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Determinants of Banking Competition in Morocco and Evaluation of the Structural Reforms 摩洛哥银行业竞争的决定因素及结构改革的评价
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2012-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2189891
A. Hakam, F. Fatine, Firano Zakaria
{"title":"Determinants of Banking Competition in Morocco and Evaluation of the Structural Reforms","authors":"A. Hakam, F. Fatine, Firano Zakaria","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2189891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189891","url":null,"abstract":"The empirical results of this paper indicate that the degree of competition in the banking system is determined by several macroeconomic aggregates that describe the relevance of the policies implemented in financial Morocco. Thus, the result shows that there is a positive relationship between the index of competition and concentration there by verifies our theoretical perception. On another note, economic growth is negatively correlated with the competition, which unfortunately indicates that when there are sustained economic growth banks does not behave concurrently and try to retain their market share stimulated by a high concentration sector. This is also dependent on conditions in the credit market, which indicates that when the demand is constant, banks tend to have fewer competing behaviors. In addition, the development of positive market impact of competition which is consistent with liberal theory. Thus, the use of financial market intensifies competition between banks to produce services being able to attract more customers to compensate for those who chose the stock market. Finally, in the implementation of monetary policy, the indicator of interbank interest rate has a positive impact on competition.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116328503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Portfolio Choice in Markets with Contagion 传染市场中的投资组合选择
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2012-10-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2157038
Yacine Ait-Sahalia, T. Hurd
{"title":"Portfolio Choice in Markets with Contagion","authors":"Yacine Ait-Sahalia, T. Hurd","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2157038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2157038","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of optimal investment and consumption in a class of multidimensional jump-diffusion models in which asset prices are subject to mutually exciting jump processes. This captures a type of contagion where each downward jump in an asset's price results in increased likelihood of further jumps, both in that asset and in the other assets. We solve in closed-form the dynamic consumption-investment problem of a log-utility investor in such a contagion model, prove a theorem verifying its optimality and discuss features of the solution, including flight-to-quality. The exponential and power utility investors are also considered: in these cases, the optimal strategy can be characterized as a distortion of the strategy of a corresponding non-contagion investor.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116255497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 71
The Evolution of R&D Networks 研发网络的演化
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2012-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2178940
H. Dawid, Tim Hellmann
{"title":"The Evolution of R&D Networks","authors":"H. Dawid, Tim Hellmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2178940","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178940","url":null,"abstract":"We study the evolution of R&D networks in a Cournot model where firms may lower marginal costs due to bilateral R&D collaborations. Stochastically stable R&D networks exhibit the dominant group architecture, and, contrary to the existing literature, generically unique predictions about the size of the dominant group can be obtained. This size decreases monotonically with respect to the cost of link formation and there exists a lower bound on the size of the dominant group for non-empty networks. Stochastically stable networks are always inefficient and an increase in linking costs has a non-monotone effect on average industry profits.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133316262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 42
Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects 异质个体的重复选择与相对年龄效应
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2012-04-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2178911
H. Dawid, Gerd Muehlheusser
{"title":"Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects","authors":"H. Dawid, Gerd Muehlheusser","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2178911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2178911","url":null,"abstract":"In contexts such as education and sports, skill-accumulation of individuals over time crucially depends on the amount of training they receive, which is often allocated on the basis of repeated selection. We analyze optimal selection policies in a model of endogenous skill formation where, apart from their ability to transform training into skills, individuals also differ with respect to relative age. The latter has been identified by recent empirical research as a major determinant for performance differentials within cohorts. We find that the optimal policy is pro-competitive at later selection stages in the sense of selecting the individuals with the higher skill signals. All eventual corrections due to relative age occur at early stages, where selection is either counter-competitive (i.e. individuals with low skill signals are selected) or even avoided at all. Thereby, the induced selection quality is non-monotone in the degree of ex-ante asymmetry due to relative age. Finally, the (empirical) observation of persistent relative age effects does in general not hint at suboptimal selection policies.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122013287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
International Trade and the Role of Market Transparency 国际贸易和市场透明度的作用
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2010-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1765285
Udo Broll, B. Eckwert, K. Wong
{"title":"International Trade and the Role of Market Transparency","authors":"Udo Broll, B. Eckwert, K. Wong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1765285","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1765285","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the economic role of market transparency on the decision problems of an international firm. Transparency is described in terms of the informativeness of a publicly observable signal. With higher transparency, the signal conveys more precise information about the random foreign exchange rate. We analyze the interaction between market transparency, ex ante expected production, domestic sales, and exports of the firm. Furthermore, we discuss the welfare implications of more transparency in the foreign exchange market for the firm and domestic consumers.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121525894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Public Debt and the Dynamics of Economic Growth 公共债务与经济增长动态
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2010-05-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1601902
Alfred Greiner
{"title":"Public Debt and the Dynamics of Economic Growth","authors":"Alfred Greiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1601902","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1601902","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze effects of public debt on economic growth and its dynamics in a basic endogenous growth assuming that the history of debt affects the primary surplus of the government. The economy with a balanced government budget is characterized by a unique balanced growth path and a condition for saddle point stability is derived. With permanent public deficits there is either no balanced growth path, a unique balanced growth path or there exist two balanced growth paths. The balanced growth path is either stable or unstable. Further, the system may undergo a Hopf bifurcation leading to stable limit cycles.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116535830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy 政治停滞还是贸易保护主义?民主国家贸易改革的政策机制
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2007-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.993811
Emily Blanchard, Gerald Willmann
{"title":"Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy","authors":"Emily Blanchard, Gerald Willmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.993811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.993811","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions, and thus the identity of the median voter. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or (exogenous) tariff liberalization by trading partners, but not, in general, by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a \"protectionist rut.\"","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128599703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 80
Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model With Human Capital and Heterogenous Agents 具有人力资本和异质性动因的内生增长模型中的财政政策
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2006-11-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.944490
Alfred Greiner
{"title":"Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model With Human Capital and Heterogenous Agents","authors":"Alfred Greiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.944490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.944490","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies effects of fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with human capital and heterogenous agents. Two types of households are considered. One household acquires human capital or skills through education while the other household remains unskilled. Sustained growth is the result of human capital accumulation which is a function of the existing human capital employed in the educational sector and of public spending for education. Aggregate production is given by a function with physical capital and labor as input factors, where total labor input is modelled by a CES function with skilled and unskilled labor as arguments. The paper studies effects of fiscal policy as concerns long-run growth and the distribution of income as well as concerns welfare of the two households.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114648295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Optimal Agenda-Setter Timing 最佳议程设定时机
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2006-04-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.897102
Mattias Polborn, Gerald Willmann
{"title":"Optimal Agenda-Setter Timing","authors":"Mattias Polborn, Gerald Willmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.897102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.897102","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the optimal timing problem of an agenda setter who can propose a project that is then voted on by a committee. The payoff consists of a common stochastic component and an idiosyncratic component that differs among committee members. The agenda setter may be biased for or against the project, relative to the median committee member, and chooses when to call the vote. We analyze how the timing decision depends on the political environment and the bias of the agenda setter. We show that both positively and negatively biased agenda setters can implement decisions that differ from those preferred by the median committee member.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122559002","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Human Capital Formation, Public Debt and Economic Growth 人力资本形成、公共债务与经济增长
Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management Pub Date : 2006-02-13 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.884333
Alfred Greiner
{"title":"Human Capital Formation, Public Debt and Economic Growth","authors":"Alfred Greiner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.884333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.884333","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an endogenous growth model with human capital, where human capital formation is the result of public education. The government finances expenditures in the schooling sector by the tax revenue and by public deficit. In addition, the government sets the primary surplus such that it is a positive linear function of public debt which guarantees that public debt is sustainable. The paper analyzes the structure of the growth model and derives implications of public debt. Further, a sensitivity analysis of the dynamics of the model is presented and it turns out that the parameter determining the reaction of the primary surplus to changes in public debt is decisive as concerns stability of the model.","PeriodicalId":381706,"journal":{"name":"Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics & Management","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127274071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
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