{"title":"The Ethics of Refusing Lifesaving Treatment Following a Failed Suicide Attempt.","authors":"Megan K Applewhite, Jacob Mago, Wayne Shelton","doi":"10.1086/726974","DOIUrl":"10.1086/726974","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>AbstractInjuries from failed suicide attempts account for a large number of patients cared for in the emergency and trauma setting. While a fundamental underpinning of clinical ethics is that patients have a right to refuse treatment, individuals presenting with life-threating injuries resulting from suicide attempts are almost universally treated in this acute care setting. Here we discuss the limitations on physician ability to determine capacity in this setting and the challenges these pose in carrying out patient wishes.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"34 3","pages":"273-277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41215393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vanessa Madrigal, Kate MacDuffie, Erin Talati Paquette
{"title":"Addressing Racism in the Healthcare Encounter: The Role of Clinical Ethics Consultants.","authors":"Vanessa Madrigal, Kate MacDuffie, Erin Talati Paquette","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Clinical ethicists move in different environments and interface with a variety of stakeholders, and are therefore uniquely positioned to answer the call for equity and anti-racism. We describe why a clinical ethicist should contribute to anti-racism efforts and describe general approaches for addressing racism across institutional contexts, including: (1) addressing racism as bedside clinical ethics consultant, (2) addressing wider lens of anti-racism work across multiple ethics consults over time, and (3) addressing racism at the organizational level.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 3","pages":"202-209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33479054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephen P Pittman, Syed M Alam, Tarris Rosell, Ajay K Nangia
{"title":"Infertility Counseling and Misattributed Paternity: When Should Physicians Become Involved in Family Affairs?","authors":"Stephen P Pittman, Syed M Alam, Tarris Rosell, Ajay K Nangia","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Infertility specialists may be confronted with the ethical dilemma of whether to disclose misattributed paternity (MP). Physicians should be prepared for instances when an assumed father's evaluation reveals a condition known for lifelong infertility, for example, congenital bilateral absence of vas deferens (CBAVD). When there is doubt regarding a patient's comprehension of his diagnosis, physicians must consider whether further disclosure is warranted. This article describes a case of MP with ethics analysis that concludes that limited nondisclosure is most consistent with a physician's principled duties to inform, to respect patients' autonomy, and to employ nonmaleficence (including the avoidance of psychosocial harms).</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"151-156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40193500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Knowing Together: The Physician-Patient Encounter and Encountering Others: Imagining Relationships and Vulnerable Possibilities.","authors":"Norman Quist","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this essay, by example of the physician-patient relationship and drawing on the work of D.W. Winnicott, I explore what may be possible together in relationships, and in the pursuit of health and flourishing, at understanding what we need, and getting ourselves and the other \"right\"-what we are afraid of and how we get each other wrong, and the distance or gap between \"what has been\" and \"what might be.\" In pursuit of these questions, I consider what both physicians and patients might endeavor to do together to address this distance: to recognize and respond to each other, and to identify and address common needs and felt distances. And, how, along the way, we may be able to better identify and understand fundamental challenges to all relationships. Finally, I ask the reader to imagine a physician-patient encounter (and all relationships) as vulnerable possibilities. And I suggest a method for a way forward. While we may not always get what we want in a relationship, perhaps our earnest effort at knowing together will open a potential space for us to get what we need. This is where I imagine that the physician-patient relationship begins: where all relationships begin.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 3","pages":"249-256"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33470066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Argument for Standardized Ethical Directives for Secular Healthcare Services.","authors":"Abram L Brummett, Jamie C Watson","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We argue that the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities has endorsed a facilitation approach to clinical ethics consultation that asserts that bioethicists can offer moral recommendations that are well-grounded in bioethical consensus. We claim that the closest thing the field currently has to a citable, nationally endorsed bioethical consensus are the 22 Core References used to construct the questions for the Healthcare Ethics Consultant-Certified (HEC-C) exam. We acknowledge that the Core References reflect some important points of bioethical consensus, but note they are unwieldy, repetitive, and sometimes inconsistent on important issues faced by clinical ethicists. In this article, we draw carefully qualified inspiration from the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs) to argue for the creation of a concise, nationally endorsed bioethical consensus document on moral issues commonly faced in clinical ethics, what we call the Standardized Ethical Guidelines for Secular Health Care Services (SEGs). We observe that such a document would better meet the expectations of stakeholders, clinical ethicists, and their trainees who desire moral recommendations grounded in a clearly articulated bioethical consensus, and we defend the SEGs from some common objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 3","pages":"175-188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33479051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethics of Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation under Conventional and Crisis Standards of Care.","authors":"Gina M Piscitello, Mark Siegler, William F Parker","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) is a form of life support for cardiac and/or pulmonary failure with unique ethical challenges compared to other forms of life support. Ethical challenges with ECMO exist when conventional standards of care apply, and are exacerbated during periods of absolute ECMO scarcity when \"crisis standards of care\" are instituted. When conventional standards of care apply, we propose that it is ethically permissible to withhold placing patients on ECMO for reasons of technical futility or when patients have terminal, short-term prognoses that are untreatable by ECMO. Under crisis standards of care, it is ethically permissible to broaden exclusionary criteria to also withhold ECMO from patients who have a low likelihood of recovery, to maximize the overall number of lives saved. Unilateral withdrawal of ECMO against a patient's preferences is unethical under conventional standards of care, but is ethical under crisis standards of care to increase access to ECMO to others in society. ECMO should only be rationed when true scarcity exists, and allocation protocols should be transparent to the public. When rationing must occur under crisis standards of care, it is imperative that oversight bodies assess for inequities in the allocation of ECMO and make frequent changes to improve any inequities.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 1","pages":"13-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9648099/pdf/nihms-1840946.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39874995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Howard J Finger, Cheryl A Dury, Giorgio R Sansone, Rani N Rao, Nancy Neveloff Dubler
{"title":"An Interdisciplinary Ethics Panel Approach to End-of-Life Decision Making for Unbefriended Nursing Home Residents.","authors":"Howard J Finger, Cheryl A Dury, Giorgio R Sansone, Rani N Rao, Nancy Neveloff Dubler","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>For those with advanced life-limiting illness, the optimization of quality of life and avoidance of nonbeneficial treatments at the end of life are key ethical concerns. This article evaluates the efficacy of an Interdisciplinary Ethics Panel (IEP) approach to decision making at the end of life for unbefriended nursing home residents who lack decisional capacity and have advanced life-limiting illness, through the use of a nine-step algorithm developed for this purpose. We reviewed the outcomes of three quality-of-care phased initiatives conducted in our facility, a large public nursing home in New York City, between June 2016 and February 2020, which indicated that this IEP approach promoted advance-care planning, as palliative measures were endorsed to optimize quality of life for this vulnerable population at the end of life. We also examined another quality-of-care initiative when this IEP approach was applied to end-of-life decision making for nursing home residents who had a surrogate during the COVID-19 pandemic. This application appeared to be beneficial in adding more residents to our Palliative Care Program while it improved rates of advance-care planning. When all of the above findings are considered, we believe this novel IEP approach and algorithm have the potential to be applied elsewhere after appropriate assessment.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"101-111"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40193495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Distress and Involuntary COVID-19 Vaccination of a Mature Minor Receiving Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment.","authors":"Brent M Kious, Toni Hesse, Philip L Baese","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 is a highly controversial issue, and many members of the public oppose it on the grounds that they should be free to determine what happens to their own body. Opinion has generally favored parental authority with respect to vaccination of children, but less attention has been paid to the ethical complexities of how to respond when mature minors refuse vaccination that is requested by their parents. We present a case in which an mature minor, who was psychiatrically hospitalized, refused vaccination that had been requested by her parents, which lead to significant moral distress for her caregivers.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 3","pages":"236-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33479504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defining Death Behind the Veil of Ignorance.","authors":"Christos Lazaridis","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this article I examine the question of how a liberal state should go about defining death. Plausible standards for a definition of death include a somatic one based on circulatory criteria, death by neurologic criteria (DNC), and higher brain death. I will argue that Rawlsian \"burdens of judgment\" apply in this process: that is, reasonable disagreement should be expected on important topics, and such disagreement ought not be resolved via the coercive powers of the state. Nevertheless, the state must legislate a definition of death, and in doing so faces a \"neutralist dilemma,\" that is, when there are multiple reasonable ways to move forward, only one can be chosen. I will examine a possible way to exit this neutralist dilemma. Finally, I will argue for DNC as the normatively preferred default definition of death. To do this, I will employ the Rawlsian heuristic of the \"original position\" and offer public reasons in favor of using DNC as the preferred default definition of death.</p><p><p></p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":" ","pages":"130-140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"40193497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Should Careproviders Deviate from Consensus?","authors":"Edmund G Howe","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Consensus documents may be extremely helpful. They may, however, also do harm. They may, for example, suggest interventions that are less than optimal, especially when they apply to patients whose situations are at the \"outer margins\" of their applicability. Yet, even in these instances, clinicians and ethics consultants may still feel pressure to comply with a guideline. Then, we may not do what we think is best for our particular patient because we fear departing from a guideline. In this article I discuss the risks of departing from guidelines and suggest what we can do to overcome those possible risks. I suggest that while guidelines may help, we should continue to put, above all else, tailoring our interventions to our patients' individual needs and wants. With our patients, together, we should decide what to do, notwithstanding what the most applicable guidelines propose.</p>","PeriodicalId":39646,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Clinical Ethics","volume":"33 3","pages":"165-174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"33469656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}