Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献_第7页

Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist 多优垄断者的强对偶性

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-09-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764539

C. Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos

{"title":"Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist","authors":"C. Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764539","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a duality-based framework for revenue maximization in a multiple-good monopoly. Our framework shows that every optimal mechanism has a certificate of optimality, taking the form of an optimal transportation map between measures. Using our framework, we prove that grand-bundling mechanisms are optimal if and only if two stochastic dominance conditions hold between specific measures induced by the buyer's type distribution. This result strengthens several results in the literature, where only sufficient conditions for grand-bundling optimality have been provided. As a corollary of our tight characterization of grand-bundling optimality, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c; c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for 2 items [Pavlov 2011]. Surprisingly, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c; c + 1] is not a grand bundling mechanism. The necessary and sufficient condition for grand bundling optimality is a special case of our more general characterization result that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of an arbitrary mechanism for an arbitrary type distribution.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132047277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 184

Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions 了解正在发生的事情:从不透明的交易中重建偏好和优先级

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-08-27 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764492

Avrim Blum, Y. Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern

{"title":"Learning What's Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions","authors":"Avrim Blum, Y. Mansour, Jamie Morgenstern","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764492","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a setting where n buyers, with combinatorial preferences over m items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these interactions, is to reconstruct both the preferences of the buyers and the mechanism of the seller. More specifically, we consider an online setting where at each stage, a subset of the buyers arrive and are allocated items, according to some unknown priority that the seller has among the buyers. Our learning algorithm observes only which buyers arrive and the allocation produced (or some function of the allocation, such as just which buyers received positive utility and which did not), and its goal is to predict the outcome for future subsets of buyers. For this task, the learning algorithm needs to reconstruct both the priority among the buyers and the preferences of each buyer. We derive mistake bound algorithms for additive, unit-demand and single minded buyers. We also consider the case where buyers' utilities for a fixed bundle can change between stages due to different (observed) prices. Our algorithms are efficient both in computation time and in the maximum number of mistakes (both polynomial in the number of buyers and items).","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127730113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets 提高拍卖的效率保证与预算

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-07-31 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764500

P. Lu, Tao Xiao

引用次数: 14

Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries 无知几乎是幸福:近乎最优的随机匹配与很少的查询

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-07-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764479

Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, A. Procaccia, Ankit Sharma

{"title":"Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries","authors":"Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, A. Procaccia, Ankit Sharma","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764479","url":null,"abstract":"The stochastic matching problem deals with finding a maximum matching in a graph whose edges are unknown but can be accessed via queries. This is a special case of stochastic k-set packing, where the problem is to find a maximum packing of sets, each of which exists with some probability. In this paper, we provide edge and set query algorithms for these two problems, respectively, that provably achieve some fraction of the omniscient optimal solution. Our main theoretical result for the stochastic matching (i.e., 2-set packing) problem is the design of an adaptive algorithm that queries only a constant number of edges per vertex and achieves a (1-ε) fraction of the omniscient optimal solution, for an arbitrarily small ε > 0. Moreover, this adaptive algorithm performs the queries in only a constant number of rounds. We complement this result with a non-adaptive (i.e., one round of queries) algorithm that achieves a (0.5 - ε) fraction of the omniscient optimum. We also extend both our results to stochastic k-set packing by designing an adaptive algorithm that achieves a (2/k - ε) fraction of the omniscient optimal solution, again with only O(1) queries per element. This guarantee is close to the best known polynomial-time approximation ratio of 3/k+1 -ε for the deterministic k-set packing problem [Furer 2013]. We empirically explore the application of (adaptations of) these algorithms to the kidney exchange problem, where patients with end-stage renal failure swap willing but incompatible donors. We show on both generated data and on real data from the first 169 match runs of the UNOS nationwide kidney exchange that even a very small number of non-adaptive edge queries per vertex results in large gains in expected successful matches.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121575139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 63

Making the Most of Your Samples 充分利用你的样品

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-07-09 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764475

Zhiyi Huang, Y. Mansour, T. Roughgarden

{"title":"Making the Most of Your Samples","authors":"Zhiyi Huang, Y. Mansour, T. Roughgarden","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764475","url":null,"abstract":"We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution D. The seller has \"data\" about D in the form of m ≥ 1 i.i.d. samples, and the algorithmic challenge is to use these samples to obtain expected revenue as close as possible to what could be achieved with advance knowledge of D. Our first set of results quantifies the number of samples m that are necessary and sufficient to obtain a (1-ε)-approximation. For example, for an unknown distribution that satisfies the monotone hazard rate (MHR) condition, we prove that Θ(ε-3/2) samples are necessary and sufficient. Remarkably, this is fewer samples than is necessary to accurately estimate the expected revenue obtained for such a distribution by even a single reserve price. We also prove essentially tight sample complexity bounds for regular distributions, bounded-support distributions, and a wide class of irregular distributions. Our lower bound approach, which applies to all randomized pricing strategies, borrows tools from differential privacy and information theory, and we believe it could find further applications in auction theory. Our second set of results considers the single-sample case. While no deterministic pricing strategy is better than 1/2-approximate for regular distributions, for MHR distributions we show how to do better: there is a simple deterministic pricing strategy that guarantees expected revenue at least 0.589 times the maximum possible. We also prove that no deterministic pricing strategy achieves an approximation guarantee better than e/4 ~.68.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115254484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 124

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange 私人帕累托最优交换

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-07-09 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764504

Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth

{"title":"Private Pareto Optimal Exchange","authors":"Sampath Kannan, Jamie Morgenstern, Ryan M. Rogers, Aaron Roth","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764504","url":null,"abstract":"We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and preferences over the goods of others, but may not use money as a medium of exchange. Because one of the most important instantiations of such economies is kidney exchange -- where the \"input\" to the problem consists of sensitive patient medical records -- we ask to what extent such exchanges can be carried out while providing formal privacy guarantees to the participants. We show that individually rational allocations cannot achieve any non-trivial approximation to Pareto optimality if carried out under the constraint of differential privacy -- or even the relaxation of joint-differential privacy, under which it is known that asymptotically optimal allocations can be computed in two sided markets [Hsu et al. STOC 2014]. We therefore consider a further relaxation that we call marginal-differential privacy --which promises, informally, that the privacy of every agent i is protected from every other agent j ≠ i so long as j does not collude or share allocation information with other agents. We show that under marginal differential privacy, it is possible to compute an individually rational and asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in such exchange economies.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128344785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 13

An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games 随机分配对策中一个价格的近似规律

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-04-24 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764531

A. Hassidim, Assaf Romm

{"title":"An Approximate Law of One Price in Random Assignment Games","authors":"A. Hassidim, Assaf Romm","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764531","url":null,"abstract":"The \"law of one price\" asserts that homogeneous goods must sell for the same price across locations and vendors. While many deviations from this 'law' have been observed in the real world, it remains a useful building block in economic theory, and serves as a benchmark for empirical studies. A crucial underlying assumption used in arguing for the validity of the law is the homogeneity of goods and buyers: buyers do not care which of the goods they buy, or which seller they are buying it from, nor do sellers care about the identity of the buyers. In other words, any two instances of the good are perfect substitutes for the buyers, as are any two buyers from any seller's point of view. This paper makes the formal claim that even in the presence of heterogeneous preferences, an approximate version of the law remains valid, and the approximation improves as the market grows large. To prove this result we use the assignment game model of Shapley and Shubik (1971) in which there is a finite set of firms and a finite set of workers, and each firm is looking to hire exactly one worker in exchange for a negotiable salary. Each firm has a (possibly different) value for hiring each of the workers, and each worker has a (possibly different) reservation value for working for each of the firms, and utilities are assumed to be linear in money. We study three different random models which generate the value: In the independent and bounded model, we assume that this productivity is separable in the firm's quality, the worker's human capital level, and an idiosyncratic component that is independently and identically distributed according to some bounded distribution.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"2 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113961969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Reverse Mechanism Design 反向机构设计

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2014-04-04 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764498

Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline

{"title":"Reverse Mechanism Design","authors":"Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764498","url":null,"abstract":"Optimal mechanisms for agents with multi-dimensional preferences are generally complex. This complexity makes them challenging to solve for and impractical to run. In a typical mechanism design approach, a model is posited and then the optimal mechanism is designed for the model. Successful mechanism design gives mechanisms that one could at least imagine running. By this measure, multi-dimensional mechanism design has had only limited success. In this paper we take the opposite approach, which we term reverse mechanism design. We start by hypothesizing the optimality of a particular form of mechanism that is simple and reasonable to run, then we solve for sufficient conditions for the mechanism to be optimal (among all mechanisms). This paper has two main contributions. The first is in codifying the method of virtual values from single-dimensional auction theory and extending it to agents with multidimensional preferences. The second is in applying this method to two paradigmatic classes of multi-dimensional preferences. The first class is unit-demand preferences (e.g., a homebuyer who wishes to buy at most one house); for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a uniform price for each item is optimal. This result generalizes one of Alaei et al. [2013] for a consumer with values uniform on interval [0; 1], and contrasts with an example of Thanassoulis [2004] for a consumer with values uniform on interval [5; 6] where uniform pricing is not optimal. The second class is additive preferences, for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a price for the grand bundle is optimal. This result generalizes a recent result of Hart and Nisan [2012] and relates to work of Armstrong [1999]. Similarly to an approach of Alaei et al. [2013], these results for single-agent pricing problems can be generalized naturally to multi-agent auction problems.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133933660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 47

Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations 竞价博弈与有效分配

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2013-11-04 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764526

G. Kalai, R. Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz

{"title":"Bidding Games and Efficient Allocations","authors":"G. Kalai, R. Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764526","url":null,"abstract":"Bidding games are extensive form games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next. Zero-sum bidding games (also known as Richman games) have been extensively studied, focusing on the fraction of the initial budget that can guaranty the victory of each player [Lazarus et al.'99, Develin & Payne '10]. We extend the theory of bidding games to general-sum two player games, showing the existence of pure subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (PSPE), and studying their properties under various initial budgets. We show that if the underlying game has the form of a binary tree (only two actions available to the players in each node), then there exists a natural PSPE with the following highly desirable properties: (a) players' utility is weakly monotone in their budget; (b) a Pareto-efficient outcome is reached for any initial budget; and (c) for any Pareto-efficient outcome there is an initial budget s.t. this outcome is attained. In particular, we can assign the budget so as to implement the outcome with maximum social welfare, maximum Egalitarian welfare, etc. We show implications of this result for various games and mechanism design problems, including Centipede games, voting games, and combinatorial bargaining. For the latter, we further show that the PSPE above is fair, in the sense that an player with a fraction of $X%$ of the total budget prefers her allocation to X% of the possible allocations.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132596161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 16

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals 离散信号下共值拍卖中的信息不对称

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2013-04-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2255268

Vasilis Syrgkanis, D. Kempe, É. Tardos

{"title":"Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals","authors":"Vasilis Syrgkanis, D. Kempe, É. Tardos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2255268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2255268","url":null,"abstract":"We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders, where the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability k and the losing bid otherwise. Under the assumption of discrete and affiliated signals, we give an explicit characterization of the (unique) equilibrium, based on a simple recurrence relation, which gives rise to a linear-time algorithm for explicitly computing the equilibrium. By analyzing the execution of the algorithm, we derive several insights about the equilibrium structure. First, we show that equilibrium revenue is decreasing in k, and that the limit second-price equilibrium selected as k->0 has highest revenue, in stark contrast to the revenue collapse of the second-price auction predicted by the trembling-hand equilibrium selection of Abraham et al. We further show that the Linkage Principle can fail to hold even in a pure first-price auction with binary signals: public revelation of a signal to both bidders may decrease the auctioneer's revenue. Lastly, we analyze the effects of public acquisition of additional information on bidder utilities and exhibit cases in which both bidders strictly prefer for a specific bidder to receive additional information.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125078040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 26