Midwest Studies in Philosophy最新文献_第7页

Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness 实践决策与可责备性的认知要求

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12108

E. Coffman

引用次数: 2

Moral Luck and Control 道德运气与控制

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12103

Steven D. Hales

引用次数: 1

Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck. 将运气回归到道德运气中。

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 Epub Date: 2019-07-11 DOI: 10.1111/misp.12104

Neil Levy

{"title":"Putting the Luck Back Into Moral Luck.","authors":"Neil Levy","doi":"10.1111/misp.12104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12104","url":null,"abstract":"In philosophy, the more constraints we bring to the consideration of a problem the better. This is particularly the case in normative domains, in which the invocation of intuitions may be inevitable. Since our intuitions are never entirely consistent even in a single individual, and different individuals may have somewhat different intuitions (as recent work on experimental philosophy has been at pains to demonstrate), every account of a philosophically interesting explanandum is revisionary to some extent. Every account has costs, in terms of conflict with intuitions, and the narrower the set of considerations we bring to choosing between them, the harder it will be to engage in principled choice between rivals. Broader sets of considerations are often essential to showing that one (somewhat counterintuitive) account is better than another. Debates over moral luck concern concepts that are largely (though not exclusively) normative. We ought therefore to expect that the narrower the range of considerations that we bring to bear on this debate, the harder it will be to give genuinely principled reasons for preferring one account over others. This fact gives us a strong reason for preferring an account that is sensitive to the full range of considerations that can be brought to bear. Yet the majority of philosophers who have thought about moral luck ignore—or argue for ignoring—the “luck” component of “moral luck.” They substitute for “luck” a lack of control condition, sometimes even while acknowledging that “luck” cannot be captured by such a condition.1 In this paper, I argue that it is a mistake to substitute “lack of control” for “luck.” If we make that substitution, we will both fail to understand the phenomenon of moral luck, narrowly construed, and we will cut ourselves off from the many ways in which considerations","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/misp.12104","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37755958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Agent‐Regret and Accidental Agency 代理-后悔和意外代理

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12112

Rachana Kamtekar, Shaun Nichols

引用次数: 7

Issue Information 问题信息

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/misp.12097

引用次数: 0

Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Manipulation, Luck, and Agents’ Histories 自由意志和道德责任:操纵、运气和代理人的历史

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12105

A. Mele

引用次数: 0

Transformative Moral Luck 变革性道德运气

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-09-01 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12111

Marcela Herdova

引用次数: 3

Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck 自由意志、自我创造与道德运气的悖论

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-08-06 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12114

Kristin M. Mickelson

{"title":"Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck","authors":"Kristin M. Mickelson","doi":"10.1111/MISP.12114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/MISP.12114","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to philosophical inquiry, many people have the intuition that the following moral principle—commonly known as the control principle—is unquestionably true: people cannot bear moral responsibility for things which are not their fault, that is, things which are beyond their control (cf. Nagel 1976, 138). We also generally assume that normal people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, as our everyday moral judgments and practices of blame and praise imply.1 At first blush, these commonsense positions seem compatible. However, when we carefully consider concrete cases of human action, it becomes plain that every action a person performs and the effects that one’s actions have on the world are largely—perhaps entirely—a matter of luck, that is, due to factors which are entirely beyond the actor’s control.2 As such, it seems that commonsense views about morality and moral responsibility commit us to the existence of something that is, by our own intuitive lights, impossible: the existence of moral luck, that is, cases in which a person is morally responsible for something which was not completely under that person’s control. The intuitive judgements which generate our apparent commitment to the existence of moral luck seem undeniable, but granting its existence is unacceptable; this is the paradox of moral luck.","PeriodicalId":39586,"journal":{"name":"Midwest Studies in Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/MISP.12114","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42880732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

Playing the Hand You're Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (and Probably Doesn't Exist) 玩你手上的牌:道德运气与道德上重要的普通运气有何不同(可能不存在)

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-07-30 DOI: 10.1111/misp.12115

D. Enoch

引用次数: 4

Flickers of Freedom and Moral Luck 自由的闪光与道德的幸运

Midwest Studies in Philosophy Pub Date : 2019-07-28 DOI: 10.1111/MISP.12106

Carolina Sartorio

引用次数: 5