Competition and Regulation in Network Industries最新文献_第8页

Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways? 欧洲铁路竞争的不对称监管?

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-07-23 DOI: 10.1177/1783591719861722

Juan J. Montero

{"title":"Asymmetric regulation for competition in European railways?","authors":"Juan J. Montero","doi":"10.1177/1783591719861722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719861722","url":null,"abstract":"There is an increasing number of voices calling for asymmetric regulation to reinforce competition in European railways as they are liberalized in December 2020. The regulatory framework defined in the Directives of the European Union (EU) might be insufficient to ensure effective and widespread competition. But the EU Directive declares tracks a natural monopoly, and structural measures in the form of vertical separation with transport activities have been imposed. Behavioral obligations have also been imposed on infrastructure managers in the form of access obligations. There is no room for asymmetry between competing networks, as tracks are a natural monopoly. Furthermore, as access conditions are ruled by the principle of nondiscrimination, it does not seem possible to introduce asymmetries in favor of newcomers, for instance in the form of access charges below the price charged to incumbent railway undertakings. For the rest of railway assets, which only exceptionally can be considered essential facilities, the EU Directives either impose no access obligations (rolling stock, drivers, ticketing systems) or when they impose access obligations (maintenance facilities), there is no formal asymmetry, as all undertakings are subject to the same access obligations. National regulatory authorities considering the introduction of asymmetric access obligations should take into account economic literature describing how asymmetries attract inefficient market entry, and they should consider that obligations introduced at a national level might fragment the Single European Railway Area.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":"20 1","pages":"184 - 201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719861722","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45674721","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Competition in the railway passenger market: The challenge of liberalization 铁路客运市场竞争:自由化的挑战

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-07-01 DOI: 10.1177/1783591719858737

Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, Aurora Ruiz-Rua

引用次数: 5

Governance models of public utility commissions in the United States 美国公用事业委员会的治理模式

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-27 DOI: 10.1177/1783591719857660

Douglas J. Howe

{"title":"Governance models of public utility commissions in the United States","authors":"Douglas J. Howe","doi":"10.1177/1783591719857660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1783591719857660","url":null,"abstract":"Regulation of utilities at the state level in the United States is undertaken by a commission on which anywhere from three to seven commissioners sit and must vote on virtually all significant utility actions, including rate requests, resource plans, acquisitions and mergers, and financing mechanisms. Public utility commissions (PUCs) are, in a very real sense, courts with adjudicatory responsibility over the area of state utility laws. In hearing a utility case, they must follow the state’s statutes and court rules. The commissioners function as judges in this court of public utility law. In a majority of states, commissioners are appointed by the state’s governor with the advice and consent of the state legislature. In a significant minority of states, commissioners are elected by popular vote. However, recent changes in US election law have made it easier for corporations and special interest groups, called political action committees, to influence elections through donations targeting direct voter outreach on behalf of specific candidates. This chapter examines what the entry of political spending in PUC elections means, and whether elected commissioners can adjudicate in the public interest, or will adjudicate for special interests. The chapter concludes that while both the appointment and election governance model can produce both “good” and “bad” commissioners, it is the elected commission that is most at risk of selecting commissioners that will not be truly independent and objective arbiters of the law.","PeriodicalId":38329,"journal":{"name":"Competition and Regulation in Network Industries","volume":"20 1","pages":"229 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1783591719857660","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44445360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

“Regulation by contract” – the French model “合同监管”——法国模式

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-7

M. Finger

引用次数: 0

Why do network industries need regulation? 为什么网络行业需要监管?

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-3

M. Finger

引用次数: 0

New digital infrastructures 新的数码基建

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-12

M. Finger

引用次数: 0

The politics of regulation 监管的政治

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-4

M. Finger

引用次数: 0

Conclusion 结论

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-13

Matthias Finger

引用次数: 0

Regulatory authorities 监管当局

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-5

M. Finger

引用次数: 2

Why are network industries interesting? 为什么网络行业很有趣?

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries Pub Date : 2019-06-26 DOI: 10.4324/9780429449567-2

M. Finger

引用次数: 0