Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation最新文献_第2页

Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract 分配对策中的分散动力学与快速收敛:扩展摘要

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764470

Bary S. R. Pradelski

{"title":"Decentralized Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game: Extended Abstract","authors":"Bary S. R. Pradelski","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764470","url":null,"abstract":"We study decentralized learning dynamics for the classic assignment game with transferable utility [Shapley and Shubik 1972]. In our model agents follow an aspiration adjustment process based on their experienced payoffs (see [Sauermann and Selten 1962], [Nax and Pradelski 2014]). At random points in time firms and workers match, break up, and re-match in the search for better opportunities. Agents have aspiration levels that they adjust based on their experienced payoffs. When matched an agent occasionally tries to succeed with a higher bid than his current aspiration level. When single an agent lowers his aspiration level in the hope of attracting a partner. In particular agents have no knowledge about other players' payoffs or actions and they update their behavior in a myopic fashion. Behavior fluctuates according to a random variable that reflects current market sentiment: sometimes the firms exhibit greater price stickiness than the workers, and at other times the reverse holds. We show that this stochastic learning process converges in polynomial time to the core. While convergence to the core is known for some types of decentralized dynamics this paper is the first to prove {polynomial time convergence}, a crucial feature from an explanatory and market design standpoint. We also show that without market sentiment the dynamic exhibits exponential time convergence. The proof relies on novel results for random walks on graphs, and more generally suggests a fruitful connection between the theory of random walks and matching theory.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116013495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 14

Canary in the e-Commerce Coal Mine: Detecting and Predicting Poor Experiences Using Buyer-to-Seller Messages 电子商务矿井中的金丝雀:利用买方对卖方的信息检测和预测不良体验

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764499

Dimitriy V. Masterov, U. Mayer, S. Tadelis

引用次数: 25

Hidden Substitutes 隐藏的替代品

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764469

J. Hatfield, S. Kominers

引用次数: 67

The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses 多重猜测的智慧

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764529

J. Ugander, Ryan Drapeau, Carlos Guestrin

{"title":"The Wisdom of Multiple Guesses","authors":"J. Ugander, Ryan Drapeau, Carlos Guestrin","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764529","url":null,"abstract":"The \"wisdom of crowds\" dictates that aggregate predictions from a large crowd can be surprisingly accurate, rivaling predictions by experts. Crowds, meanwhile, are highly heterogeneous in their expertise. In this work, we study how the heterogeneous uncertainty of a crowd can be directly elicited and harnessed to produce more efficient aggregations from a crowd, or provide the same efficiency from smaller crowds. We present and evaluate a novel strategy for eliciting sufficient information about an individual's uncertainty: allow individuals to make multiple simultaneous guesses, and reward them based on the accuracy of their closest guess. We show that our multiple guesses scoring rule is an incentive-compatible elicitation strategy for aggregations across populations under the reasonable technical assumption that the individuals all hold symmetric log-concave belief distributions that come from the same location-scale family. We first show that our multiple guesses scoring rule is strictly proper for a fixed set of quantiles of any log-concave belief distribution. With properly elicited quantiles in hand, we show that when the belief distributions are also symmetric and all belong to a single location-scale family, we can use interquantile ranges to furnish weights for certainty-weighted crowd aggregation. We evaluate our multiple guesses framework empirically through a series of incentivized guessing experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and find that certainty-weighted crowd aggregations using multiple guesses outperform aggregations using single guesses without certainty weights.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127353474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Full Substitutability in Trading Networks 交易网络中的完全可替代性

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764472

J. Hatfield, S. Kominers, A. Nichifor, M. Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp

{"title":"Full Substitutability in Trading Networks","authors":"J. Hatfield, S. Kominers, A. Nichifor, M. Ostrovsky, Alexander Westkamp","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764472","url":null,"abstract":"Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. In this paper, we extend earlier models' canonical definitions of substitutability to a setting in which an agent can be a buyer in some transactions and a seller in others, and show that all the different substitutability concepts are equivalent. Next, we introduce a new class of fully substitutable preferences that models the preferences of intermediaries with production capacity. We then prove that substitutability is preserved under economically important transformations such as trade endowments, mergers, and limited liability. We show that full substitutability can be recast in terms of submodularity of the indirect utility function, the single improvement property, a \"no complementarities\" condition, and a condition from discrete convex analysis called M♮-concavity. Finally, we show that substitutability implies two key monotonicity conditions known as the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. All of our results explicitly incorporate economically important features such as indifferences, non-monotonicities, and unbounded utility functions that were not fully addressed in prior work.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"125 23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126816562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

Designing Dynamic Contests 设计动态竞赛

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764473

K. Bimpikis, S. Ehsani, Mohamed Mostagir

{"title":"Designing Dynamic Contests","authors":"K. Bimpikis, S. Ehsani, Mohamed Mostagir","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764473","url":null,"abstract":"Innovation contests have emerged as a viable alternative to the standard research and development process. They are particularly suited for settings that feature a high degree of uncertainty regarding the actual feasibility of the end goal. The objective of the contest designer is to maximize the probability of reaching the innovation goal while minimizing the time it takes to complete the project. Obviously here the important question is how to best design these contests. This paper departs from prior literature through three key modeling features. First, in our model, an agent's progress towards the goal is not a deterministic function of effort. As is typically the case in real-world settings, progress is positively correlated with effort but the mapping involves a stochastic component. Secondly and quite importantly, it is possible that the innovation in question is not attainable, either because the goal is actually infeasible or because it requires too much effort and resources that it makes little economic sense to pursue. We model such a scenario by having an underlying state of the world (whether the innovation is attainable or not) over which participants have some prior belief. Taken together, these two features imply that an agent's lack of progress may be attributed to either an undesirable underlying state (the innovation is not attainable) or simply to the fact that the agent was unlucky in how her effort was stochastically mapped to progress. Thirdly, we consider a dynamic framework that captures how competition between agents evolves over time and incorporates the fact that agents learn from each other's partial progress to discern the underlying reason for their own lack of progress. In particular, our modeling setup includes well-defined intermediate milestones that constitute partial progress towards the end goal.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127829697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 86

Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising 网络展示广告逆向选择与拍卖设计

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2603336

N. Arnosti, M. Beck, Paul R. Milgrom

引用次数: 44

Why Prices Need Algorithms 为什么价格需要算法

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764515

T. Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

引用次数: 5

Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints 一般分布约束下的匹配机制设计

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764501

Masahiro Goto, F. Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, A. Tamura, M. Yokoo

{"title":"Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints","authors":"Masahiro Goto, F. Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, A. Tamura, M. Yokoo","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764501","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (schools) impose some distributional constraints (e.g., a maximum quota for a set of schools), and develop a strategyproof mechanism that can handle a very general class of distributional constraints. We assume distributional constraints are imposed on a vector, where each element is the number of contracts accepted for each school. The only requirement we impose on distributional constraints is that the family of vectors that satisfy distributional constraints must be hereditary, which means if a vector satisfies the constraints, any vector that is smaller than it also satisfies them. When distributional constraints are imposed, a stable matching may not exist. We develop a strategyproof mechanism called Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), which is nonwasteful and \"more fair\" than a simple nonwasteful mechanism called the Serial Dictatorship mechanism (SD) and \"less wasteful\" than another simple fair mechanism called the Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ACDA). We show that we can apply this mechanism even if the distributional constraints do not satisfy the hereditary condition by applying a simple trick, assuming we can find a vector that satisfy the distributional constraints efficiently. Furthermore, we demonstrate the applicability of our model in actual application domains.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133701042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets 在预测市场中整合做市商、限价单和连续交易

Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Pub Date : 2015-06-15 DOI: 10.1145/2764468.2764532

Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

{"title":"Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets","authors":"Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764532","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764532","url":null,"abstract":"We provide the first concrete algorithm for combining market makers and limit orders in a prediction market with continuous trade. Our mechanism is general enough to handle both bundle orders and arbitrary securities defined over combinatorial outcome spaces. We define the notion of an e-fair trading path, a path in security space along which no order executes at a price more than e above its limit, and every order executes when its market price falls more than e below its limit. We show that, under a certain supermodularity condition, a fair trading path exists for which the endpoint is efficient, but that under general conditions reaching an efficient endpoint via an e-fair trading path is not possible. We develop an algorithm for operating a continuous market maker with limit orders that respects the e-fairness conditions in the general case. We conduct simulations of our algorithm using real combinatorial predictions made during the 2008 US presidential election and evaluate it against a natural baseline according to trading volume, social welfare, and violations of the two fairness conditions.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116075481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7