Mahdi Kefayati, H. Rabiee, S. Miremadi, A. Khonsari
{"title":"Misbehavior resilient multi-path data transmission in mobile ad-hoc networks","authors":"Mahdi Kefayati, H. Rabiee, S. Miremadi, A. Khonsari","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180357","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces Adaptive Path Selection and Loading (APSL) as a multi-path data transmission scheme for mitigating the effects of misbehaving nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks. In APSL, misbehavior resilience is achieved by adaptively loading Reed-Solomon (RS) coded data into multiple node-disjoint paths. In order to maximize packet delivery ratio, paths are loaded according to Path State Information (PSI) which dynamically estimates the availability and stability of each path. We evaluated APSL through simulation in terms of packet delivery ratio, normalized average end-to-end delay and overhead. APSL can achieve more than 90% packet delivery ratio. Compared to adaptive single path and adaptive multi-path data forwarding with uniform loading, the packet delivery ratio is increased up to 0:9 while the end-to-end delay is reduced by a factor of 6 and the overhead is reduced by a factor of 2.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128221242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A resilient packet-forwarding scheme against maliciously packet-dropping nodes in sensor networks","authors":"Suk-Bok Lee, Yoon-Hwa Choi","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180353","url":null,"abstract":"This paper focuses on defending against compromised nodes' dropping of legitimate reports and investigates the misbehavior of a maliciously packet-dropping node in sensor networks. We present a resilient packet-forwarding scheme using Neighbor Watch System (NWS), specifically designed for hop-by-hop reliable delivery in face of malicious nodes that drop relaying packets, as well as faulty nodes that fail to relay packets. Unlike previous work with multipath data forwarding, our scheme basically employs single-path data forwarding, which consumes less power than multipath schemes. As the packet is forwarded along the single-path toward the base station, our scheme, however, converts into multipath data forwarding at the location where NWS detects relaying nodes' misbehavior. Simulation experiments show that, with the help of NWS, our forwarding scheme achieves a high success ratio in face of a large number of packet-dropping nodes, and effectively adjusts its forwarding style, depending on the number of packet-dropping nodes en-route to the base station.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130455531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SIGF: a family of configurable, secure routing protocols for wireless sensor networks","authors":"A. Wood, L. Fang, J. Stankovic, T. He","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180351","url":null,"abstract":"As sensor networks are deployed in adversarial environments and used for critical applications such as battlefield surveillance and medical monitoring, security weaknesses become a big concern. The severe resource constraints of WSNs give rise to the need for resource bound security solutions.In this paper we present SIGF (Secure Implicit Geographic Forwarding), a configurable secure routing protocol family for wireless sensor networks that provides \"good enough\" security and high performance. By avoiding or limiting shared state, the protocols prevent many common attacks against routing, and contain others to the local neighborhood.SIGF makes explicit the tradeoff between security provided and state which must be stored and maintained. It comprises three protocols, each forming a basis for the next: SIGF-0 keeps no state, but provides probabilistic defenses; SIGF-1 uses local history and reputation to protect against certain attacks; and SIGF-2 uses neighborhood-shared state to provide stronger security guarantees.Our performance evaluation shows that SIGF achieves high packet delivery ratios with low overhead and end-to-end delay. We evaluate the security of SIGF protocols under various security attacks and show that it effectively contains the damage from compromised nodes and defends against black hole, selective forwarding, Sybil, and some denial of service attacks.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"2011 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121422442","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impact of optimal MAC layer attacks on the network layer","authors":"Svetlana Radosavac, J. Baras, G. Moustakides","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180362","url":null,"abstract":"Node misbehavior in wireless ad hoc networks leads to sudden unpredictable changes in network topology, resulting in fluctuation of traffic load and capacity for already existing links. In this work we consider node misbehavior in the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and its effects on the performance of the network layer. In order to capture uncertainty of the attacker's strategy as well as the unpredictable nature of the wireless medium, we quantify the optimal attack strategy by using the principle of minimum cross-entropy. Following that, we apply the obtained results for analysis of the IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC protocol and investigate the effects of such optimal attacks on the network layer. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of two different routing protocols against the worst-case MAC layer attacks and justify the need for the MAC layer-based Intrusion Detection Sytems (IDS).","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117012401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diversify sensor nodes to improve resilience against node compromise","authors":"A. Alarifi, Wenliang Du","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180359","url":null,"abstract":"A great challenge in securing sensor networks is that sensor nodes can be physically compromised. Once a node is compromised, attackers can retrieve secret information (e.g. keys) from the node. In most of the key pre-distribution schemes, the compromise of secret information on one node can have substantial impact on other nodes because secrets are shared by more than one node in those schemes. Although tamper-resistant hardware can help protect those secrets, it is still impractical for sensor networks.Having observed that most sensor network applications and key pre-distribution schemes can tolerate the compromise of a small number of sensors, we propose to use diversity to protect the secret keys in sensor networks. Our scheme consists of two steps. First, we obfuscate the data and the code for each sensor, such that, when attackers have compromised a sensor node, they need to spend a substantial amount of time to find the secrets from the obfuscated code (e.g., by reverse engineering or code analysis). This first line of defense raises the bar of difficulty for a successful attack on one single node. Second, for different nodes, we make sure that the data and code obfuscation methods are different. This way, even if the attacks have successfully derived the location of the secrets, they cannot use the same location for another node, because for different nodes, their secrets are stored in different ways and in different places. Such diversity makes it a daunting job to derive the secret information from a large number of compromised nodes. We have implemented our scheme for Mica2 motes, and we present the results in this paper.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114475203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inverting sensor networks and actuating the environment for spatio-temporal access control","authors":"Shu Chen, Yu Zhang, W. Trappe","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180347","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless sensor networks are typically deployed to measure the information field, rather than create an information field. However, by utilizing the radio on sensor nodes, it is possible to invert the role of sensor networks, and allow sensor nodes to actuate the environment. Such actuation can facilitate new forms of access control that are based on whether a user is located at the right place at the right time. In this paper, we explore the challenges of supporting spatio-temporal access control, where access to an object or service is based on the user's spatio-temporal context. Specifically, we focus on supporting spatio-temporal access control through the specification of access control policies, and show how complex spatio-temporal policies can be specified using automata. We outline a challenge-response mechanism for verifying user location in a centralized spatio-temporal access control mechanism. We utilize sensor networks in an inverted fashion to support spatio-temporal access control. Sensor nodes announce keys according to a time-varying schedule, and users may access restricted files/resources only if they are in the neighborhood of the correct sensor node and witness the appropriate cryptographic key.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126659463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"RANBAR: RANSAC-based resilient aggregation in sensor networks","authors":"L. Buttyán, Péter Schaffer, I. Vajda","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180356","url":null,"abstract":"We present a novel outlier elimination technique designed for sensor networks. This technique is called RANBAR and it is based on the RANSAC (RANdom SAmple Consensus) paradigm, which is well-known in computer vision and in automated cartography. The RANSAC paradigm gives us a hint on how to instantiate a model if there are a lot of compromised data elements.However,the paradigm does not specify an algorithm and it uses a guess for the number of compromised elements, which is not known in general in real life environments. We developed the RANBAR algorithm following this paradigm and we eliminated the need for the guess. Our RANBAR algorithm is therefore capable to handle a high percent of outlier measurement data by leaning on only one preassumption,namely that the sample is i.i.d. in the unattacked case. We implemented the algorithm in a simulation environment and we used it to filter out outlier elements from a sample before an aggregation procedure. The aggregation function that we used was the average. We show that the algorithm guarantees a small distortion on the output of the aggregator even if almost half of the sample is compromised. Compared to other resilient aggregation algorithms, like the trimmed average and the median, our RANBAR algorithm results in smaller distortion, especially for high attack strengths.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126944554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Attack-resilient hierarchical data aggregation in sensor networks","authors":"Sankardas Roy, Sanjeev Setia, S. Jajodia","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180355","url":null,"abstract":"In a large sensor network, in-network data aggregation, i.e., combining partial results at intermediate nodes during message routing, significantly reduces the amount of communication and hence the energy consumed. Recently several researchers have proposed robust aggregation frameworks, which combine multi-path routing schemes with duplicate-insensitive algorithms, to accurately compute aggregates (e.g., Sum, Count, Average) in spite of message losses resulting from node and transmission failures. However, these aggregation frameworks have been designed without security in mind. Given the lack of hardware support for tamper-resistance and the unattended nature of sensor nodes, sensor networks are highly vulnerable to node compromises. We show that even if a few compromised nodes contribute false sub-aggregate values, this results in large errors in the aggregate computed at the root of the hierarchy. We present modifications to the aggregation algorithms that guard against such attacks, i.e., we present algorithms for resilient hierarchical data aggregation despite the presence of compromised nodes in the aggregation hierarchy. We evaluate the performance and costs of our approach via both analysis and simulation. Our results show that our approach is scalable and efficient.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124058411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Modelling adversaries and security objectives for routing protocols in wireless sensor networks","authors":"G. Ács, L. Buttyán, I. Vajda","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180352","url":null,"abstract":"The literature is very broad considering routing protocols in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). However, security of these routing protocols has fallen beyond the scope so far. Routing is a fundamental functionality in wireless networks, thus hostile interventions aiming to disrupt and degrade the routing service have a serious impact on the overall operation of the entire network. In order to analyze the security of routing protocols in a precise and rigorous way, we propose a formal framework encompassing the definition of an adversary model as well as the \"general\" definition of secure routing in sensor networks. Both definitions take into account the feasible goals and capabilities of an adversary in sensor environments and the variety of sensor routing protocols. In spirit, our formal model is based on the simulation paradigm that is a successfully used technique to prove the security of various cryptographic protocols. However, we also highlight some differences between our model and other models that have been proposed for wired or wireless networks. Finally, we illustrate the practical usage of our model by presenting the formal description of a simple attack against an authenticated routing protocol, which is based on the well-known TinyOS routing.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134061732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charikleia Zouridaki, B. L. Mark, Marek Hejmo, Roshan K. Thomas
{"title":"Robust cooperative trust establishment for MANETs","authors":"Charikleia Zouridaki, B. L. Mark, Marek Hejmo, Roshan K. Thomas","doi":"10.1145/1180345.1180349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1180345.1180349","url":null,"abstract":"In a mobile ad hoc network (MANET), a source node must rely on intermediate nodes to forward its packets along multi-hop routes to the destination node. Due to the lack of infrastructure in such networks,secure and reliable packet delivery is diffocult to achieve. We propose a robust cooperative trust establishment scheme to improve the reliability of packet delivery in MANETs, particularly in the presence of malicious nodes. In the proposed scheme, each node determines the trustworthiness of the other nodes with respect to reliable packet forwarding by combining first-hand trust information obtained independently of other nodes and second-hand trust information obtained via recommendations from other nodes. First-hand trust information for neighbor nodes is obtained via direct observations at the MAC layer whereas first-hand information for non-neighbor nodes is obtained via feedback from acknowledgements sent in response to data packets. The proposed scheme exploits information sharing among nodes to accelerate the convergence of trust establishment procedures, yet is robust against the propagation of false trust information by malicious nodes. We present simulation results which demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in a variety of scenarios involving nodes that are malicious both with respect to packet forwarding and trust propagation.","PeriodicalId":380051,"journal":{"name":"ACM Workshop on Security of ad hoc and Sensor Networks","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122075888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}