Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law最新文献

The Mad (and not so Mad) Scientist Next Door: A Holistic Approach to Addressing Do-it-Yourself Biology 隔壁的疯狂(和不那么疯狂)科学家:解决自己动手生物学的整体方法

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1035

Jared Burr

{"title":"The Mad (and not so Mad) Scientist Next Door: A Holistic Approach to Addressing Do-it-Yourself Biology","authors":"Jared Burr","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Synthetic biology promises to be one of the most exciting developments in bioengineering. Through synthetic biology, scientists can now recreate the genomes of extinct organisms, modify existing organism to give them functions that they previously never possessed, and eventually create novel organisms entirely. Synthetic biology has attracted the attention of both professional scientists as well as the attention of a growing movement of amateur biologists, a testament to the increasing democratization of previously rarefied science. As a result, while this powerful new technology, along with the increased dissemination of its techniques and methods, may lead to greater influence in the future and to substantial benefits for society, it also raises concerns for biosecurity. Consequently, scientists and policy makers have begun to seriously consider the issues posed by this developing science in the context of a world where such knowledge and technology is becoming widely accessible to the general population. Part one of the paper will provide background on synthetic biology and do-it-yourself biology, briefly describing their nature, prospects, and risks to biosecurity. Part two of the paper will shift the focus from description to evaluation. It will summarize some of the existing policy responses to this issue and legal infrastructure within the United States before arguing for a holistic approach to addressing this issue. Then the focus will be upon three separate areas of possible regulation while noting some of the interconnections between these areas.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128127080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

A Legal Analysis of the Search Warrants of the Amerithrax Investigation Amerithrax案搜查令之法律分析

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1040

Courtney Grafft

{"title":"A Legal Analysis of the Search Warrants of the Amerithrax Investigation","authors":"Courtney Grafft","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One of the nation’s most complex investigations in its history stemmed from the 2001 anthrax attack letters. Filled with dead-ends, false leads, and flustered FBI and Postal Inspection officers trying to grapple with intricate scientific details, the Amerithrax investigation caused many to question the efforts of America's forefront investigative entity. The specialized American bioweapons community remained in a constant state of paranoia from late 2001 to 2008, and over 30,000 members of the American Society for Microbiology received a letter indicating the high probability “that one or more of you know” the anthrax killer. Finally, in 2007 the Amerithrax Task Force named Dr. Bruce Ivins, a civilian bioweapons specialist at the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), who only a few years before helped the officers sort through the complicated task of studying the weaponized anthrax, as the prime suspect. Investigative efforts ratcheted up in fall of 2007 when a series of warrants were issued to search Dr. Ivins’ home, office, and vehicles.Since the ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the United States has recognized the importance of a system with laws designed to prohibit unfettered investigations by the leaders of our country. This paper analyzes the search warrants utilized in the Dr. Ivins’ investigation and discusses the Fourth Amendment implications. First, a brief review of the state of America in September 2001 is detailed. Next, the paper discusses the facts of the Amerithrax investigation, including the mishap involving Steven Hatfill. Section III explains some Fourth Amendment search warrant basics before getting to the meat of this analysis: the actual search warrants of the Amerithrax investigation.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"316 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122783405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

WHO's Got Yellow Rain: An Analysis of the Yellow Rain Incident and the Possible Involvement of the World Health Organization 世卫组织有黄雨:黄雨事件分析及世卫组织可能介入

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1029

Zack Allen

引用次数: 0

The Role of Regulations in Minimizing the Bioterrorism Threat to Food Imports 法规在尽量减少食品进口的生物恐怖主义威胁中的作用

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1036

B. Tate

引用次数: 1

Duties and Difficulties of Investigating and Prosecuting Biocrimes 生物犯罪侦查与起诉的职责与难点

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-07-31 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1032

Lisa M. Danley

{"title":"Duties and Difficulties of Investigating and Prosecuting Biocrimes","authors":"Lisa M. Danley","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Biological warfare has been used longer than most conventional weapons, yet international and domestic response protocol and regulations designed to effectively manage, investigate, and prosecute biocrimes have only recently been implemented. Even with such protocol and regulations, significant difficulties arise in the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. This article will identify and describe many of these challenges, beginning with the scope of biocrimes, which can generally be defined as a malevolent use of pathogens or toxins to harm others. Other challenges surrounding the investigation of biocrimes which will be addressed within this article include: identifying what biological agent caused an illness or disease outbreak; characterizing the event as a deliberate attack or a naturally occurring outbreak; and balancing an infected person’s civil liberties with conducting a thorough and accurate investigation. The final significant challenge of investigation and prosecuting biocrimes is the extremely high cost of mistakes. Ultimately, this article recommends ways to remove some the challenges to investigating and prosecuting biocrimes through greater information sharing and standardized investigative and prosecutorial training.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"493 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116534531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

BioIntel: Leveraging Information to Prevent Biological Weapons Attacks 生物情报:利用信息防止生物武器攻击

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1020

Jeff Mustin

引用次数: 1

A Survey of Priorities and Impediments for a Biosecurity Code of Conduct as a Confidence Building Measure for the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention 作为《生物武器和毒素公约》建立信任措施的生物安全行为守则的优先事项和障碍调查

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1038

V. Sutton

{"title":"A Survey of Priorities and Impediments for a Biosecurity Code of Conduct as a Confidence Building Measure for the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention","authors":"V. Sutton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1038","url":null,"abstract":"The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972, is the express sense of 162 nations that as a world community, we agree to the end of the use of biological weapons by state parties. However, the increasing numbers of biological, pharmaceutical and public health facilities, coupled with the biotechnology revolution in the latter part of the 20th century, made the development of preventative code of conduct a priority. Biosafety and biosecurity codes of conduct became a topic for consideration by the BTWC in 2005. To develop this new focus, the BTWC conference held a series of expert meetings culminating with the 2011 Review Conference.Codes of conduct encourage a community approach to formulate acceptable, effective, and reasonably related principles in order to achieve its goals. In order to achieve a collective definition of the priorities or impediments for a biosecurity code of conduct among the representatives of the States Parties, a survey was designed. The survey instrument was designed to be answered during one of the days of the regular intersessional Meetings of Experts of the BTWC on August 27, 2009. This article provides a review and assessment of results of this survey.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131381901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Cold Cooperation: Biodevelopment and The Legal Landscape 冷合作:生物发展和法律景观

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1016

Colby Rideout

引用次数: 0

International Bioterrorism Search and Seizure Issues: A Comparative Analysis of American and French Search and Seizure Law as it Relates to the Global War on Terror 国际生物恐怖主义搜查和扣押问题:美国和法国搜查和扣押法的比较分析，因为它涉及全球反恐战争

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1014

C. Jeansonne

引用次数: 0

International Health and Intelligence Gathering: One in the Same or Rival Factions? 国际卫生和情报收集:同一派别还是敌对派别?

Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law Pub Date : 2012-03-07 DOI: 10.1515/2154-3186.1017

Jo-Anne Shelton

{"title":"International Health and Intelligence Gathering: One in the Same or Rival Factions?","authors":"Jo-Anne Shelton","doi":"10.1515/2154-3186.1017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/2154-3186.1017","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will consider a proposal for a new type of governmental agency to counter the threat of international public health concerns. Public health has increasingly become an international concern as a national security issue regardless of whether it involves an intentional release of a disease. September 11th and the Anthrax letters woke people up to the threat of bioterrorism. In addition, SARS, H1N1, and the Andrew Speaker incident have served to remind us that the threat of fatal disease occurs naturally and does not need to be turned into a weapon before it is a legitimate threat. The natural question that one must raise is whether existing government agencies are sufficiently equipped and prepared to deal with such challenges. The hypothetical government agency discussed in this paper will is one that combines aspects of a public health agency along with that of an intelligence organization. To begin the analysis of such a hypothetical agency, one must first consider where the world of public health intersects with espionage and law enforcement. Next, this paper will discuss the some of the government entities charged separately with different aspects of these duties. Finally, this paper will consider some of the legal limits of such a new agency.","PeriodicalId":378562,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety and Biodefense Law","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134126372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1