The Mad (and not so Mad) Scientist Next Door: A Holistic Approach to Addressing Do-it-Yourself Biology

Jared Burr
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract Synthetic biology promises to be one of the most exciting developments in bioengineering. Through synthetic biology, scientists can now recreate the genomes of extinct organisms, modify existing organism to give them functions that they previously never possessed, and eventually create novel organisms entirely. Synthetic biology has attracted the attention of both professional scientists as well as the attention of a growing movement of amateur biologists, a testament to the increasing democratization of previously rarefied science. As a result, while this powerful new technology, along with the increased dissemination of its techniques and methods, may lead to greater influence in the future and to substantial benefits for society, it also raises concerns for biosecurity. Consequently, scientists and policy makers have begun to seriously consider the issues posed by this developing science in the context of a world where such knowledge and technology is becoming widely accessible to the general population. Part one of the paper will provide background on synthetic biology and do-it-yourself biology, briefly describing their nature, prospects, and risks to biosecurity. Part two of the paper will shift the focus from description to evaluation. It will summarize some of the existing policy responses to this issue and legal infrastructure within the United States before arguing for a holistic approach to addressing this issue. Then the focus will be upon three separate areas of possible regulation while noting some of the interconnections between these areas.
隔壁的疯狂(和不那么疯狂)科学家:解决自己动手生物学的整体方法
合成生物学有望成为生物工程领域最令人兴奋的发展之一。通过合成生物学,科学家们现在可以重建灭绝生物的基因组,修改现有生物,赋予它们以前从未拥有的功能,并最终创造出全新的生物。合成生物学不仅吸引了专业科学家的注意,也吸引了越来越多的业余生物学家的注意,这证明了以前的稀有科学正在日益民主化。因此,虽然这项强大的新技术及其技术和方法的日益传播可能在未来产生更大的影响并为社会带来实质性利益,但它也引起了对生物安全的关注。因此,科学家和决策者已经开始认真考虑这门发展中的科学所带来的问题,在这个世界的背景下,这类知识和技术正广泛地为普通大众所获取。论文的第一部分将提供合成生物学和自己动手生物学的背景,简要描述它们的性质、前景和对生物安全的风险。论文的第二部分将重点从描述转向评价。在提出解决这一问题的整体方法之前,它将总结一些针对这一问题的现有政策反应和美国国内的法律基础设施。然后,重点将放在三个可能监管的独立领域,同时注意到这些领域之间的一些相互联系。
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