{"title":"Not for Members Only: Group Endorsements as Electoral Information Cues","authors":"M. McDermott","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900207","url":null,"abstract":"Endorsements by groups in American politics have typically been studied as voting cues only for members of the given organization. Using both the formal theoretical and low-information cognitive voting literatures, this article argues for a broader electoral role for group endorsements. Specifically, if groups that have clear ideological or policy preferences endorse candidates, these endorsements should provide all voters with ideological or issue information about the endorsed candidates. This inferred information should then impact voters’ behavior, especially in low-information scenarios. Using both an experimental test and a test with American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data, this study analyzes the hypothesis in terms of elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. It finds that when the AFL-CIO endorses Democratic candidates, voters behave as though a liberal message has been sent—liberals are significantly more supportive while conservatives are significantly less supportive than they are when no endorsement is given, regardless of whether or not they are union members. At the same time, however, the analysis finds no support that endorsements of Republicans have any ideological impact on voting.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123411459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Dynamic Consequences of Nonvoting in American National Elections","authors":"Christopher Ellis, J. Ura, Jenna Ashley-Robinson","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900205","url":null,"abstract":"A growing body of work examines the consequences of unequal participation in American democracy for electoral outcomes. However, this scholarship has ignored the potential impact of unequal voting for the quality of dynamic representation in the American political system. Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), we examine the dynamic relationship between the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters in the American electorate. Further, we assess how unequal participation—and the incentives that it may give to policymaking elites—may moderate the relationship between the mass public and policy outcomes. Our analysis reveals that the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters respond in similar ways to the political and economic environment. In addition, we find no evidence that national policymaking elites are differentially responsive to changes in the preferences of voters and nonvoters.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132975659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Federalism and Budgetary Tradeoffs in the American States","authors":"Sean Nicholson-Crotty, Nick A. Theobald, B. Wood","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900212","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the massive scale of state-level budgeting, there currently exists no theoretically grounded and empirically sound examination of budgetary tradeoffs at this level of government. In order to provide such an examination, we extend a well-accepted approach to tradeoffs at the federal level in order to accommodate the unique intergovernmental aspects of state-level budgeting. We develop expectations that need for a good, ideology of state-level decisionmakers, and the relative amounts of federal grants received in each expenditure category all influence tradeoff decisions. We test these hypotheses in an analysis of budgetary decisions in all 50 states between 1971 and 1996.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127329903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Stephen P. Nicholson, Adrian D. Pantoja, Gary M. Segura
{"title":"Political Knowledge and Issue Voting Among the Latino Electorate","authors":"Stephen P. Nicholson, Adrian D. Pantoja, Gary M. Segura","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900208","url":null,"abstract":"How informed is a Latino vote? Though recent scholarship has improved our understanding of Latino political participation, partisanship, and policy preferences, relatively little is known about how Hispanics make electoral decisions. In this effort, we evaluate the role policy issues, candidate affect, and symbolism play in the electoral choices of Latino voters. In particular, we are interested in how these factors affect the vote across voters with varying levels of political information. Using the 2000 Tomás Rivera Policy Institute pre-election poll, we explore the degree to which Latino voters relied on issue-positions to judge the two major party candidates and compare the effect of such considerations with symbolic and candidate-specific appeals. We find that policy issues played an important role in shaping voting preferences, but only among politically knowledgeable voters, while among uninformed voters, symbolism and long-standing partisan preferences matter most. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for political representation and Latino politics.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115815124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Field Experiment on the Effects of Negative Campaign Mail on Voter Turnout in a Municipal Election","authors":"D. Niven","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900203","url":null,"abstract":"This field experiment is used to expose a random sample of voters in a 2003 mayoral race to various pieces of negative direct mail advertising. Exposure to the negative advertising stimulus improved turnout overall about 6 percent over that of the control group. Results show that different topics and amounts of negative advertising had different effects on turnout. The results suggest that alarm bells sounded by some previous research and by public officials may be overheated, because the effects of campaign negativity may not be monolithic, and it would appear political negativity can have a positive effect on turnout.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116442283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Making Democracy Work More? Exploring the Linkage between Social Capital and Government Performance","authors":"Margit Tavits","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900204","url":null,"abstract":"This study considers the linkage between social capital and government performance. The latter concept is disaggregated into two dimensions: policy activism and administrative efficiency. Social capital may be related to government performance either because it increases the level of political sophistication and facilitates the cooperation within society, helping people to voice their policy demands better, or because social capital, being shared also by the bureaucratic elites of a polity, facilitates cooperation and helps to overcome the agency problem within the bureaucratic organization. The former argument links social capital to policy activism while the latter links it to administrative efficiency. Empirical tests with data from the German and American subnational governments provide support for the former but not for the latter argument.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115338377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public-Private Contracting and Political Reciprocity","authors":"R. Zullo","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900209","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900209","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research linking public-private contracts with political donations has not examined the dynamics of exchange. Evaluating data from Wisconsin, I test for a temporal association between the awarding of public-private construction contracts and political donations by construction firm owners and executives. My findings indicate that donation activity peaks near the months when contracts are approved; that contract-related donation premiums are comparable in magnitude to election cycle premiums; and that political giving varies across three separate procurement processes. I deduce that patterns of political giving reflect strategic expenditures during the negotiation phase of the public-private procurement process. These findings have implications for campaign finance reform and privatization policy.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130959332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Position-Taking and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. House of Representatives","authors":"Gregory L. Bovitz, Jamie L. Carson","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900211","url":null,"abstract":"While past research has offered some initial evidence linking patterns of position-taking behavior with incumbents’ electoral fortunes, we are left without a comprehensive study that informs us whether individual roll-call votes can be electorally consequential and lends insight into the conditions under which position-taking on roll calls may yield electoral implications. This article takes a step toward filling that void by examining the electoral implications of hundreds of House roll calls since the early 1970s. We find that, after controlling for the usual factors, a wide range of individual roll-call decisions have significant effects on incumbents’ electoral margins. We also find that the extent to which a particular roll call is controversial, salient, and a catalyst for intra-party disagreement affects whether it has electoral implications. In sum, our analysis addresses longstanding questions regarding how and when legislators are rewarded or punished at the polls for their behavior in Congress.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125563059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Judging a Book by its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game","authors":"Rick K. Wilson, Catherine C. Eckel","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900202","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines one mechanism by which people decide whether to trust strangers. Using a laboratory setting that provides subjects with controlled information about their counterparts, we test whether attractive subjects gain a “beauty premium” in a game involving trust and reciprocity. Attractive trustees are viewed as more trustworthy; they are trusted at higher rates and as a consequence earn more in the first stage of the game. Attractiveness does not guarantee higher earnings, as we find a “beauty penalty” attached to attractive trusters in the second stage of the game. This penalty arises because attractive trusters do not live up to expectations of them on the part of the trustees. Trustees withhold repayment when their expectations are dashed. `This punishment is larger when the disappointing truster is attractive.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"188 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121714197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Jurisdiction, Institutional Structure, and Committee Representativeness","authors":"J. Battista","doi":"10.1177/106591290605900105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290605900105","url":null,"abstract":"I model the ideological representativeness of state legislative committees and their majority-party slates, testing hypotheses derived from extant models of committees and institutional choice. Committee representativeness and the representativeness of majority-party slates vary across states as a function of their effective number of parties and professionalization, but the jurisdiction of a committee has little discernible effect on representativeness of either. A possible mechanism is that competitive parties create committees that more closely adhere to the party ratio of the chamber, eliminating many possible outlying committees.","PeriodicalId":394472,"journal":{"name":"Political Research Quarterly (formerly WPQ)","volume":"145 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131881605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}