PSN: Global Markets (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Financial Markets and Terrorism: The Perspective of the Two Sides of the Conflict","authors":"Rafael Eldor, Shmuel Hauser, Yoram Kroll, Sharbel Shoukair","doi":"10.5430/JBAR.V1N2P18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5430/JBAR.V1N2P18","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a unique data set and advanced econometric methods to examine the effect of terrorism on financial markets of both sides of the barricade in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The main finding are: (1) Real economies on both sides suffered significantly during the intifada period; (2) On the avarege share prices on the Israeli side declined significantly due to terror attack by 0.43% where the decline on the other side (probably due to fear of retaliation) was much less and insignificant; (3) There is a bi-directional causality effects of returns in the two markets and both markets are affected by the US market; (4) The more fatal the terror attack is, the greater is the negative effect in the two markets. In the more severe terror attack event (i.e. more people were killed and injured or if it was suicide attack), share prices in the Israeli market declined significantly by 0.63% compared to a decline of 0.16% in less severe attacks. The same pattern, but less significant is revealed on the Palestinian side. In the more severe terror attack, share prices declined significantly by 0.21% compared with 0.07% in less severe attacks.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127106095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Frontier Market Equity Investing: Finding the Winners of the Future (a Summary)","authors":"Lawrence S. Speidell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2277406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2277406","url":null,"abstract":"Frontier markets represent a multitude of distinct cultures and can be overwhelming to investors. The author examines the many opportunities for investing that exist in frontier countries. He reviews the stock markets, the listed companies, the potential returns, and the diversification benefits. He also considers economic and political fundamentals.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121174663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Anuncios Macroeconómicos Y Mercados Accionarios: El Caso Latinoamericano (Macroeconomics and the Stock Market: The Case of Latin America)","authors":"Diego A. Agudelo, Angelo Gutierrez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2407178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2407178","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Reflejan los mercados accionarios los fundamentales macroeconomicos de un pais?. La hipotesis de eficiencia semifuerte (Fama 1970) implica que los mercados accionarios deben reaccionar inmediatamente, y sin sobre ni subreaccion predecible, a las sorpresas en los anuncios macroeconomicos relevantes. Ponemos a prueba esta implicacion en los seis principales mercados accionarios de Latinoamerica: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico y Peru ante los anuncios de inflacion, tasa de interes del banco central, PIB, balanza comercial y desempleo. Se discute el efecto esperado de una sorpresa en el anuncio de cada variable economica. Siguiendo a Flannery y Protopapadakis (2002), se estima el efecto sobre la media y la volatilidad de dichos anuncios mediante modelos de serie de tiempo univariados de volatilidad heterocesdastica controlando por los efectos de los rendimientos de indices internacionales y de la tasa de cambio. Entre los principales hallazgos se encuentra que los efectos de los anuncios solo son significativos y con el signo esperado para la inflacion en Mexico, para la tasa de interes en Chile y Colombia, y para el desempleo en estos tres mercados. Se encuentra ademas que, en determinados casos, los mercados no incorporan toda la informacion en el dia del anuncio, y en otros, que reaccionan ante el anuncio en si mismo controlando por la sorpresa, contrario a lo postulado por la hipotesis de eficiencia de mercado. Se concluye que los mercados accionarios latinoamericanos, solo reaccionan parcialmente a la informacion macro, y no con total eficiencia.English Abstract: Do stock markets reflect changes on the macroeconomic fundamentals? The semi-strong form of the Efficient market hypothesis (HEM - Fama 1970) asserts that stock prices should react immediately to the surprise content on announcements of macroeconomic variables, without predictable over or under reaction. We test this in the six main Latin-American equity markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, for the announcements of Consumer Price Inflation, Central Bank interest rate, GDP growth, Trade Balance and Unemployment rate. Following Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), we estimate the effect of the surprises of such announcements, using time series models of conditional volatility, controlling of the exchange rate and international stock markets. We found that the effects on the market returns are significant and with the expected sign only for the CPI in Mexico, for the interest rate in Chile and Colombia, and for Unemployment on those three markets. Moreover, in some cases the stock markets incorporate the announcement with a lag, whereas in others, they react to the announcement rather than to the surprise, in conflict with the HEM. We conclude that the Latin-American stock markets react only partially to the macroeconomic announcements and not fully incorporating the new information in an efficient manner.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"681 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132485127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Credit Risk Pricing in Emerging Markets During Elections: Time Inconsistency and Forward Looking Uncertainty","authors":"C. Balding","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1570044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1570044","url":null,"abstract":"To study the role of elections in financial market instability, we focus on the role of credit risk pricing during elections from 2004 to 2007 in thirteen emerging market economies. We use a unique dataset of daily credit default swap (CDS) pricing, with standard macroeconomic controls, to study the role of elections in prompting financial market instability and contagion. Sovereign credit default swap pricing provides a number of advantages in understanding emerging market instability of previous studies. First, the daily data allows a greater level of specificity than was used in previous credit and political studies. Second, even though sovereign credit conditions change slowly, CDS pricing changes daily, reflecting sentiment or forward looking beliefs. Third, the CDS allows us to focus on the perceived credit risk of an election and the incoming government. Our study reveals a number of unique findings. First, investors price in additional risk for elections regardless of party, incumbency, or size of win. Second, long and short term investors price risk very differently, with 1 year CDS investors reacting much more strongly to election risk, causing the overall spread to narrow. Third, our results provide continued support for the theory of investor herding in international financial markets, and a focus on a small number of economic variables in determining sovereign credit worthiness. Investors do not study the relative risk factors as much as price in structural risk by the existence of definable benchmarks like elections.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125526492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Prospects for the Global Regulation of Markets","authors":"G. Gilligan","doi":"10.4337/9781847204288.00014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781847204288.00014","url":null,"abstract":"This accessible book aims to inform readers interested in assessing privatization and market development concepts on a global scale, and outlines a range of thinking on how these policy ideas have moved around the globe. Bringing together an international team of contributors, the book traces how privatization concepts have grown in application, and how they have spread to become a central policy idea for governments.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131935830","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons from Nike","authors":"R. Locke, Feipeng Qin, Alberto Brause","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.916771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.916771","url":null,"abstract":"Using a unique data set based on factory audits of working conditions in over 800 of Nike's suppliers in 51 countries, this paper seeks to explore whether or not monitoring for compliance with corporate codes of conduct - currently the principal way both global corporations and labor rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address poor working conditions in global supply chain factories - actually lead to remediation in terms of improved working conditions and enforced labor rights. The evidence presented suggests that notwithstanding the significant efforts and investments by Nike and its staff to improve working conditions among its suppliers, monitoring alone appears to produce only limited results. Instead, our research indicates that when monitoring efforts are combined with other interventions focused on tackling some of the root causes of poor working conditions - by improving the ability of suppliers to better schedule their work and improve their quality and efficiency - working conditions appear to significantly improve. This suggests that the current (highly polarized) debates over monitoring and labor standards need to be recast and new, more systemic approaches towards tackling these problems need to be pursued.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"37 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128885956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Partisan Convergence in Emerging Economies: What Can We Learn from Stock Markets?","authors":"Daniela Campello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2243114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243114","url":null,"abstract":"Globalization theorists have long argued that the convergence of left-wing and right-wing governments' agendas has made alternation of power irrelevant from the economic perspective, particularly in emerging economies heavily dependent on foreign savings. So far, however, the difficulties involved in quantifying integration and the lack of reliable data has made empirical work on these regions mostly inconclusive. In this article, I argue that stock market responses to national elections provide a simple and rather effective measure of partisan convergence on economic outcomes, suitable to testing this claim. Results challenge convergence theories, pointing to a scenario of partial divergence, whereby markets respond to elections along partisan lines but their capacity to anticipate a government’s agenda during the campaign is limited, even when electoral results are predictable. Compared to developed democracies, I find that the magnitude of market responses to elections is still significantly larger in the emerging markets.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"172 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114326986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Evaluation of Financial Globalisation Under Fund-Manager Capitalism: The Case of the UK Unit Trust Industry","authors":"Colin Williams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2316605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2316605","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing upon evidence from the UK unit trust industry, this paper evaluates the extent and nature of financial globalisation. It finds that despite this rapidly growing and prominent form of fund-manager capitalism operating with increasingly mobile capital in a more inter-connected de-regulated world, this does not signal the advent of homeless capital and the end of geography.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"135 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126983729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sanctions, Inducements, and Market Power: Political Economy of International Influence","authors":"A. Stein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3170458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3170458","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that economics sanctions, whether positive or negative, require market power on the part of the sanctioning state(s) and entail distributional consequences. As a result, sanctions result in the growth of state power and the monitoring and punishing of one's own allies and citizens. Similarly, countermeasures on the part of sanctioned states also entail market power and result in both the growth of state power and unintended as well as intended distributional consequences. The political requisites for both sides imply that democracies have a more difficult time imposing sanctions and autocracies the easiest in adopting countermeasures. Since outcomes are the combined result of sanctions and countermeasures, and given the incentives of sanctioned states in adopting countermeasures, even comprehensive sanctions have differential consequences and result in targeted outcomes and targeted sanctions generate unintended collateral damage.","PeriodicalId":374935,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Global Markets (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130656932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}