Representing Reasons

A. Gregory
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Abstract

This chapter assesses the worry that desire-as-belief raises the bar too high for desiring since it excludes many animals from having desires. In response, the chapter first sketches a general theory of how normative beliefs get their contents: a version of conceptual role semantics according to which the content of a given normative belief is determined by the inputs and outputs to that state. Then, with this theory in hand, the chapter argues that animals count as borderline cases of creatures with desires, since they are borderline cases of creatures with reasons beliefs. This conclusion has some intuitive appeal, and remaining resistance may be undercut by appeal to the distinction between desires and likings, and by appeal to the fact that “wants” is sometimes used merely to mean “needs”.
表示原因
这一章评估了一种担忧,即欲望即信仰将欲望的标准提高得太高,因为它排除了许多动物的欲望。作为回应,本章首先概述了规范性信念如何获得其内容的一般理论:概念角色语义学的一个版本,根据该版本,给定规范性信念的内容由该状态的输入和输出决定。然后,有了这个理论,本章认为动物是有欲望的生物的边缘案例,因为它们是有理性信仰的生物的边缘案例。这个结论有一些直觉上的吸引力,而对欲望和喜欢之间的区别的呼吁,以及对“想要”有时仅仅用来表示“需要”这一事实的呼吁,可能会削弱剩余的阻力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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