The Large Effects of a Small Win: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Abstract

Candidates’ placements in polls or past elections can be powerful coordination devices for both parties and voters. Using a regression discontinuity design in French elections, we show that candidates who place first by only a small margin in the first round are more likely to stay in the race, win, and win conditionally on staying in than those who place second. The impacts are even larger for ranking second instead of third, and also present for third instead of fourth. Rankings’ effects are largest when candidates have the same political orientation (making coordination more important), but remain strong when only two candidates qualify for the second round (and coordination is not needed). They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the “bandwagon effect” of desiring to vote for the winner. We find similar results in two-round elections across 19 other countries.