{"title":"20 Years for Clearing Your Browser History","authors":"Juliana Devries","doi":"10.15779/Z38BZ61750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38BZ61750","url":null,"abstract":"In today’s world, average people create and delete massive amounts of digital data every single day. And most of the time people can do so without expecting the Department of Justice to come knocking. But deleting digital data — including clearing browser history — can also result in federal felony obstruction of justice charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, the federal anti- shredding statute, which carries a 20-year maximum penalty. It is thus vital that citizens understand what is and is not illegal under § 1519.Unfortunately, understanding what the statute prohibits is an almost impossible task. Indeed, this Article will argue that § 1519 has a vagueness problem. That is, the statute arguably fails “to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited” and “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” This Article brings attention to § 1519’s vagueness problem and to suggest solutions. Specifically, it recommends that the courts either impose a “nexus requirement” on § 1519 or limit enforcement to the corporate crime context.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124009824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Flagrant Police Abuse: Why Black Lives (Also) Matter to the Fourth Amendment","authors":"J. A. Moreno","doi":"10.15779/Z38D21RH93","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38D21RH93","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127674650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Long May You Run: Drug Courts in the Twenty-First Century","authors":"M. Duggal","doi":"10.15779/Z38R785N63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38R785N63","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"318 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130135053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Insight” Into Life Crimes: The Rhetoric of Remorse and Rehabilitation in California Parole Precedent and Practice","authors":"Lilliana Paratore","doi":"10.15779/Z38RF5KF32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38RF5KF32","url":null,"abstract":"Between 2002 and 2011, the California Supreme Court decided a series of cases that profoundly altered the ability of people convicted of indeterminate life sentences to be found suitable for parole. An inmate’s vocalization of “insight” – in this Note taken to mean remorse, guilt, and/or shame – has become the lynchpin to freedom. This Note explores the California Supreme Court’s judicial evolution on determining parole suitability, how the Court’s assessment of “insight” can be understood through the framework of the field of law and emotion, the empirical basis for granting parole based on a positive finding of “insight,” and how discretionary bodies such as the California Board of Parole Hearings make assessments of “insight.” Ultimately, this Notes endeavors to discern whether the rhetoric of remorse and rehabilitation that “insight” attempts to encapsulate provides inmates with a full or a false promise for release.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128069904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The First Thing We Do, Let’s Heal All the Law Students: Incorporating Self-Care into a Criminal Defense Clinic","authors":"Ronald Tyler","doi":"10.15779/Z38KD1QJ9N","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38KD1QJ9N","url":null,"abstract":"Law students in direct services clinics represent clients in crisis and therefore experience stress and vicarious trauma similar to some practicing attorneys. Yet legal education and scholarship rarely recognize those harms or offer strategies to increase student resiliency in clinics and in the practice years that follow. Seeking to fill those critical gaps, this Article describes an innovative self-care curriculum in the Stanford Criminal Defense Clinic that encourages mindful selfreflection, teaches coping skills, and increases resilience. Inspired by mindfulness-based stress reduction programs from medical education, the self-care curriculum alerts students to sources of stress in their attorney/client relationships and provides strategies to address those stressors. The curriculum is closely aligned with theories from the humanizing legal education movement. Each self-care session includes: the introduction of resiliency tools, mindful reflection on and sharing of personal successes, and the creation of supportive group norms. Qualitative student feedback demonstrates that the self-care workshops significantly enhance wellbeing. Many students value the workshops as a space to mindfully analyze both positive and troubling","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121676787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"It's High Time to Dump the High Crime Area Factor","authors":"R. Shirazi","doi":"10.15779/Z388C9R37M","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z388C9R37M","url":null,"abstract":"A high-crime area, when used as a factor in reasonable suspicion analysis to help justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of an African American, is overtly racist. This Note will first analyze the empirical data showing that high-crime areas are predominately high-black areas— including a historical analysis for how this came about. Next, the Note will explain the origin and jurisprudence of the high-crime area factor, highlighting its curtailment by lower courts. It will then validate that the only viable solution is to dump the high-crime area factor. Finally, this Note explains how the high-crime area factor potentially violates the Equal Protection Clause.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129541715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Assaultive Femicide and the American Felony-Murder Rule","authors":"Hava Dayan","doi":"10.15779/Z380G40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z380G40","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the American legal criminal doctrine that is commonly applied in cases of a particular sub-type of femicide: assaultive femicide, women who are battered to death. The most relevant criminal doctrine applicable to these circumstances is the felony-murder rule, applied in most U.S. jurisdictions. As will be shown, the doctrine’s most problematic modification relates to one of its sub-doctrines, the principle of merger, which was stretched and extended to include lesser non-homicidal offenses such as assault. This gross doctrinal extension has in fact created a criminal anomaly whereby blameworthy murderers of women are exonerated and technically exempted from murder convictions. Given that most U.S. jurisdictions apply the felony-murder doctrine in some form, the article will analyze and scrutinize the felonymurder doctrine with regard to its particular applicability to circumstances of assaultive femicide. In addition, the article will propose statutory amendments to Sections 210.2(b) and 210.6 of the U.S. Model Penal Code. The proposed statutory amendments to the U.S. Model Penal Code are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to most American jurisdictions and may constitute a prototype for future legislative state reforms.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"391 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122846682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Armed Not Militarized: Achieving Real Police Militarization","authors":"Gilbert Rivera","doi":"10.15779/Z388P0C","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z388P0C","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126412741","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Should an Innocent Citizen Shoulder the Burden of an Officer's Mistake of Law? Heien v. North Carolina Tells Police to Detain First and Learn the Law Later","authors":"G. Dery, Jacklyn R. Vasquez","doi":"10.15779/Z387P1F","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z387P1F","url":null,"abstract":"This Article analyzes Heien v. North Carolina, in which the Supreme Court considered whether an officer’s stop of a motorist could be considered a “reasonable” seizure under the Fourth Amendment even though it was based on a police officer’s mistake of law regarding the state’s traffic code. The Heien Court ruled that an officer’s mistake of law could be objectively reasonable and therefore contribute to the reasonable suspicion needed to support a traffic stop. This work examines the concerns created by Heien’s ruling. This Article asserts that, in allowing an officer to seize a person on the basis of that officer’s mistaken belief that the individual violated the law, Heien could encourage stops and arrests based on unclear laws that could cause Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment problems. Further, Heien’s conclusion that an officer’s mistake of law can be reasonable is inconsistent with the Court’s Fourth Amendment balancing analysis for assessing reasonableness. Heien’s allowance of police mistakes of law could impair police professionalism and undermine public confidence in law enforcement. Finally, Heien’s acceptance of officers’ mistakes of law could cause serious negative consequences for motorists beyond the","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"202 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116172578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}