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Interplay Between Competition Networks, Strategy Uniqueness, and Hedge Fund Performance 竞争网络、策略独特性与对冲基金绩效之间的相互作用
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2025-07-02 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.70001
Maher Kooli, Min Zhang
{"title":"Interplay Between Competition Networks, Strategy Uniqueness, and Hedge Fund Performance","authors":"Maher Kooli,&nbsp;Min Zhang","doi":"10.1111/fmii.70001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.70001","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the effect of competition networks among hedge fund managers on strategy distinctiveness and fund performance. Using a sample of 2711 US-based hedge funds from the Lipper TASS database between 1994 and 2018, we construct a hedge fund competition network (HFCN) based on alumni and employment ties derived from LinkedIn profiles. We find that greater centrality in the HFCN, indicating closer proximity to peer competitors, is associated with lower abnormal performance. This effect is partially mediated by a decline in strategy distinctiveness, measured by the Strategy Distinctiveness Index (SDI). Funds with stronger network ties tend to exhibit greater return similarity with peers, suggesting that social proximity encourages strategic conformity. The results are robust across performance metrics, style classifications, and subsamples and are particularly pronounced among managers with strong cognitive profiles.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 4","pages":"173-195"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.70001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145237099","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Estimating Hedge Fund Leverage: A Three-Step Estimation Protocol 估计对冲基金杠杆：一个三步估计协议
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2025-05-22 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12214
Ariston Karagiorgis, Konstantinos Drakos
{"title":"Estimating Hedge Fund Leverage: A Three-Step Estimation Protocol","authors":"Ariston Karagiorgis,&nbsp;Konstantinos Drakos","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12214","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Utilizing a micro-level hedge fund dataset, we propose a methodology for estimating hedge fund leverage. Initially, we perform a Principal Component Analysis on a set of 49 risk factors for dimension deduction purposes. After acquiring 10 Principal Components, we deploy the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator regression (Lasso) per fund by seven 3-year monthly non-overlapping intervals in order to select which Principal Components affect each fund's return. As a last step, we execute a regression in the same manner as previously, with only the non-zero Principal Components. By aggregating <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <mrow>\u0000 <mi>β</mi>\u0000 <mi>s</mi>\u0000 </mrow>\u0000 <annotation>$beta {rm s}$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math>, we estimate an average sectorial leverage of 3.3 with an average <span></span><math>\u0000 <semantics>\u0000 <msup>\u0000 <mi>R</mi>\u0000 <mn>2</mn>\u0000 </msup>\u0000 <annotation>$R^2$</annotation>\u0000 </semantics></math> of 58.2%. Moreover, we observe an analogous degree of Deleveraging in 2007–2009 that includes the 2008 financial crisis as in 2019–2021 that includes the COVID-19 stress period.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 4","pages":"155-172"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12214","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145237252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How Do Banks Respond to Supplier IPOs? 银行如何应对供应商ipo ？
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2025-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12212
Sung C. Bae, Iftekhar Hasan, Liuling Liu, Haizhi Wang
{"title":"How Do Banks Respond to Supplier IPOs?","authors":"Sung C. Bae,&nbsp;Iftekhar Hasan,&nbsp;Liuling Liu,&nbsp;Haizhi Wang","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12212","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how supplier IPO events affect their key customers’ cost of debt. The evidence reveals that average loan spreads for customers increase by roughly 20% (23.7 basis points) following suppliers’ IPO events. This negative spillover effect is more pronounced when suppliers make significant relationship-specific investments (high switching cost), when suppliers face less concentrated customer bases, or when customers face more concentrated supplier bases. Our results show that customers receive less favourable trade terms and are forced to pay more for inputs after their suppliers go public, all of which increase customers’ operational costs, risk and subsequent borrowing costs. Furthermore, we document that customer loan contracts become significantly more restrictive after a supplier's IPO. Finally, we find that the observed negative spillover effect is also present in customers’ access to the public bond market.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 3","pages":"111-129"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12212","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opportunistic Insider Trading During the COVID-19 Pandemic COVID-19大流行期间的机会主义内幕交易
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2025-04-06 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12213
Bijoy Chandra Das
{"title":"Opportunistic Insider Trading During the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"Bijoy Chandra Das","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12213","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines whether opportunistic or routine insiders in US markets engage in informed trading and earn higher short-term returns during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our findings indicate that trades by opportunistic insiders are indeed informative, yielding higher returns compared to those of routine insiders during the pandemic. Interestingly, we also observe that opportunistic directors earn higher returns than CEOs. Additionally, opportunistic insiders trading in the Nasdaq market achieve higher returns compared to those in the NYSE, and opportunistic insiders in the financial sector outperform those in the non-financial sector. Our results remain robust across various model specifications, alternative measures and considerations for endogeneity. Overall, our findings suggest that opportunistic insiders possess a significant informational advantage, enabling them to engage in informed trading during the pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 3","pages":"131-149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12213","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144536987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Financial flexibility and the persistence of extreme financial leverage policies: A new empirical approach 金融弹性与极端金融杠杆政策的持久性：一种新的实证方法
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12211
Tahera Ebrahimi, Basil Al-Najjar
{"title":"Financial flexibility and the persistence of extreme financial leverage policies: A new empirical approach","authors":"Tahera Ebrahimi,&nbsp;Basil Al-Najjar","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12211","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Firms might adopt capital structure policies which are far away from their optimal targets, this is known in the literature as extreme financing policies. Unlike previous empirical studies, our research sheds new light on the impact of financial flexibility (changes in credit ratings and over/underinvestment) on the duration of these policies. Using a large sample of US firms for the period from 1985 to 2017, we employ a novel empirical approach of multilevel survival model estimators for different subsamples of conservative and aggressive debt policy users. The results show that, on average, the duration of extreme financing policies renders the degree of urgency to shift towards firms' optimal leverage. Accordingly, firms adopting extreme financial policies are less keen to adjust quickly to their target debt ratios and such speed of adjustment varies between conservative and aggressive debt users. Our results provide interesting empirical implications for firms adopting conservative or aggressive debt policies.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 2","pages":"85-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2025-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12211","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143801726","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The political and economic environment promoting growth in American wealth inequality 促进美国财富不平等增长的政治和经济环境
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2024-11-18 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12210
Lucy F. Ackert, Gabriel G. Ramirez
{"title":"The political and economic environment promoting growth in American wealth inequality","authors":"Lucy F. Ackert,&nbsp;Gabriel G. Ramirez","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12210","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Wealth inequality around the world is high and rising. In this paper, we argue that wealth inequality in the United States has been exacerbated by an environment favourable to the ultra-wealthy. Three distinctive changes in the economic and political landscape have fostered the increase in inequality. First, campaign finance law abruptly changed after the Citizens United Supreme Court decision. This decision gave the ultra-wealthy an outsized influence on American politics. Second, an increase in competition for executive talent drove CEO salaries to new heights. Demand increased for executives with general leadership skills as corporations grew larger, increasing competition in the market for executive talent. Third, because tax policy in the United States is subject to lobbying influences, those at the top of the wealth distribution are favoured, leading to further concentration in wealth. Our empirical results are consistent with the view that these changes resulted in an increase in disparity, shifting wealth from the 99% to the 1%.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 2","pages":"71-84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fmii.12210","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143801600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Does it cost to be politically connected? An examination of the grabbing hand hypothesis using corporate taxes 拥有政治人脉需要付出代价吗？用公司税对“抢夺之手”假说的检验
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2024-09-11 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12209
Taufiq Arifin, Rezaul Kabir
{"title":"Does it cost to be politically connected? An examination of the grabbing hand hypothesis using corporate taxes","authors":"Taufiq Arifin,&nbsp;Rezaul Kabir","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12209","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Extant studies on political connections document both benefits and costs for firms. In this study, we investigate whether politically connected firms pay higher taxes than their non-connected counterparts and thus facilitate politicians to receive political benefits. Using the presidential election in Indonesia as an exogenous event, and analysing a sample of Indonesian listed firms over the period 2007–2016, we show that politicians extract resources from firms to realise their political objectives, for example, increasing tax revenues and gaining votes. We also find that politicians pursue more rent-seeking among firms with transactional political connections. In return for over-payment of corporate taxes, these connected firms enjoy lower cost of borrowing and higher firm value after the election year. These results are robust to the use of different regression techniques (i.e., pooled ordinary least square and probit) and tests (i.e., endogeneity, parallel trend assumption and placebo), and support the grabbing hand hypothesis of political connections. Our study contributes to the scarce literature showing that politically connected firms help politicians by providing higher tax revenues and experience a lower cost of debt and higher firm value in exchange for providing this favour to politicians.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 1","pages":"39-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143114129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do high-centrality CEOs influence audit outcomes? 高中心性ceo会影响审计结果吗？
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2024-09-09 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12208
Mohamad Mazboudi, Salim Chahine, Yiwei Fang, Mingying Cheng
{"title":"Do high-centrality CEOs influence audit outcomes?","authors":"Mohamad Mazboudi,&nbsp;Salim Chahine,&nbsp;Yiwei Fang,&nbsp;Mingying Cheng","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12208","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using insights from the social network theory which posits that individuals with high network centrality have influence and power within their social networks, we argue that CEO network centrality increases the CEO bargaining power in audit fee negotiations. We find that audit fees are lower in firms managed by CEOs with high network centrality. We also find that high-centrality CEOs do not negotiate audit fees at the expense of lower-quality audit services. We further document the influence high-centrality CEOs have on the audit decisions of their social peers within the network. For example, we show that less central (i.e., peripheral) CEOs are likely to hire auditors that do work for firms with CEOs enjoying high levels of network centrality. Together our findings suggest that high network centrality reflects a bargaining power CEOs can use to lower their audit fees.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"34 1","pages":"3-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143113853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do banks adjust their capital when they face liquidity shortages? Evidence from U.S. commercial banks 银行在面临流动性短缺时是否会调整资本？来自美国商业银行的证据
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2024-07-30 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12207
Thierno Amadou Barry, Alassane Diabaté, Amine Tarazi
{"title":"Do banks adjust their capital when they face liquidity shortages? Evidence from U.S. commercial banks","authors":"Thierno Amadou Barry,&nbsp;Alassane Diabaté,&nbsp;Amine Tarazi","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12207","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate how small and large banks behave when they face liquidity shortages. Our findings reveal that only small banks increase their capital ratios during episodes of liquidity shortages. They do so by downsizing but also by holding less risky assets and by reducing their lending. Furthermore, the increase in capital ratios is higher for small banks which are more reliant on market liquidity and small banks operating below their target capital ratio. On the whole, our findings show that small banks operate prudently whereas large banks are less concerned. Our work has strong implications for bank regulation and supervision.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"33 5","pages":"515-542"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142642526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Piercing through the haze: Did PPP increase versus decrease bank efficiency? 穿透阴霾：公私伙伴关系提高还是降低了银行效率？
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2024-07-23 DOI: 10.1111/fmii.12206
Allen N. Berger, Cristina Ortega, Raluca A. Roman
{"title":"Piercing through the haze: Did PPP increase versus decrease bank efficiency?","authors":"Allen N. Berger,&nbsp;Cristina Ortega,&nbsp;Raluca A. Roman","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12206","DOIUrl":"10.1111/fmii.12206","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study profit and cost efficiency effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) for US banks that disbursed the funds. Using bank-level data combined with PPP bailout data and instrumental variables and other techniques for identification, our findings suggest that more intense PPP lending boosted bank profit efficiency but decreased cost efficiency. We uncover channels for profit efficiency improvements through higher revenues from core deposits and lending, and a labour-related channel for the decline in bank cost efficiency from hiring more employees and significantly increasing compensation expenses. Findings are robust to many checks and may have important implications for bank management and future government bailout policy design.</p>","PeriodicalId":39670,"journal":{"name":"Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments","volume":"33 5","pages":"479-514"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141812056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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