{"title":"The Susceptibility of Lithuanian Youth to Information Attacks: the Elaboration Likelihood Model and Presumable Attack Topics","authors":"Raminta Stankutė-Søsted","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0014","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the susceptibility of Lithuanian youth to information attacks aimed at psychologically influencing them, i.e., changing or shaping their attitudes. It raises the question whether the bias of Lithuanian youth towards news sources and their passivity regarding political news can make them vulnerable to attacks. To answer the question, insights from propaganda and persuasion studies were applied to design a quasi-experimental study. The overall evaluation showed that the attitude of all the participants in the study significantly worsened after receiving propaganda information about the EU situation, their country’s political institutions, and the Polish minority. The study did not find sufficient evidence that Lithuanian youth participating in the study were more susceptible to propaganda products when they were not motivated to elaborate the information provided to them even though it came from a potentially credible source.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"335 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43109347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ostrovets Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuanian Foreign Policy: Objectives, Measures and Future Prospects","authors":"J. Juozaitis","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0013","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article analyses Lithuanian foreign policy in respect of the Ostrovets NPP from December 2008 till 2019. The aim of the article is to examine the goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy, its measures and outcomes. The analysis of official documents and high-level meetings was used to achieve this aim. The documents helped to reveal the strategic and economic features of the Ostrovets NPP, the official Lithuania’s position and its change. Meanwhile, the study of high-level meetings helped to determine the direction of Lithuanian foreign policy, its objectives, ways to justify them and means of their implementation. The study revealed that Lithuania opposed the construction of the Ostrovets NPP throughout the entire period under analysis, but initially it did that indirectly, emphasizing the issue of nuclear safety, and since mid-2016, the indirect resistance has gradually turned into a direct one - this nuclear power plant was considered a Russian geopolitical project. Although Lithuania’s interests with regard to the Ostrovets NPP have not been consistently represented at the highest political level during the period being analyzed, the country’s foreign policy can still be considered sufficiently effective. Lithuania successfully raised the issue of nuclear safety internationally, which eventually made Belarus to partially comply with Lithuania’s requirements for the admission of international experts. When it comes to constraining the supply of Belarusian electricity, Lithuania was able to agree on a favorable scenario for the synchronization of electricity systems of the Baltic States through Poland, securing Warsaw’s support. Nevertheless, attempts to constrain the supply of Belarusian electricity till the synchronization can only be effective if Lithuania succeeds in reaching agreements with Latvia and Estonia.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"295 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47665302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alliance between Putin and European Far-Right: Where Does the Convergence of Interests Lead?","authors":"Veronica Arridu, Arūnas Molis","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The study traces the development occurred in the alliance between Putin’s Russia and the European far-right parties since the European Parliamentary election held in May 2019. The article briefly summarizes the populist upsurge in Europe, exploring the reasons behind it. Consequently, the relations established between the political actors are outlined, starting with the concept of “sovereign democracy” to cover all the eventual points where the interests of the Kremlin match with those of the European far-right populists. The ultimate purpose of the study is to define three possible macro-scenarios for the alliance and, indirectly, for the European Union in the near term, concluding that even though the uprising of the populist parties has been somehow contained and the alliance has been widely exposed, the far-right still benefits from great success among public opinion. Furthermore, however ephemeral and transitory the collaboration between Putin and the populists may be, it has already laid the foundations for a more fruitful understanding. Russia’s importance as an economic and political partner will grow as its friendly political forces do and their mutual sympathy will stand until there are reciprocal gains.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"157 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48045824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Scenarios for Baltic Defence: What to Prepare Against","authors":"Lukas Milevski","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article considers Baltic defence strategically, focusing on three scenarios of Russian aggression against the Baltic states: 1) an ambiguous invasion, what the West would call a hybrid war; 2) a hasty invasion by Russian formations already in and around the Baltic region; and 3) a prepared invasion by more substantial Russian forces brought within striking distance of the Baltic states from other parts of Russia. The ultimate question for each is: does this particular scenario present Russia with a viable strategy, a convincing theory of success? Each scenario is explored through the perspectives of military practice or tactics, then politics, and then synthesized through a strategic perspective. The article argues that neither the ambiguous invasion nor the hasty invasion scenarios provide convincing theories of success for Russia, whereas the prepared invasion does provide a compelling theory of victory.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"197 - 210"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48505947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Implications of the Technological Trends in Military on the Defence of Small States","authors":"Giedrius Česnakas","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article argues that technological innovations change war, and pushes to innovate, to rethink strategic, operational and tactical decisions which raise new issues of moral and legal impacts. Small states have to redefine their defence concerning major technological trends. Technological progress will only strengthen the polycentric system in military technology because war is waged in six domains; small states do not have access to all of them, and at the same time they lack financial and industrial capabilities. Artificial intelligence, the increasing role of cyber and informational elements, unmanned systems, 3D printing and changing battlefield force to adapt the defence of small states. Small states have to plan their defence in three periods – peace, attack until full occupation and resistance. Technological innovations for the defence of small states are important, but the most crucial element is preparation of military and society for total resistance with the focus on denying victory for the aggressor. Small states cannot compete with technologically advanced powers (in terms of arms quality and quantity), so they have to adapt by expanding their fighting force, adapt to defend in the areas which decrease technological advantage and increase uncertainty. Small states also have to approach defence more creatively by exploiting non-conventional instruments, focusing on capabilities to fight without clear command and control, investing in personal skills of officers and soldiers, as well as maintaining symbiotic relations with technologically superior allies.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"273 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49328197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic Stability: It Takes Two to Tango?","authors":"Ieva Karpavičiūtė","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article focuses upon the most recent trends in nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. It addresses the contemporary developments in three interconnected domains: first-strike, crisis and arms race stability. It traces the evolution of strategic stability studies, highlights the most fundamental contribution in the three above-mentioned study areas, and attempts to explain the change in contemporary nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War the superpowers developed international practices and unwritten rules of nuclear deterrence. Political practices emerged together with extensive studies of nuclear deterrence, which were based on a rational choice approach and game modelling. Contemporary international relations (IR) faces revival of nuclear deterrence studies. While some scholars are rediscovering the Cold War IR analysis models and adapting them to contemporary realities, others are looking for new analytical possibilities. This article focuses upon interlinkages between first-strike, crisis and arms race stability, and attempts to explain how changes in strategic environment can help better understanding the contemporary nuclear deterrence. It discusses whether and under what conditions nuclear parity, first-strike stability, arms control and crisis equilibrium can guarantee the strategic stability and military balance. It also addresses the qualitative or quantitative change in the conflict or crisis perception, and its implications on contemporary deterrence.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"17 1","pages":"121 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47528267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On the Road to the Second Century: The Geopolitical Future of the Baltic States in the Visions of Politicians and Political Scientists","authors":"E. Vareikis","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2018-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2018-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After they had emerged as national republics in 1918, the Baltic states spent the first hundred years of their independence as small, isolated, poorly defended countries that sought to foster their national identity nonetheless. Geopolitically speaking, they had little influence on their environment, rather constituting an area of geopolitical interests of other states. The geopolitical visions of the 21stcentury picture them as part of an integrated Euro-Atlantic space with good potential to become members of the centre of power that is currently taking shape in Central Europe or provide a strong Western European border next to the weakening Russia. The 21stcentury will be the age of US leadership, putting the Baltic states, as allies to the US, in a safer position than they were in the last century.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"13 - 33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48971656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lithuania‘s Contribution to International Operations: the Current Situation and Potential Scenarios","authors":"Gintas Gumbrys","doi":"10.2478/LASR-2018-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/LASR-2018-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article provides the information on Lithuania’s military contribution to the assurance of international security and stability - the participation of the military personnel of the Republic of Lithuania (further - RL) in international operations and training missions of the European Union in 2004- 2017. The study briefly familiarizes the reader with legal principles of participating in international operations and presents essential restrictions affecting the number of military personnel participating in international operations. The author of the article thoroughly analyses the change in the number of troops of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in international operations conducted by NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and other strategic partners in 2004-2017. The military contribution of Lithuania is provided within the context of joint military operations carried out by NATO, the EU, and the UN, the tendencies of the change in the participation of the Lithuanian military personnel in international operations are presented as well. Keeping in mind the change in the resources (financial and human) allocated and available to the National Defence System of the RL and the political will to participate in international operations, expressed by the Seimas of the RL, the author attempts to find out, on the grounds of historical perspective, their potential connection with and influence on the Lithuanian military contribution to future international operations.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"59 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47125551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Territorial Defence and Partisan Resistance (Lithuania’s Experience)","authors":"V. Jokubauskas","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2018-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2018-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the 21st century - as in the first half of the 20th century - Lithuania has faced threats posed to its national security and statehood. Owing to its limited resources, the country is not essentially able to establish large regular forces; therefore, it is permanently developing its territorial defence forces. In the interwar period, their nucleus was formed by the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, while in the 21st century it is by the National Defence Volunteer Forces. While modelling new concepts of territorial defence, it is inevitable to consider not only the practices of other countries and their military theories but also Lithuania’s national experience. Of course, this is the experience of 1990-2004, but in the first part of the 20th century the idea of territorial defence was also put into practice and cultivated at the theoretical level. Another aspect is that territorial defence in practice is inextricably entwined with the tactics of guerrilla warfare and their application. Lithuania’s historical experience and analysis of its territorial defence and partisan war is not only knowledge for its own sake. It may have tangible practical value since Lithuania considered, premeditated and applied these notions in practice repeatedly in the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the geographical location of the country and distribution of eventual sources of conflict in comparison with the interwar period have virtually not changed. In the interwar period, East Prussia, part of Germany and separated by the Polish Corridor, had been a semi-exclave up until September 1939. Similarly, it is only by sea and air that this territory is accessible at present, though now a subject of the Russian Federation as the Kaliningrad region. Due to geopolitical transformations, after World War II the ‘enemy from the East’ had moved geographically to Western Lithuania. There exists a similar situation on the south-eastern border of Lithuania, where a none-too-friendly interwar Poland changed to a Belarus governed by Alexander Lukashenko. Lithuania’s northern border with Latvia, also a NATO member at present, remains unchanged and comparatively safe; in the interwar period, only attempts were made to discuss the idea of having mutual defence although Latvia had planned to provide some support for the Lithuanian forces in the case of a Wehrmacht attack from East Prussia to the East. So it is expedient to elaborate on what attention the Lithuanian Armed Forces in the interwar period paid to the history of war, what kind of experience of the 20th century territorial defence and partisan resistance they gained, and how this may be of value to defence experts in the 21st century.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"331 - 371"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44011400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hybrid Threats: Analysis of Content, Challenges Posed and Measures to Overcome","authors":"Eitvydas Bajarūnas, Vytautas Keršanskas","doi":"10.2478/lasr-2018-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2478/lasr-2018-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The study analyses, in both theoretical and practical aspects, the topic of hybrid warfare and threats that have become particularly relevant after Russia’s war in Ukraine. First, the authors examine the theoretical debates, concerning the definition of hybrid threats by singling out its main elements and estimating, on their basis, the definitions used by the European Union and NATO. Second, on the grounds of examples of the Baltic states and specifically of Lithuania, the article presents practical challenges related to hybrid threats and posed by Russia. Finally, the study surveys the decisions taken during recent years at the level of Lithuania, the European Union, and NATO with the exception of essential measures in fighting against hybrid threats.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"16 1","pages":"123 - 170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48509224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}