European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series最新文献

{"title":"Risk Retention in Securitization and Empty Creditors","authors":"Evgenia Chouliara, Edoardo D. Martino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3824733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3824733","url":null,"abstract":"The risk retention rule was introduced in the US and the EU as a mechanism to curb the originate-to-distribute model, associated with securitizations and the financial crisis of 2008. This paper argues that besides its original financial stability rationale, the rule has positive spillovers on debt governance and specifically on the incentives to monitor, the design of covenants and the lender’s stance during renegotiation and bankruptcy (the ‘empty creditor’ problem). Risk retention in true sale securitizations makes the strongest case for debt governance, although the existence of various options of retention appears to be associated with varying incentives. The mechanism and effects of risk retention on synthetic securitizations remain ambivalent, given the perverse incentives associated with over-insurance (negative economic ownership). However, the upcoming restriction of double hedging for synthetic STS transactions is a positive development.","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123446377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sustainability Disclosure in the EU Financial Sector","authors":"D. Busch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3650407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3650407","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it explores the main features of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation. On the other hand, it tries to assess whether the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation is likely to succeed in harmonising sustainability-related (i) disclosure rules and (ii) fiduciary duties, not only across Member States, but also across financial products and distribution channels. The author concludes that before we reach a sufficient degree of harmonisation of sustainability-related disclosure rules and fiduciary duties, there is still a long way to go. And even if we reach the required degree of harmonisation in the EU, it is not given that this will necessarily lead to a more sustainable world. As may be gleaned from the European Green Deal and the Sustainable Finance Action Plan, the EU is aiming high when it comes to sustainability. But the EU is not an island. The author argues that there are roughly two opposite scenarios. In a pessimistic scenario, the more lenient or even non-existent sustainability agenda of other geopolitical powers gives them a competitive edge that is detrimental to the EU. In a positive scenario, the EU becomes a global standard-setter in the area of sustainability. Large global institutional investors such as Blackrock and State Street in any event say they are strong supporters of the sustainability agenda. Also, the re-entry of the United States of America in the Paris Climate Agreement under the Biden Administration may give us some hope.","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123471237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Regulated Markets, Alternative Trading Venues & Systematic Internalisers in Europe","authors":"D. Busch, Han Gulyas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3723660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3723660","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to explain the similarities and differences between regulated markets (RMs), alternative trading venues (i.e. multilateral trading facilities / MTFs and organised trading facilities / OTFs), and systematic internalisers (SIs) in Europe. The structure of the paper is as follows. Paragraph II provides an overview of the main terms and definitions. Subsequently, the authors discuss the MiFID II scope in relation to RMs, alternative trading venues, and SIs (paragraph III). This is followed by a treatment of the organisational requirements for RMs, alternative trading venues, and SIs (paragraph IV). Then, the MiFID II pre- and post-trade transparency rules are discussed, both for equity (paragraph V) and nonequity (paragraph VI). The authors end with some concluding observations (paragraph VII).","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"274 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116553495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Climate Change as a Systemic Risk – Are Macroprudential Authorities up to the Task?","authors":"Seraina N. Grunewald","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3580222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3580222","url":null,"abstract":"There is growing acknowledgement among policymakers that climate change may give rise to potentially catastrophic financial risk and impact financial stability. This paper explores the specific features of climate-related financial risks (CRFR), drawing on a growing body of macrofinancial literature and policy work, and discusses the options macroprudential policy-makers have in the face of such risk. It finds that there are significant challenges associated with ‘greening’ macroprudential policy, both epistemological and methodological as well as behavioural, and points to potential ingredients of a ‘green’ macroprudential policy. In light of the radical uncertainty in relation to the dynamics of CRFR, the timing of policy action is of the essence. The paper, in particular, explores the merits and challenges associated with a precautionary approach to tackling the systemic effects of CRFR. Finally, it discusses the role that Central Banks can and should play in the transition to a low-carbon economy, both within the confines and in fulfilment of their price and financial stability mandates.","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132238609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"SREP Exercise and Resolution Planning Outcomes as Inside Information under MAR","authors":"Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi, Ugo Malvagna","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3568552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3568552","url":null,"abstract":"When it comes to banks, disclosure – as a means towards market discipline – can be considered from the standpoint of both Basel’s Pillar 3 and (in case of listed banks) the Market Abuse Regulation. Especially in the latter context, it is controversial whether the specific layer of information consisting of a) the ECB’s measures taken when performing the yearly Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), i.e. the so called SREP decision, and b) the resolution planning (including the setting of MREL levels), which the Single Resolution Board is responsible for, have to be considered as inside information under MAR. As it is apparent, this issue is highly critical when such disclosure reveals that a bank is in financial distress, as far as disclosure could potentially prompt an idiosyncratic crisis. According to the ESMA’s position, in both of the above-mentioned cases each credit institution has to assess, under its own responsibility, whether decisions taken by Supervision and Resolution Authorities, under SREP and resolution planning, actually have to be disclosed. This paper focuses on SREP exercise and resolution planning (including MREL calibration) decisions, assessing their relevance as inside information under the requirements of precision and price-sensitivity set out in Article 7 MAR, and the subsequent existence of an obligation to disclose under Article 17 MAR. The relevance of the SREP’s draft letter is also considered in this respect. Moreover, the paper investigates whether, and to what extent, a single bank’s stability concern can be considered as a «legitimate interest» for delaying disclosure, either under Article 17(5) MAR (that is, when there is a public interest in delaying disclosure in order to preserve the financial system’s stability) or under Article 17(4) MAR (when delay meets the need of preserving the issuer’s legitimate interests).","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123840180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Global Rules for a Global Market Place? – The Regulation and Supervision of FinTech Providers","authors":"Matthias B. Lehmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3421963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3421963","url":null,"abstract":"Financial technology (FinTech) revolutionizes the way in which financial services are rendered. Although the phenomenon is not new, it has taken on a novel dimension. Markets which were once national are morphing into global ones. The interest in regulating them not only exists, but to some extent is even higher compared to traditional services. This article illustrates the many different needs for regulating FinTech providers, from the protection of investors and consumers to the fight against money laundering and tax evasion. The article demonstrates that these questions cannot be adequately addressed by a laboratory free space or by self-regulation. It also shows that idiosyncratic national rules would result in legal fragmentation and deprive the world of the benefit that digital services can provide. \u0000 \u0000The paper suggests therefore that global standards would be the most adequate solution for the regulation of global services. It proposes to re-conceptualize the FSB and to transform it into a ‘Financial Stability and Innovation Board’. In light of the diverging customs, knowledge and practices of residents around the world, the global standards need to be complemented by tailored national rules. Also, global rule harmonization will not cause differences in supervision to disappear. Regulatory competition and arbitrage might give incentives to countries to lower their supervisory standards, accepting negative externalities for residents of other states in order to become a global FinTech hub. This tendency must be countered by a competition for the strictest quality of supervision. Since such a competition requires transparency, this article suggests requiring mandatory information about the competent supervisor in any marketing and customer communication by a FinTech service provider. Through experience and ratings of supervisors, a run for quality will be triggered.","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123311338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Relevance of the Resolution Tools Within the SRM","authors":"Jens-Hinrich Binder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3274520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3274520","url":null,"abstract":"In addition to, and complementing the, new regime on recovery and resolution planning, the introduction of a harmonised, in part innovative set of new resolution tools and corresponding powers for the resolution of systemically important banking institutions with the BRRD and the SRMR was intended, and expected by many observers, to be no less than a game changing event. For most EU Member States, the BRRD has triggered relevant legislation for the first time ever, while for some (including, in particular, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Denmark), the new framework followed up on similar innovations in earlier domestic legislation. Within the Eurozone, the creation of the Single Resolution Mechanism has complemented the substantive and procedural rules established by the BRRD with an institutionalised framework for central-ised decision-making as well as national execution and implementation of supra-national resolu-tion decisions. To a considerable extent, the SRMR even substitutes national legislation transpos-ing the BRRD, thus facilitating even further harmonisation of applicable laws, but also necessi-tating a rather complex interplay of directly applicable EU law and national legislation. This pa-per assesses the relevance of the resolution tools provided by the BRRD and the SRMR (sale of business, bridge institution, asset separation, and bail-in) in the light of the first cases decided under the auspices of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). Specifically, three dimensions are ex-plored: First, taking into account both the historic roots of each resolution tool and the recent case law, the paper assesses potential scenarios and preconditions for successful, effective im-plementation. Second, and related to the foregoing, the examines operational issues pertaining to the implementation of the resolution toolbox. Thirdly, and in the light of the aspects discussed before, the paper examines the suitability of the new resolution tools for application in extraor-dinary cases of macro-economic distress, where adverse market conditions and mounting non-performing loans affect large numbers of credit institutions at the same time.","PeriodicalId":383457,"journal":{"name":"European Banking Institute (EBI) Research Paper Series","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116161668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}