Desire as BeliefPub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0012
A. Gregory
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"This brief chapter first restates the arguments for desire-as-belief, reiterates how it illuminates various questions about motivation, rationality, and what we ought to do, and recapitulates the ways in which the view can avoid objections. It then briefly restates the contrasts between desire-as-belief and some rival views. The chapter next presents some autobiographical claims about which aspects of the view the author finds most and least compelling, and finally notes various topics that stand out as requiring further investigation in relation to desire-as-belief: the nature of reasons, the prospects for objectivism in metaethics, developments in neuroscience, and questions about desire-as-belief and the status of knowledge – as opposed to mere belief – about reasons.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117236280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Desire as BeliefPub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0008
A. Gregory
{"title":"Desire and Feeling","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the relationship between desires and feelings such as pleasure and emotion. It explains how emotions bear on our desires in a manner that is consistent with desire-as-belief – our emotions affect our desires largely by directing our attention onto the reasons we have. It then discusses the influence of appetites and pleasure on desire – these things affect our desires because they affect the reasons we have. Moreover, the chapter argues that by understanding appetites and likings as distinct states from desires, desire-as-belief can make good sense of apparently non-rational variation in desire between people, and over time. The chapter goes on to explain how desire-as-belief can make good sense of ascetics who believe that they have no reasons to pursue pleasure. Finally, the chapter addresses the role that desires play in producing pleasure.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116953529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Desire as BeliefPub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0006
A. Gregory
{"title":"Irrationality","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter replies to one common objection to desire-as-belief: that it makes poor sense of practical irrationality such as akrasia. This objection to desire-as-belief is closely related to two others: the worry that we sometimes desire to do things without believing we have reason to pursue them, and the worry that we sometimes believe we have reason to pursue things without desiring to do them. The chapter offers a series of complementary responses to these objections: that our beliefs can be irrational, that some of what we say about our desires is misleading, and that we might fail to be motivated by our desires. Between these factors, it is doubtful that such objections succeed. The chapter finishes with a brief aside on second-order desires, and concludes that they are of little relevance to the occurrence of akrasia.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131386062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Desire as BeliefPub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009
A. Gregory
{"title":"Uncertainty and Reasoning","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"In the first half, the chapter explains how desires can come in degrees. The most complex question here is how degrees of uncertainty in our reasons beliefs get expressed with respect to desires. The answer is that they get expressed as uncertainty about what we want. In the second half, the chapter turns to our capacity to reason with our desires. It focuses on instrumentalism, the view that only instrumental desires can be changed by reasoning. This might seem problematic for desire-as-belief. But the chapter shows that instrumentalism is false, in light of the fact that some desires are neither instrumental nor ultimate.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131984654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Desire as BeliefPub Date : 2021-06-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010
A. Gregory
{"title":"Representing Reasons","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses the worry that desire-as-belief raises the bar too high for desiring since it excludes many animals from having desires. In response, the chapter first sketches a general theory of how normative beliefs get their contents: a version of conceptual role semantics according to which the content of a given normative belief is determined by the inputs and outputs to that state. Then, with this theory in hand, the chapter argues that animals count as borderline cases of creatures with desires, since they are borderline cases of creatures with reasons beliefs. This conclusion has some intuitive appeal, and remaining resistance may be undercut by appeal to the distinction between desires and likings, and by appeal to the fact that “wants” is sometimes used merely to mean “needs”.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"34 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114129826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：