Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201117
J. Simpson
{"title":"Gettier Beliefs and Serious Beliefs","authors":"J. Simpson","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme20201117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201117","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent exchange in the pages of this journal, John Biro responds to Gabor Forrai’s argument against Biro’s argument that in most, if not all, Gettier cases the belief condition, contra popular opinion, isn’t satisfied. In this note, I’ll argue that Biro’s response to Forrai satisfactorily resolves the first of Forrai’s two central objections to Biro’s argument that the belief condition isn’t satisfied in most, if not all, Gettier cases. But Biro’s response leaves mostly unaddressed the most plausible way of construing Forrai’s second objection. I’ll take up the mantle of successfully defending Biro’s argument from this more plausible construal of Forrai’s second objection. However, even though I’ll argue that Biro’s argument is in good shape with respect to Forrai’s objections, I’ll show that the definition of serious belief that Biro offers us is mistaken.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80213469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201116
Gregory Stoutenburg
{"title":"Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability","authors":"Gregory Stoutenburg","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme20201116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201116","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77077371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011322
Domingos Faria
{"title":"Group Testimony","authors":"Domingos Faria","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011322","url":null,"abstract":"Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84146596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201111
Frederik J. Andersen
{"title":"Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement","authors":"Frederik J. Andersen","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme20201111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20201111","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81057694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011328
S. Aikin
{"title":"Does Metaphilosophically Pragmatist Anti-Skepticism Work?","authors":"S. Aikin","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011328","url":null,"abstract":"Michael Hannon has recently given “a new apraxia” argument against skepticism. Hannon’s case is that skepticism depends on a theory of knowledge that makes the concept “useless and uninteresting.” Three arguments rebutting Hannon’s metaphilosophical pragmatism are given that show that the concept of knowledge that makes skepticism plausible is both interesting and useful.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73885024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011436
Nuno Venturinha
{"title":"Context-Sensitive Objectivism","authors":"Nuno Venturinha","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011436","url":null,"abstract":"This paper outlines the major topics addressed in my book Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018), anticipates some possible misunderstandings and discusses issues that warrant further investigation.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84944096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011325
R. Michels
{"title":"Husserlian Eidetic Variation and Objectual Understanding as a Basis for an Epistemology of Essence","authors":"R. Michels","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011325","url":null,"abstract":"Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic circularity as its knowledge-based foil. I argue that there is a straight-forward solution to this problem, but then raise three serious problems for an amended version of Vaidya’s proposal and any similar Husserlian epistemology of essence. The paper closes with general reflections on applying the Husserlian method to the contemporary notion of essence and the idea of refocusing the epistemology of essence on understanding instead of knowledge. ∗mail@robert-michels.de","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87819853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011214
A. Mărășoiu
{"title":"Justified by Thought Alone","authors":"A. Mărășoiu","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011214","url":null,"abstract":"The new rationalists – BonJour and Bealer – have characterized one type of a priori justification as based on intellectual intuitions or seemings. I argue that they are mistaken in thinking that intellectual intuitions can provide a priori justification. Suppose that the proposition that a surface cannot be red and green all over strikes you as true. When you carefully consider it, you couldn't but realize that no surface could be both red and green all over. Ascertaining the truth of what you believe (when you believe that a surface cannot be red and green all over) requires conscious experiences of thinking. The character of such experiences (propositions’ striking you as true, and the sense of incoherence you would experience were they to be false) is what justifies your belief. It should follow that the justification for such propositions (and your believing them) is a posteriori, i.e., based on conscious experience. Your cognitive phenomenology plays a constitutive role in justifying your belief. Hence your belief is not a priori justified, contra the new rationalists.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90931738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011434
Jonathan Egeland Harouny
{"title":"The Problem with Trusting Unfamiliar Faculties","authors":"Jonathan Egeland Harouny","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011434","url":null,"abstract":"According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible – where a priori is ...","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80418844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logos and EpistemePub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011326
Diana Sofronieva
{"title":"Empathy as a Tool for Learning about Evaluative Features of Objects","authors":"Diana Sofronieva","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011326","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy can help us learn about evaluative features of objects in the world. I further defend this claim by comparing empathy to testimony. Then I present and respond to two possible objections to this analogy.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73705968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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