reduces private attribute inferences to random guessing while maximally retaining classifier accuracy of public attributes relative to raw data (average PubLoss = .053 and PrivLoss = .075, see Figure 4). In addition, our sifting transformations led to consistent classification performance when evaluated using a set of five modern machine learning methods (linear SVM, kNearest Neighbors, Random Forests, kernel SVM, and Neural Nets).","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131670547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. McCarney, David Barrera, Jeremy Clark, S. Chiasson, P. V. Oorschot
{"title":"Tapas: design, implementation, and usability evaluation of a password manager","authors":"D. McCarney, David Barrera, Jeremy Clark, S. Chiasson, P. V. Oorschot","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420964","url":null,"abstract":"Passwords continue to prevail on the web as the primary method for user authentication despite their well-known security and usability drawbacks. Password managers offer some improvement without requiring server-side changes. In this paper, we evaluate the security of dual-possession authentication, an authentication approach offering encrypted storage of passwords and theft-resistance without the use of a master password. We further introduce Tapas, a concrete implementation of dual-possession authentication leveraging a desktop computer and a smartphone. Tapas requires no server-side changes to websites, no master password, and protects all the stored passwords in the event either the primary or secondary device (e.g., computer or phone) is stolen. To evaluate the viability of Tapas as an alternative to traditional password managers, we perform a 30 participant user study comparing Tapas to two configurations of Firefox's built-in password manager. We found users significantly preferred Tapas. We then improve Tapas by incorporating feedback from this study, and reevaluate it with an additional 10 participants.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126458503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yingnong Dang, D. Zhang, Song Ge, Chengyun Chu, Yingjun Qiu, Tao Xie
{"title":"XIAO: tuning code clones at hands of engineers in practice","authors":"Yingnong Dang, D. Zhang, Song Ge, Chengyun Chu, Yingjun Qiu, Tao Xie","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2421004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2421004","url":null,"abstract":"During software development, engineers often reuse a code fragment via copy-and-paste with or without modifications or adaptations. Such practices lead to a number of the same or similar code fragments spreading within one or many large codebases. Detecting code clones has been shown to be useful towards security such as detection of similar security bugs and, more generally, quality improvement such as refactoring of code clones. A large number of academic research projects have been carried out on empirical studies or tool supports for detecting code clones. In this paper, we report our experiences of carrying out successful technology transfer of our new approach of code-clone detection, called XIAO. XIAO has been integrated into Microsoft Visual Studio 2012, to be benefiting a huge number of developers in industry. The main success factors of XIAO include its high tunability, scalability, compatibility, and explorability. Based on substantial industrial experiences, we present the XIAO approach with emphasis on these success factors of XIAO. We also present empirical results on applying XIAO on real scenarios within Microsoft for the tasks of security-bug detection and refactoring.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114820289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sumayah A. Alrwais, Alexandre Gerber, Christopher W. Dunn, O. Spatscheck, Minaxi Gupta, E. Osterweil
{"title":"Dissecting ghost clicks: ad fraud via misdirected human clicks","authors":"Sumayah A. Alrwais, Alexandre Gerber, Christopher W. Dunn, O. Spatscheck, Minaxi Gupta, E. Osterweil","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420954","url":null,"abstract":"FBI's Operation Ghost Click, the largest cybercriminal takedown in history, recently took down an ad fraud infrastructure that affected 4 million users and made its owners 14 million USD over a period of four years. The attackers hijacked clicks and ad impressions on victim machines infected by a DNS changer malware to earn ad revenue fraudulently. We experimented with the attack infrastructure when it was in operation and present a detailed account of the attackers' modus operandi. We also study the impact of this attack on real-world users and find that 37 subscriber lines were impacted in our data set. Also, 20 ad networks and 257 legitimate Web content publishers lost ad revenue while the attackers earned revenue convincing a dozen other ad networks that their ads were served on websites with real visitors. Our work expands the understanding of modalities of ad fraud and could help guide appropriate defense strategies.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124799733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, A. Juels, Alina Oprea
{"title":"Iris: a scalable cloud file system with efficient integrity checks","authors":"Emil Stefanov, Marten van Dijk, A. Juels, Alina Oprea","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420985","url":null,"abstract":"We present Iris, a practical, authenticated file system designed to support workloads from large enterprises storing data in the cloud and be resilient against potentially untrustworthy service providers. As a transparent layer enforcing strong integrity guarantees, Iris lets an enterprise tenant maintain a large file system in the cloud. In Iris, tenants obtain strong assurance not just on data integrity, but also on data freshness, as well as data retrievability in case of accidental or adversarial cloud failures.\u0000 Iris offers an architecture scalable to many clients (on the order of hundreds or even thousands) issuing operations on the file system in parallel. Iris includes new optimization and enterprise-side caching techniques specifically designed to overcome the high network latency typically experienced when accessing cloud storage. Iris also includes novel erasure coding techniques for the first efficient construction of a dynamic Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) protocol over the entire file system.\u0000 We describe our architecture and experimental results on a prototype version of Iris. Iris achieves end-to-end throughput of up to 260MB per second for 100 clients issuing simultaneous requests on the file system. (This limit is dictated by the available network bandwidth and maximum hard drive throughput.) We demonstrate that strong integrity protection in the cloud can be achieved with minimal performance degradation.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129929935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security economics: a personal perspective","authors":"Ross J. Anderson","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420971","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420971","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the origins of security economics. The birth of this thriving new discipline is sometimes credited to a talk I gave at ACSAC in December 2001, but the story is more complex. After sabbatical visits to Berkeley in 2001--2 to work with Hal Varian, we organised the first Workshop on the Economics of Information Security in June 2002. Since then the field has grown to encompass arguments over open versus proprietary systems, the econometrics of online crime, the behavioural economics of security and much else. It has started to have a significant impact on policy, with security-economics studies of cybercrime and infrastructure vulnerability being adopted as policy in the EU, while security economics PhDs have got influential jobs in the White House and elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128588195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Iasonas Polakis, M. Lancini, Georgios Kontaxis, F. Maggi, S. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, S. Zanero
{"title":"All your face are belong to us: breaking Facebook's social authentication","authors":"Iasonas Polakis, M. Lancini, Georgios Kontaxis, F. Maggi, S. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, S. Zanero","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2421008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2421008","url":null,"abstract":"Two-factor authentication is widely used by high-value services to prevent adversaries from compromising accounts using stolen credentials. Facebook has recently released a two-factor authentication mechanism, referred to as Social Authentication, which requires users to identify some of their friends in randomly selected photos. A recent study has provided a formal analysis of social authentication weaknesses against attackers inside the victim's social circles. In this paper, we extend the threat model and study the attack surface of social authentication in practice, and show how any attacker can obtain the information needed to solve the challenges presented by Facebook. We implement a proof-of-concept system that utilizes widely available face recognition software and cloud services, and evaluate it using real public data collected from Facebook. Under the assumptions of Facebook's threat model, our results show that an attacker can obtain access to (sensitive) information for at least 42% of a user's friends that Facebook uses to generate social authentication challenges. By relying solely on publicly accessible information, a casual attacker can solve 22% of the social authentication tests in an automated fashion, and gain a significant advantage for an additional 56% of the tests, as opposed to just guessing. Additionally, we simulate the scenario of a determined attacker placing himself inside the victim's social circle by employing dummy accounts. In this case, the accuracy of our attack greatly increases and reaches 100% when 120 faces per friend are accessible by the attacker, even though it is very accurate with as little as 10 faces.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126230018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Claudio Marforio, H. Ritzdorf, Aurélien Francillon, Srdjan Capkun
{"title":"Analysis of the communication between colluding applications on modern smartphones","authors":"Claudio Marforio, H. Ritzdorf, Aurélien Francillon, Srdjan Capkun","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420958","url":null,"abstract":"Modern smartphones that implement permission-based security mechanisms suffer from attacks by colluding applications. Users are not made aware of possible implications of application collusion attacks---quite the contrary---on existing platforms, users are implicitly led to believe that by approving the installation of each application independently, they can limit the damage that an application can cause.\u0000 We implement and analyze a number of covert and overt communication channels that enable applications to collude and therefore indirectly escalate their permissions. Furthermore, we present and implement a covert channel between an installed application and a web page loaded in the system browser. We measure the throughput of all these channels as well as their bit-error rate and required synchronization for successful data transmission. The measured throughput of covert channels ranges from 3.7 bps to 3.27 kbps on a Nexus One phone and from 0.47 bps to 4.22 kbps on a Samsung Galaxy S phone; such throughputs are sufficient to efficiently exchange users' sensitive information (e.g., GPS coordinates or contacts). We test two popular research tools that track information flow or detect communication channels on mobile platforms, and confirm that even if they detect some channels, they still do not detect all the channels and therefore fail to fully prevent application collusion. Attacks using covert communication channels remain, therefore, a real threat to smartphone security and an open problem for the research community.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132735356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Martin Johns, Sebastian Lekies, Bastian Braun, Benjamin Flesch
{"title":"BetterAuth: web authentication revisited","authors":"Martin Johns, Sebastian Lekies, Bastian Braun, Benjamin Flesch","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420977","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420977","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents \"BetterAuth\", an authentication protocol for Web applications. Its design is based on the experiences of two decades with the Web. BetterAuth addresses existing attacks on Web authentication, ranging from network attacks to Cross-site Request Forgery up to Phishing. Furthermore, the protocol can be realized completely in standard JavaScript. This allows Web applications an early adoption, even in a situation with limited browser support.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131650262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pieter Agten, S. Acker, Yoran Brondsema, Phu H. Phung, Lieven Desmet, F. Piessens
{"title":"JSand: complete client-side sandboxing of third-party JavaScript without browser modifications","authors":"Pieter Agten, S. Acker, Yoran Brondsema, Phu H. Phung, Lieven Desmet, F. Piessens","doi":"10.1145/2420950.2420952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2420950.2420952","url":null,"abstract":"The inclusion of third-party scripts in web pages is a common practice. A recent study has shown that more than half of the Alexa top 10000 sites include scripts from more than 5 different origins. However, such script inclusions carry risks, as the included scripts operate with the privileges of the including website.\u0000 We propose JSand, a server-driven but client-side JavaScript sandboxing framework. JSand requires no browser modifications: the sandboxing framework is implemented in JavaScript and is delivered to the browser by the websites that use it. Enforcement is done entirely at the client side: JSand enforces a server-specified policy on included scripts without requiring server-side filtering or rewriting of scripts. Most importantly, JSand is complete: access to all resources is mediated by the sandbox.\u0000 We describe the design and implementation of JSand, and we show that it is secure, backwards compatible, and that it performs sufficiently well.","PeriodicalId":397003,"journal":{"name":"Asia-Pacific Computer Systems Architecture Conference","volume":"64 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116367912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}