PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Mixed Member Proportional; Equal Influence and Assembly Size","authors":"E. Stensholt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3683695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3683695","url":null,"abstract":"With the present (2020) tally rules, the number of seats in the Bundestag is highly volatile. In 2017 it got 709 seats, 111 of them extra-ordinary. The tally rules may double the influence of a voter who splits the vote; the proportionality requirement may multiply an unfortunate side effect by a high factor. The paper explains when and how this happens. <br><br>A ballot’s combination of Erststimme and Zweitstimme is information that now is ignored; the tally is as if Erststimme and Zweitsimme were collected in different ballot boxes. The suggested faithful accounting uses this information. With 2017 data, it is estimated that the number of extra-ordinary seats would have been reduced by about 74, to 37. <br><br>Tallying 2017 data with present rules and CDU/CSU as one party reduces the size by 42 seats; combined with faithful accounting, the reduction is more than 74.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127421630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compulsory Voting and Populism","authors":"P. Crabb","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3662725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3662725","url":null,"abstract":"The political theory and strategy of populism has recently gained traction throughout the world but has a long history in Iberian South America. This region is further characterized by constitutional requirements that everyone vote, known as compulsory voting systems. We present a study showing a high use of such laws in the region as a method to elect populist leaders and maintain their control of government, and conclude that a continuation of the populist trend elsewhere is likely to be associated with more compulsory voting laws. <br>","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129433916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Large Effects of a Small Win: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates","authors":"V. Pons, Clémence Tricaud, Clémence Tricaud","doi":"10.3386/W26599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W26599","url":null,"abstract":"Candidates’ placements in polls or past elections can be powerful coordination devices for both parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French elections, we show that candidates who place first by only a small margin in the first round are more likely to stay in the race, win, and win conditionally on staying in than those who place second. The impacts are even larger for ranking second instead of third, and also present for third instead of fourth. Rankings’ effects are largest when candidates have the same political orientation (making coordination more important), but remain strong when only two candidates qualify for the second round (and coordination is not needed). They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the “bandwagon effect” of desiring to vote for the winner. We find similar results in two-round elections across 19 other countries.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126887396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering on Political Parties","authors":"N. Stephanopoulos, C. Warshaw","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3330695","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3330695","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between votes and seats in the legislature lies at the heart of democratic governance. However, there has been little previous work on the downstream effects of partisan gerrymandering on the health of political parties. In this study, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the impact of partisan advantage in the districting process on an array of downstream outcomes. We find that districting bias impedes numerous party functions at both the congressional and state house levels. Candidates are less likely to contest districts when their party is disadvantaged by a districting plan. Candidates that do choose to run are more likely to have weak resumes. Donors are less willing to contribute money. And ordinary voters are less apt to support the targeted party. These results suggest that gerrymandering has long-term effects on the health of the democratic process beyond simply costing or gaining parties seats in the legislature.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116505071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Continuing Validity of the Electoral College: A Quantitative Confirmation","authors":"Audrey Lynn","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/6h2pa","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/6h2pa","url":null,"abstract":"Debates over the merits of the Electoral College historically have been characterized by philosophical arguments and arcane statistical models. In light of growing efforts to undermine or discard the electoral system, the nation needs objective answers about how the Electoral College affects presidential elections. Using accessible quantitative techniques, this Article answers three essential questions: what was the electoral system intended to do, what has it done, and what is the best (or worst) it can do? It answers these questions using a unique approach that measures the electoral system’s success and potential in terms that correspond to its raison d'être, parameterizing the problem in terms of satisfaction and population instead of voters. Also in contrast to traditional expositions, this Article dispenses with “highly stylized” and voter-based statistical models. It instead correctly recognizes the Electoral College as a discrete mathematical system and applies much simpler and more meaningful descriptive and predictive techniques to actual election data. The result is that the system’s effect on elections is quantified, related to historical data, and reliably forecast for the foreseeable future. This is the type of substantive analysis long needed to confirm or disprove the system’s merits. Part I first examines records of the Constitutional Convention seeking to determine what the Framers’ purpose was in choosing the algorithm they did. Concluding that their purpose was to provide a president who would be representative of people across the country, the Article proceeds with a focus on people and places to examine whether the system has achieved its goal. Beginning with the first election in which there was a registered popular vote, Part II briefly describes the few discrepancies there have been between the popular and electoral vote in order to fairly characterize the basis for controversy. Its novel contribution, however, is to propose and apply a framework for assessing whether the Electoral College results in an effective expression of the will and interests of the People that is consistent with the legitimizing principles of our government. Part III concludes with a mathematical analysis that proves that there are specific, calculable limitations on the size and distribution of a prevailing minority and illustrates that there is a continuing likelihood that winning candidates will be selected by states comprising a majority of the population.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122108096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Effects of Photo Id Laws on Registration and Turnout: Evidence from Rhode Island","authors":"Francesco Esposito, Diego Focanti, Justine S. Hastings","doi":"10.3386/W25503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W25503","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of photo ID laws on voting using a difference-in-differences estimation approach around Rhode Island’s implementation of a photo ID law. We employ anonymized administrative data to measure the law’s impact by comparing voting behavior among those with drivers’ licenses versus those without, before versus after the law. Turnout, registration, and voting conditional on registration fell for those without licenses after the law passed. We do not find evidence that people proactively obtained licenses in anticipation of the law, nor do we find that they substituted towards mail ballots which do not require a photo ID.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129985054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions","authors":"Garance Genicot, Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira","doi":"10.1093/JEEA/JVAB016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JEEA/JVAB016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper studies the political determinants of inequalities in government interventions under majoritarian (MAJ) and proportional representation (PR) systems. We propose a probabilistic voting model of electoral competition with highly targetable government interventions and heterogeneous localities. We uncover a novel relative electoral sensitivity effect that affects government interventions only under MAJ systems. This effect tends to reduce inequality in government interventions under MAJ systems when districts are composed of sufficiently homogeneous localities. This effect goes against the conventional wisdom that MAJ systems are necessarily more conducive to inequality than PR systems. We illustrate the empirical relevance of our results with numerical simulations on possible reforms of the US Electoral College.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131524695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion","authors":"Konstantinos Matakos, R. Savolainen, Orestis Troumpounis, Janne Tukiainen, Dimitrios Xefteris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3212638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3212638","url":null,"abstract":"We study parties' optimal ideological cohesion across electoral rules, when the following trade-off is present: A more heterogenous set of candidates is electorally appealing (catch-all party), yet, it serves policy-related goals less efficiently. When the rule becomes more disproportional, thus inducing a more favorable seat allocation for the winner, the first effect is amplified, incentivizing parties to be less cohesive. We provide empirical support using a unique data-set that records candidates' ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections. Exploiting an exogenous change of electoral rule disproportionality at different population thresholds, we identify the causal effect of electoral rules on parties' cohesion.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131761219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Identifying the Effect of Mobilization on Voter Turnout through a Natural Experiment","authors":"K. Fukumoto, Y. Horiuchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2586826","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2586826","url":null,"abstract":"Although numerous get-out-the-vote field experiments have identified the effects of particular mobilization tactics (e.g., canvassing, phone calls, direct mails) on voter turnout, we do not yet have a full understanding of the causal effect of overall mobilization. We study this by leveraging a natural experiment in Japan, in which the timing of a municipal election is as-if randomly assigned. The results show that almost concurrently held municipal elections boost these municipalities’ voter turnout in prefectural elections by one to two percentage points. We argue that some unique settings in Japan allow us not only to mitigate omitted variable bias but also to attribute the estimated effect only to mobilization, rather than the effects of cost sharing and psychological stimulus.","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131978993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Local Favoritism in At-Large Proportional Representation Systems","authors":"Jon H. Fiva, A. Halse","doi":"10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2016.08.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2016.08.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":380919,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Electoral Institutions (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120032927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}