Yale Journal of Law and Technology最新文献

{"title":"LECTURE: Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of Science in the Law","authors":"David L. Faigman","doi":"10.5860/choice.37-3873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.37-3873","url":null,"abstract":"Is scientific information misused by this country's court system and lawmakers? Today more than ever before, lawyers, politicians, and government administrators are forced to wrestle with scientific research and to employ scientific thinking. The results are often less than enlightened. In \"Legal Alchemy,\" David Faigman explores the ways the American legal system incorporates scientific knowledge into its decision making. Praised by both legal and scientific communities when it first appeared in hardcover, \"Legal Alchemy\" shows how science has been used and misused in a variety of settings, including - The Courtroom--from the O. J. Simpson trial to the Dow Corning silicone breast implant lawsuit to landmark cases such as Roe v. Wade. - The Legislature--where Congress uses scientific information to help enact legislation about clean air, cloning, and government science projects like the space station and the superconducting super collider. - Government Agencies--who use science to determine policy on a variety of topics, from regulating sport utility vehicles to reintroducing gray wolves to Yellowstone National Park. As Faigman describes these and other important cases, he provides disturbing evidence that many judges, juries, and members of Congress simply don't understand the science behind their decisions. Finally, he offers suggestions on how the science and legal professions can overcome their miscommunication and work together more effectively.","PeriodicalId":385021,"journal":{"name":"Yale Journal of Law and Technology","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128932490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE","authors":"D. Benoliel","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.925132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.925132","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Copyright law is not distinctively designed for redistribution. And yet, numerous fairness scholars and other critics of the economics paradigm claim that copyright law should be based upon redistribution, rather than efficiency. Redistributive justice goals' intrinsically play a role in the design of the copyright commons, but whether copyright law should itself serve as the means of achieving such goals is truly questionable. This Article argues instead that, subject to narrow exceptions, copyright law doctrine should not promote redistributive justice concerns and that other, more efficient areas of law such as taxation and welfare programs should do so. This argument accords with the prevailing welfare economics approach to copyright jurisprudence and emphasizes the latest Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing litigation. This Article focuses on the leading classes of individuals subject to the distributive injustice that has emerged on the internet: poor infringers, poor creators and wealthy copyright holders. This Article argues that, for at least these three classes of individuals, redistribution through copyright law offers no efficiency advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and other legal transfer mechanisms. TABLE OF CONTENTS A. INTRODUCTION B. CLASSES OF COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE 1. ENRICHMENT OF POOR INFRINGERS 2. ENRICHMENT OF POOR CREATORS 3. DIMINISHMENT OF THE WEALTH OF COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES C. DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICES: THE THREE ACCOUNTS 1. LIBERTARIAN ARGUMENTS: BEYOND PARETO SUPERIORITY 2. WELL-BEING THEORY: BEYOND BASIC NEEDS 3. WELFARE ECONOMICS: BEYOND KALDOR-HICKSIAN APTITUDE D. RATIONALES AGAINST COPYRIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1. DISTRIBUTION DISCRIMINATES I. LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRESSIVE DAMAGES II. DISPARITIES BETWEEN LITIGANTS AND NON-LITIGANTS 2. DISTRIBUTION IS OVER-COSTLY 3. DISTRIBUTION IS IMPRECISE 4. DISTRIBUTION IMPOSES INEFFICIENT SOCIAL COSTS E. CONCLUSION A. INTRODUCTION Copyright law, like so many normative theories concerning social arrangements, seems to have bent into the dialectics of egalitarianism. (1) Copyright law is often perceived as a social arrangement, but it is primarily concerned with governing the processes of creation and invention and not simply the proprietary legal entitlements it bestows. However, copyright jurisprudence may have reached a point where it can no longer be said to merely preserve freedom of speech, (2) maintain the public sphere, (3) protect subsequent generations of authors, (4) promote liberty and freedom. (5) Instead, it now is said to support direct distributive justice ends through what is considered a fair distribution of proprietary legal entitlements. Within copyright jurisprudence, distributive justice functions as a normative claim about the lair allocation of proprietary entitlements among original copyright owners and other individuals in society. (6) An examination of the academic literature and copyright litigation reveal","PeriodicalId":385021,"journal":{"name":"Yale Journal of Law and Technology","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126102634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}