Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

Abstract

Prior to philosophical inquiry, many people have the intuition that the following moral principle—commonly known as the control principle—is unquestionably true: people cannot bear moral responsibility for things which are not their fault, that is, things which are beyond their control (cf. Nagel 1976, 138). We also generally assume that normal people are sometimes morally responsible for their actions, as our everyday moral judgments and practices of blame and praise imply.1 At first blush, these commonsense positions seem compatible. However, when we carefully consider concrete cases of human action, it becomes plain that every action a person performs and the effects that one’s actions have on the world are largely—perhaps entirely—a matter of luck, that is, due to factors which are entirely beyond the actor’s control.2 As such, it seems that commonsense views about morality and moral responsibility commit us to the existence of something that is, by our own intuitive lights, impossible: the existence of moral luck, that is, cases in which a person is morally responsible for something which was not completely under that person’s control. The intuitive judgements which generate our apparent commitment to the existence of moral luck seem undeniable, but granting its existence is unacceptable; this is the paradox of moral luck.