{"title":"数字版权管理与技术捆绑","authors":"Jin‐Hyuk Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1285721","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":382677,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Digital Rights Management and Technological Tying\",\"authors\":\"Jin‐Hyuk Kim\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1285721\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":382677,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-09-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285721\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERPN: Market Structure (Industrial) (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285721","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes DRM-based technological tying, where the content and hardware form a system. A closed DRM system makes the legal content incompatible with a rival’s hardware, whose users must then obtain illegal copies. The main finding is that the tying firm gains market power in a competitive hardware market and invests in product upgrades at a later stage. Welfare implications of the policy that requires an open DRM system are also discussed.
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