{"title":"Economic Analysis of Vehicle-Infrastructure Cooperative Approach for Enabling Automated Driving","authors":"D. Vignon, Yafeng Yin, S. Bahrami, K. Laberteaux","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3833485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3833485","url":null,"abstract":"The current approach to driving automation has been primarily vehicle-centric. However, a vehicle-infrastructure cooperative approach, in which infrastructure and vehicles cooperate to perform the different driving tasks, may prevail in enabling automated driving. This paper conducts an economic analysis of vehicle infrastructure cooperation for automated driving. In doing so, we present a model that captures investment decisions in vehicle automation and infrastructure digitalization and their effect on travellers’ purchase and travel decisions. Our analysis shows that, under certain conditions, equipping both infrastructure and vehicles is socially optimal. However, by analyzing strategic interactions between infrastructure support service providers and automakers, we show that lack of coordination between these two actors results in suboptimal investment in vehicle automation and infrastructure digitalization. Especially, when these two technologies are complementary, service providers are reluctant to invest in digital infrastructure and vehicle manufacturers tend to over equip their vehicles so as to avoid relying on infrastructure technology. Thus, we conclude by showing that better coordination between automakers and service providers–under the form of profit sharing–is welfare improving and could potentially yield the socially optimal levels of automation and digitalization.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123306241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Winning Big: Scale and Success in Retail Entrepreneurship","authors":"Brett Hollenbeck, R. Giroldo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613183","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses lottery allocation of retail store entry licenses as a natural experiment to understand the size and source of returns to scale in retail.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116512639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic R&D Investment Decisions in the Pharmaceutical Industry","authors":"A. Rao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2652755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2652755","url":null,"abstract":"Do pharmaceutical firms respond to the actions of their competitors in R&D, and how much? Answering this has implications on the impact of a faster FDA approval process - something pharmaceutical companies are pushing for. While a faster approval process leads to quicker realization of profits and more remaining time on the firm's patent, it also intensifies competition reducing per-firm profits. Which effect dominates depends on the degree of competition. To this end, I estimate a dynamic investment model using Phase-3 data. Solving the new equilibrium, I find an expedited process is beneficial only when competitors are far from launching.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134146630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Price Elasticities in the Presence of Network Effects","authors":"Zhiyuan Chen, Xiaoying Liang, Lei Xie, Houmin Yan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2571872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571872","url":null,"abstract":"Price elasticities characterize the effect of price changes on demands in a multi-product context. We demonstrate and explain two perverse properties concerning price elasticities in the presence of network effects when three or more substitutable products are involved: Cross-price elasticities are not necessarily positive, and own-price elasticities are not necessarily negative. These findings imply that the consequences of firms' price moves in a competitive market when network effects are in play deserve further scrutiny.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115792415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying","authors":"Jin‐Hyuk Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1285721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285721","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130594103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Theory of Young Firm Acquisitions","authors":"Masako Ueda, Kyriakos Frantzeskakis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.992533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.992533","url":null,"abstract":"Evidence suggests that young firm acquisitions have outgrown both IPOs and established firm acquisitions. To study this phenomenon, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of mergers and acquisitions as efficient reallocation of assets. A firm may build assets that it may not be able to manage successfully. If so, the firm may be acquired by an established firm that has proved its ability to manage such assets successfully. A young firm has not yet proved its ability to manage assets, and can only do so by remaining independent and managing assets. We find that when the transaction costs of acquisition decrease and/or the costs of building and managing assets increase, an established firm switches from building new assets internally to acquiring a young firm. We also find that when the young firm's attempt to manage assets are less likely to fail and/or assets obsolete sooner, more young firms become acquisition targets and the fraction of independent young firms such as IPO firms declines. Our model is consistent with some stylized facts of mergers and acquisitions such as the bidder discount, the target premia and the size distribution of acquirers and targets.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"611 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116453814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Firm's Life Cycle and Mergers as Efficient Reallocation","authors":"Kyriakos Frantzeskakis, Masako Ueda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.953112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.953112","url":null,"abstract":"Any factor that makes acquisition more appealing should increase the number of acquisition that occur. This idea has been captured in standard static models in the literature. However, an increase in the number of acquisitions today means fewer firms exist to perform acquisitions in the future. This dynamic, which we explore, is not well understood. We study a model of mergers motivated by efficient reallocation of projects. A firm may conceive a project that it may not be able to develop successfully. It can be acquired by an established firm that has already proved its ability to develop such projects successfully. We find that, when acquisition costs are low established firms acquire young firms (but not other established firms) in the steady state. More strikingly, if the likelihood of project success decreases for young firms, we find that a higher fraction of young firms attempt to develop their projects rather than to be acquired. This contrasts the previous literature's findings on acquisitions. The explanation for this result is that an increased likelihood of firms' failures causes a shortage of established firms that can then acquire new young firms. Finally, if acquisition costs are moderate we find that established firms acquire other established firms, but not young firms.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"106 Pt 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132490701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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