PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic)最新文献

The Economics of Disarmament and Arms Control Through the Gorbachev Era 戈尔巴乔夫时代的裁军和军备控制经济学

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-05-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3851632

S. Choudhury

引用次数: 0

Global Arms Trade and Oil Dependence 全球武器贸易和石油依赖

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2018-03-19 DOI: 10.1093/JLEO/EWY007

V. Bove, C. Deiana, R. Nisticò

引用次数: 46

북한 외화획득사업 운영 메커니즘 분석: 광물부문(무연탄ㆍ철광석)을 중심으로 (An Analysis of Operation Mercanism of Foreign Exchange Acquisition Project in North Korea: Focuses the Mineral Sector (Anthracite, Iron Ore)) 分析朝鲜赚取外汇事业运营机制:以矿物部门(无烟炭·铁矿石)为中心(An Analysis of Operation Mercanism of Foreign Exchange Acquisition Project in North Korea: Focuses the Mineral Sector (Anthracite, Iron Ore))

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-12-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3147570

Sooho Lim, Moon-soo Yang, Jung-kyun Rhee

{"title":"북한 외화획득사업 운영 메커니즘 분석: 광물부문(무연탄ㆍ철광석)을 중심으로 (An Analysis of Operation Mercanism of Foreign Exchange Acquisition Project in North Korea: Focuses the Mineral Sector (Anthracite, Iron Ore))","authors":"Sooho Lim, Moon-soo Yang, Jung-kyun Rhee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3147570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3147570","url":null,"abstract":"Minerals are North Korea's key exports. The international community assumes that a significant portion of North Korea's mineral exports is devoted to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as nuclear weapons and missiles, and therefore has been implementing strong export sanctions since 2016. As a result, North Korean exports of more than 10 kinds of minerals, including anthracite and iron ore, have been banned for trade by the international community. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of sanctions placed on anthracite and iron ore exports on the North Korean economy in depth, which account for the largest share of North Korea’s exports. More specifically, we examine the production and export of anthracite and iron ores, the process of acquiring foreign currency as a result of the trade and its distribution mechanism. To ensure this end, we conducted in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors who have worked in the business of acquiring foreign exchange as a result of trade in anthracite and iron ores in North Korea, and Korean and Chinese business operators who had engaged in mineral trades with North Korea. 광물은 북한의 핵심 수출품이다. 국제사회는 북한의 광물 수출대금 중 상당 부분이 핵ㆍ미사일 등 대량살상무기(WMD) 개발에 전용된다고 간주하고 2016년부터 강력한 수출제재를 실시하고 있다. 이에 따라 북한은 무연탄과 철광석을 비롯한 10여 종의 광물을 해외로 수출할 수 없게 되었다. 본 연구는 광물제재, 특히 북한의 수출에서 가장 큰 비중을 차지하는 무연탄 및 철광석 수출제재가 북한경제에 미치는 영향을 심층적으로 분석하기 위해 무연탄 및 철광석의 생산과 수출, 그리고 그 과정에서 동반되는 외화의 획득과 분배 메커니즘을 체계적으로 분석하고자 하였다. 이를 위해 북한에서 무연탄 및 철광석 외화벌 이사업에 종사한 경험이 있는 탈북자, 대북 광물무역에 종사한 경험이 있는 한국 및 중국 사업자들을 대상으로 심층 인터뷰를 실시하였다.","PeriodicalId":381297,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132215631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Trading Speed Competition: Can the Arms Race Go Too Far? 交易速度竞争:军备竞赛会走得太远吗?

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-05-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2779904

Dion Bongaerts, Lingtian Kong, Mark Van Achter

引用次数: 7

More Noise than Signal in Proliferation Studies? 扩散研究中的噪音比信号多?

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3275657

Etel Solingen

{"title":"More Noise than Signal in Proliferation Studies?","authors":"Etel Solingen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3275657","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3275657","url":null,"abstract":"Mark Bell’s article (2016) is a welcome contribution to the unavoidable task of evaluating a research program that exhibits the problems he identifies: the failure of most quantitative studies to offer strong explanations for proliferation patterns, and their inability to predict out-of-sample cases. His findings resonate with those of other proliferation experts. The existing quantitative literature, argues Bell, produces more tentative findings than scholars typically understand. We concur fully with the first part of the last sentence but believe that the broader community of experts typically does understand the serious limitations of most quantitative studies (and qualitative ones) on this topic. What are those limitations of quantitative studies according to Bell? First, there are many more distinctive explanations than cases. Second, most variables identified as significant determinants of proliferation “fail to provide robust explanations for existing patterns.” Third, studies question the robustness of each other’s quantitative findings. Fourth, they provide little sense of the hierarchy of importance of different explanations. Fifth, they offer “little predictive ability beyond what we can achieve with an extremely simple model” (which, incidentally but unstated in Bell’s piece, can be of a qualitative kind). Sixth, they are not transparent about those limitations. Seventh, they typically model the effects of variables as constant across time and space. Here Bell reiterates a point others have made: studies must control for the world-time under which nuclear weapons are developed or eschewed, such as pre- or post-NPT era (Solingen 2007). Because of all of the above and more, Bell concludes that weak correlations between proliferation and many variables in extant quantitative studies offer no proof whatsoever that those variables do not in fact cause or prevent proliferation. In other words, the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, as is sometimes argued in court. Most of these shortcomings are well known, and some can afflict qualitative studies as well (for an extensive review, see Wan and Solingen 2015 and Solingen 2007).","PeriodicalId":381297,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic)","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122012080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Assemblage of the Vertical: Commercial Drones and Algorithmic Life 垂直装配:商用无人机和算法生命

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-11-12 DOI: 10.5194/GH-71-137-2016

J. Crampton

引用次数: 37

Changes in North Korea and Policy Responses of the International Community Toward North Korea 北韩的变化和国际社会对北韩的政策反应

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2954424

C. Pritchard, S. Baek, Yuzhi Qiao, Scott Snyder, Huji Zhao, Alexander Z. Zhebin, Narihiko Ito

引用次数: 3

Enlightenment and Nuclear Order 启蒙与核秩序

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-05-01 DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00633.x

Joachim J. Krause

{"title":"Enlightenment and Nuclear Order","authors":"Joachim J. Krause","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00633.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00633.x","url":null,"abstract":"Applying the method of enlightenment correctly to the area of nuclear non-proliferation would require a major effort to critically evaluate ideologies. Liberal arms control despite its many successes and merits has devised over the years a whole set of ideological tenets and attitudes. Some of them have been transformed into beliefs that could be termed myths. The most prominent ideological myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) was in essence a disarmament agreement, not a non-proliferation treaty. To depict the negotiations as a premeditated effort of enlightenment, where the governments of this world came together to solemnly decide that some of them would be allowed to have some nuclear weapons for an interim period while the others would renounce their possession immediately, is pure. It would be equally wrong to qualify the grand bargain as one between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. Another myth of the liberal arms control school is the notion that - in order to gain support for the NPT - the superpowers had altered their nuclear weapons strategy in the 1960s. Again, this contention is not borne out by the development of nuclear strategies and doctrines. The third myth is the contention that there was an abrupt shift in US non-proliferation policy as George W. Bush came into power. The major changes in US non-proliferation policy had already started during the Clinton administration and some of them can be traced back to the tenure of President George W. H. Bush senior. They all reflected the changed international environment and represented necessary adjustments of the non-proliferation strategy. The Clinton administration left some of the traditional paths of arms control and rightly undertook some changes that were necessary because traditional instruments of arms control were no longer adequate. The Bush administration continued that policy, but in a more radical way.","PeriodicalId":381297,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117804193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 27

Domestic Aspects of Strategic Postures: Past and Future in a Middle East Nuclear Regime 战略姿态的国内方面:中东核制度的过去与未来

PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic) Pub Date : 1995-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3277650

Etel Solingen

{"title":"Domestic Aspects of Strategic Postures: Past and Future in a Middle East Nuclear Regime","authors":"Etel Solingen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3277650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3277650","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines domestic aspects of the debate over the establishment of a regional nuclear regime in the Middle East. It does so in order to offset the marginal attention paid to the impact of domestic processes and institutions in the definition of strategic outcomes. The call for incorporating domestic politics into the study of international regimes is not new but, with few exceptions, has been rarely followed by actual applications. That failure has not been the subject of great controversy in the analysis of nuclear options in the Middle East, because neorealist assumptions about the primacy of state survival considerations have gained unparalleled analytical supremacy. The potential for physical annihilation compelled a neorealist point of departure, even when neorealist assumptions led to no particular saddlepoint, or solution (in logical terms, the search for survival could have led to a range of means and outcomes). That different domestic actors are likely to define strategic options with different considerations in mind seems self-evident. Domestic groups weigh different international outcomes according to the latter's potential effect on their own political and institutional pay-offs. The pay-offs associated with different outcomes can be affected by different mixes of side-payments. For instance, no military establishment entrusted with maintaining conventional deterrence would endanger its access to conventional weapons, the means with which it maintains its mission. In general terms, domestic actors rank their preferences according to the rate at which they discount the future, their degree of receptivity to transparency, their sensitivity coefficients to gaps in gains, and/or their definition of a 'balanced exchange'. These four, of course, are influenced by the extent to which actors are concerned with short-term political/electoral gains or with longer-term institutional and bureaucratic survival. Thus, the conventional military establishment may be open to absolute (mutual) gains and transparency at the nuclear level while resisting anything other than relative gains in conventional weaponry. A certain political party may be reluctant to ratify an agreement that does not make its own positional gains clear. Strategic postures are nested in a multidimentional space where foreign aid and investment, technological change, electoral cycles (or their equivalent), and conventional military balances intersect in often unpredictable ways. If one construes the past evolution of Middle East nuclear postures with these considerations in mind, where does one look in trying to understand the emergence of nuclear opaqueness on the one hand, and a stillborn regional regime on the other? Were these outcomes compatible with the ability of relevant domestic groups to pursue their own political agendas? Were they perhaps even optimal in terms of increasing their internal political latitude? A positive answ","PeriodicalId":381297,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Arms Races & Arms Control (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132647096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3