{"title":"Towards provable security for ad hoc routing protocols","authors":"L. Buttyán, I. Vajda","doi":"10.1145/1029102.1029119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029119","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a formal framework for the security analysis of on-demand source routing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach is based on the well-known simulation paradigm that has been proposed to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Our main contribution is the application of the simulation-based approach in the context of ad hoc routing. This involves a precise definition of a real-world model, which describes the real operation of the protocol, and an ideal-world model, which captures what the protocol wants to achieve in terms of security. Both models take into account the peculiarities of wireless communications and ad hoc routing. Then, we give a formal definition of routing security in terms of indistinguishability of the two models from the point of view of honest parties. We demonstrate the usefulness of our approach by analyzing two \"secure\" ad hoc routing protocols, SRP and Ariadne. This analysis leads to the discovery of as yet unknown attacks against both protocols. Finally, we propose a new ad hoc routing protocol and prove it to be secure in our model.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"565 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127684816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security in wireless sensor networks","authors":"J. Stankovic","doi":"10.1145/1029102.1029103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029103","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are envisioned to consist of large numbers of minimum capacity devices operating in demanding real-world environments. These issues, together with the inherent problems of wireless communication, make security an especially difficult problem. Many WSN also need to operate under real-time constraints. We discuss three routing protocols for WSN that have good real-time performance properties: SPEED, RAP and IGF. We suggest extensions to these protocols that improve their security properties. Denial of service is another key problem facing WSN. We discuss a highly decentralized algorithm for the detection and mapping of jammed regions of a WSN. The solution is robust to failures and can operate on partial information (a type of anytime algorithm). We conclude by considering several potential future directions for security solutions, including: secure groups based on relaxed semantics, exploiting physical properties, exploiting time validity intervals for data, and the interaction between security and privacy.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124565258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Source-location privacy in energy-constrained sensor network routing","authors":"Celal Öztürk, Yanyong Zhang, W. Trappe","doi":"10.1145/1029102.1029117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029117","url":null,"abstract":"As sensor-driven applications become increasingly integrated into our lives, issues related to sensor privacy will become increasingly important. Although many privacy-related issues can be addressed by security mechanisms, one sensor network privacy issue that cannot be adequately addressed by network security is confidentiality of the source sensor's location. In this paper, we focus on protecting the source's location by introducing suitable modifications to sensor routing protocols to make it difficult for an adversary to backtrack to the origin of the sensor communication. In particular, we focus on the class of flooding protocols. While developing and evaluating our privacy-aware routing protocols, we jointly consider issues of location-privacy as well as the amount of energy consumed by the sensor network. Motivated by the observations, we propose a flexible routing strategy, known as <i>phantom routing</i>, which protects the source's location. Phantom routing is a two-stage routing scheme that first consists of a directed walk along a random direction, followed by routing from the phantom source to the sink. Our investigations have shown that phantom routing is a powerful technique for protecting the location of the source during sensor transmissions.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121841950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An attack on the proactive RSA signature scheme in the URSA ad hoc network access control protocol","authors":"Stanislaw Jarecki, Nitesh Saxena, J. Yi","doi":"10.1145/1029102.1029105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1029102.1029105","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, Luo, et al. in a series of papers [17, 14, 13, 18, 15] proposed a set of protocols for providing ubiquitous and robust access control [URSA] in mobile ad hoc networks without relying on a centralized authority. The URSA protocol relies on the new proactive RSA signature scheme, which allows members in an ad hoc group to make access control decisions in a distributed manner. The proposed proactive RSA signature scheme is assumed secure as long as no more than an allowed threshold of participating members is simultaneously corrupted at any point in the lifetime of the scheme.\u0000 In this paper we show an attack on this proposed proactive RSA scheme, in which an admissible threshold of malicious group members can completely recover the group RSA secret key in the course of the lifetime of this scheme. Our attack stems from the fact that the threshold signature protocol which is a part of this proactive RSA scheme leaks some seemingly innocuous information about the secret signature key. We show how the corrupted members can in uence the execution of the scheme in such a way so that the slowly leaked information is used to reconstruct the entire shared secret.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125551828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Admission control in Peer-to-Peer: design and performance evaluation","authors":"Nitesh Saxena, G. Tsudik, J. Yi","doi":"10.1145/986858.986873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986873","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-Peer (P2P) applications and services are very common in today's computing. The popularity of the P2P paradigm prompts the need for specialized security services which makes P2P security an important and challenging research topic. Most prior work in P2P security focused on authentication, key management and secure communication. However, an important pre-requisite for many P2P security services is secure admission, or how one becomes a peer in a P2P setting. This issue has been heretofore largely untouched.This paper builds upon some recent work [11] which constructed a peer group admission control framework based on different policies and corresponding cryptographic techniques. Our central goal is to assess the practicality of these techniques. To this end, we construct and evaluate concrete P2P admission mechanisms based on various cryptographic techniques. Although our analysis focuses primarily on performance, we also consider other important features, such as: anonymity, unlinkability and accountability. Among other things, our experimental results demonstrate that, unfortunately, advanced cryptographic constructs (such as verifiable threshold signatures) are not yet ready for prime time.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133438480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T. S. Messerges, J. Cukier, T. Kevenaar, L. Puhl, R. Struik, E. Callaway
{"title":"A security design for a general purpose, self-organizing, multihop ad hoc wireless network","authors":"T. S. Messerges, J. Cukier, T. Kevenaar, L. Puhl, R. Struik, E. Callaway","doi":"10.1145/986858.986860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986860","url":null,"abstract":"We present a security design for a general purpose, self-organizing, multihop ad hoc wireless network, based on the IEEE 802.15.4 low-rate wireless personal area network standard. The design employs elliptic-curve cryptography and the AES block cipher to supply message integrity and encryption services, key-establishment protocols, and a large set of extended security services, while at the same time meeting the low implementation cost, low power, and high flexibility requirements of ad hoc wireless networks.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125300122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A certificate revocation scheme for wireless ad hoc networks","authors":"C. Crépeau, Carlton R. Davis","doi":"10.1145/986858.986866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986866","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing prominence of wireless ad hoc networks is stimulating greater interest in developing adequate security mechanisms for securing applications involving these innovative networks paradigms. To-date, the proposed security schemes either provide inadequate security or they are too costly computationally, and therefore impractical for most ad hoc network applications.Adapting wired network security schemes---particularly those involved digital certificates---to wireless ad hoc networks environments, poses many difficulties, primarily for two reasons: the limitation of computational resources, and the absence of centralized entities for performing critical key management tasks such as certificate revocation.In this paper, we propose a certificate revocation scheme for wireless ad hoc networks. Our revocation scheme not only provides a measure of protection against malicious accusation attacks, but it also effectively eliminates the window of opportunity whereby revoked certificates can be used to access network services.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127714110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Location-based pairwise key establishments for static sensor networks","authors":"Donggang Liu, P. Ning","doi":"10.1145/986858.986869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986869","url":null,"abstract":"Sensor networks are ideal candidates for applications such as target tracking and environment monitoring. Security in sensor networks is critical when there are potential adversaries. Establishment of pairwise keys is a fundamental security service, which forms the basis of other security services such as authentication and encryption. However, establishing pairwise keys in sensor networks is not a trivial task, particularly due to the resource constraints on sensors. This paper presents several techniques for establishing pairwise keys in static sensor networks. These techniques take advantage of the observation that in static sensor networks, although it is difficult to precisely pinpoint sensors' positions, it is often possible to approximately determine their locations. This paper presents a simple location-aware deployment model, and develops two pairwise key predistribution schemes, a closest pairwise keys predistribution scheme and a location-based pairwise keys scheme using bivariate polynomials, by taking advantage of sensors' expected locations. The analysis in this paper indicates that these schemes can achieve better performance if such location information is available and that the smaller the deployment error (i.e., the difference between a sensor's actual location and its expected location) is, the better performance they can achieve.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126986313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security support for in-network processing in Wireless Sensor Networks","authors":"Jing Deng, Richard O. Han, Shivakant Mishra","doi":"10.1145/986858.986870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986870","url":null,"abstract":"The benefits of in-network processing for wireless sensor networks include improved scalability, prolonged lifetime, and increased versatility. This paper addresses the challenges associated with securing in-network processing within WSNs, and proposes a collection of mechanisms for delegating trust to aggregators that are not initially trusted by individual sensor nodes. Security mechanisms are proposed to address the downstream requirement that sensor nodes authenticate commands disseminated from parent aggregators. Conversely, security mechanisms are also proposed to address the upstream requirement that aggregators authenticate data produced by sensors before aggregating. Simulation results in ns2 of the proposed mechanisms for secure in-network processing are presented, as well as implementation on a mote testbed.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131603092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Secure long term communities in ad hoc networks","authors":"N. Prigent, C. Bidan, J. Andreaux, Olivier Heen","doi":"10.1145/986858.986874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/986858.986874","url":null,"abstract":"Until recently, ad hoc networks were mainly used for military and security-sensitive applications. Nowadays, they could also be used in SOHO (Small Office / Home Office) or home networks. In such networks, devices are linked by long term relations. To ensure their security, it is necessary to define precisely which devices belong to a given network and are consequently inside the security perimeter. The chosen mechanisms need to be easy to use, because the users of SOHO and home networks are neither willing nor able to configure the security of their network. In this paper, we present a new fully distributed approach for securing long term communities of devices in SOHO and home ad hoc networks that minimizes user intervention.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128291959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}