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Desire as Belief最新文献

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Desire and Feeling 欲望与感觉
Desire as Belief Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0008
A. Gregory
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引用次数: 0
Uncertainty and Reasoning 不确定性和推理
Desire as Belief Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009
A. Gregory
{"title":"Uncertainty and Reasoning","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198848172.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"In the first half, the chapter explains how desires can come in degrees. The most complex question here is how degrees of uncertainty in our reasons beliefs get expressed with respect to desires. The answer is that they get expressed as uncertainty about what we want. In the second half, the chapter turns to our capacity to reason with our desires. It focuses on instrumentalism, the view that only instrumental desires can be changed by reasoning. This might seem problematic for desire-as-belief. But the chapter shows that instrumentalism is false, in light of the fact that some desires are neither instrumental nor ultimate.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131984654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Representing Reasons 表示原因
Desire as Belief Pub Date : 2021-06-17 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010
A. Gregory
{"title":"Representing Reasons","authors":"A. Gregory","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848172.003.0010","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter assesses the worry that desire-as-belief raises the bar too high for desiring since it excludes many animals from having desires. In response, the chapter first sketches a general theory of how normative beliefs get their contents: a version of conceptual role semantics according to which the content of a given normative belief is determined by the inputs and outputs to that state. Then, with this theory in hand, the chapter argues that animals count as borderline cases of creatures with desires, since they are borderline cases of creatures with reasons beliefs. This conclusion has some intuitive appeal, and remaining resistance may be undercut by appeal to the distinction between desires and likings, and by appeal to the fact that “wants” is sometimes used merely to mean “needs”.","PeriodicalId":380618,"journal":{"name":"Desire as Belief","volume":"34 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114129826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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