Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)最新文献

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Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets 保险市场费率管制的效率后果
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.985578
Sharon Tennyson
{"title":"Efficiency Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets","authors":"Sharon Tennyson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.985578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985578","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the presence of many and diverse sellers of insurance in most markets, insurance prices in some markets remain subject to regulation by state governments. Insurance rate regulation has a long and storied history in this country and the reasons for its continued existence are subject to debate and interpretation. This paper critically examines the arguments for rate regulation and discusses the consequences of this regulation for the insurance marketplace. It first provides a brief overview of the history, scope and objectives of insurance rate regulation, examines the most prevalent justifications for rate regulation and argues that they are incorrect or incomplete. It then turns to the consequences of rate regulation for insurance market outcomes making use of both economic theory and empirical evidence from academic studies of regulated insurance markets. The paper concludes that insurance rate regulation entails high costs for society and for insurance consumers, and that alternative policies for meeting regulatory objectives should be considered.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"16 15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121184064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Corporate Governance, Shareholder Conflicts, and Audit Quality 公司治理、股东冲突与审计质量
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-03-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.669024
P. Frantz, Norvald Instefjord
{"title":"Corporate Governance, Shareholder Conflicts, and Audit Quality","authors":"P. Frantz, Norvald Instefjord","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.669024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.669024","url":null,"abstract":"A string of high profile corporate failures over the past years have led to strong regulatory responses for corporate governance, some of which are aimed at strengthening the audit function of the governance process. This paper introduces an analytical model investigating the desirability of mandatory corporate governance requirements in the presence of shareholder conflicts. In this model, investment in governance and audit serves to protect outside shareholders' claim from decisions made by a dominant shareholder (entrepreneur) with conflicting preferences. The paper provides conditions under which an entrepreneur requiring equity financing selects weak as opposed to strong corporate governance. We find no evidence of governance failure and hence no case for intervention as long as the market for audit services is fully competitive. In contrast, when this market is not fully competitive, governance failures, in which the entrepreneur selects the weak governance regime when the strong governance regime maximizes economic welfare, may arise. Mandating strong governance may however have an adverse effect on economic welfare as weak governance can be welfare-maximizing.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127455291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment 模型不确定性与死刑的威慑效应
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-02-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.977560
Ethan Cohen-Cole, S. Durlauf, J. Fagan, D. Nagin
{"title":"Model Uncertainty and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment","authors":"Ethan Cohen-Cole, S. Durlauf, J. Fagan, D. Nagin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.977560","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977560","url":null,"abstract":"The reintroduction of capital punishment after the end of the Supreme Court moratorium has permitted researchers to employ state level heterogeneity in the use of capital punishment to study deterrent effects. However, no scholarly consensus exists as to their magnitude. A key reason this has occurred is that the use of alternative models across studies produces differing estimates of the deterrent effect. Because differences across models are not well motivated by theory, the deterrence literature is plagued by model uncertainty. We argue that the analysis of deterrent effects should explicitly recognize the presence of model uncertainty in drawing inferences. We describe methods for addressing model uncertainty and apply them to understand the disparate findings between two major studies in the deterrence literature, finding that evidence of deterrent effects appears, while not nonexistent, is weak.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132392563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 89
The Evolving Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in Regulatory Policy 美国管理和预算办公室在监管政策中的角色演变
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1003401
J. Graham
{"title":"The Evolving Role of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in Regulatory Policy","authors":"J. Graham","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1003401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1003401","url":null,"abstract":"Since the early Reagan years, critics have argued that benefit-cost analysis is used by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as a one-sided tool of deregulation to advance the interests of business. This article discloses a little-known fact: OMB also plays a powerful pro-regulation role when agency proposals address market failures and are supported by benefit-cost analysis. Drawing on four case studies from the George W. Bush Administration, the author examines how and why OMB encouraged regulatory initiatives while protecting some rulemakings from opposition by forces inside and outside of the executive branch. The case studies address the labeling of foods for trans fat content, control of diesel engine exhaust, improvement of light-truck fuel economy, and control of air pollution from coal-fired power plants. OMB's role in the 2001-2006 period was unusual by historic standards because, rather than await agency drafts, OMB played a pro-active role in both the initiation of rulemakings and the creation of regulatory alternatives for consideration. The benefit-cost framework could be much more powerful if greater investments were made in applied research to expand knowledge on key regulatory issues.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131885377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Permits to Elicit Information 索取资料的许可证
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2006-12-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.939655
Erzo F. P. Luttmer, R. Zeckhauser, C. Kousky
{"title":"Permits to Elicit Information","authors":"Erzo F. P. Luttmer, R. Zeckhauser, C. Kousky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.939655","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.939655","url":null,"abstract":"This paper identifies a novel function for permits: they can be used by the government as an instrument to elicit information about the intentions of private investors to put capital into an area. Such information is a crucial input for the government’s decision on how much infrastructure to build in an area, such as the capacity of an elementary school or a public transit system in an expanding community. Decisions on infrastructure that protects against natural disasters require precisely this information. For example, a levee should be built higher and stronger the more capital it will protect. Current experience in New Orleans makes this evident, particularly given the considerable uncertainties about the private sector’s intention of returning to or investing in areas at risk. Permits can replace unreliable “cheap talk” elicitation devices, such as surveys or town meetings, and can be used as an input into prediction or futures markets. An important innovation in our procedure is to use markets to elicit information separately from hedgers (the investors in our model) and speculators.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124851294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Impact of Municipal Regulations on SMMEs 市政法规对中小企业的影响
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2006-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.967624
Henlo van Nieuwenhuyzen, Sumetee Pahwa, J. Bester, Ghalieb Dawood, Duncan Pieterse, Kevin Kane, L. Schlemmer, M. Bot, G. Hamilton, Cecil Madel, Riaan van Eeden
{"title":"Impact of Municipal Regulations on SMMEs","authors":"Henlo van Nieuwenhuyzen, Sumetee Pahwa, J. Bester, Ghalieb Dawood, Duncan Pieterse, Kevin Kane, L. Schlemmer, M. Bot, G. Hamilton, Cecil Madel, Riaan van Eeden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.967624","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.967624","url":null,"abstract":"The regulatory impact of municipalities on small enterprise is inextricably linked to their developmental and service delivery roles. A general lack of information about municipal regulations and their enforcement was also discerned among the small businesses interviewed. The most significant distinctions of four categories of micro, very small, small and medium enterprise are as follows: Micro survivalist and micro non-survivalist businesses also classified as the informal sector. This category requires a specialised focus through standardised regulations and transparent and predictable service delivery arrangements. Where possible, targeted support for certain, highly viable micro businesses could assist them in becoming formalised and graduate to the very small status. Very small businesses are on the threshold of becoming more established, small or medium enterprises. They are already formalised which means that the initial regulatory barrier posed through licensing and zoning applications has been crossed. This category requires municipal support in the form of business advice, training and reliable provision of utilities. Small and medium enterprises stand to gain significantly from effective supply chain management policies of municipalities that rely on unbundling of larger projects, capacity building of businesses and regular monitoring and evaluation of the regulatory environment. A range of recommendations to enhance municipal regulatory role is offered in this paper.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121664634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru 贿赂如何影响公共服务的提供?来自秘鲁服务使用者和公职人员的微观证据
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2005-11-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.878358
D. Kaufmann, Judit Montoriol-Garriga, F. Recanatini
{"title":"How Does Bribery Affect Public Service Delivery? Micro-Evidence from Service Users and Public Officials in Peru","authors":"D. Kaufmann, Judit Montoriol-Garriga, F. Recanatini","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.878358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.878358","url":null,"abstract":"When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery\"tax.\"This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117163933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 70
Driving with the Brakes on: Guido Calabresi's Failed 1970 Auto Insurance Case Against Safety-Device Mandates 开着刹车开车:1970年Guido Calabresi针对安全装置强制要求的汽车保险案失败
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2005-08-30 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.794226
P. Butler
{"title":"Driving with the Brakes on: Guido Calabresi's Failed 1970 Auto Insurance Case Against Safety-Device Mandates","authors":"P. Butler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.794226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.794226","url":null,"abstract":"Guido Calabresi's book, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, gives two contrasting examples which together prove that efficient decisions about car safety devices must be guided by individual costs. Part I of this essay reviews Calabresi's demonstration that, if charged accurate insurance costs, Taney would invest in improved brakes and Marshall would not. To show why this demonstration fails to inform debates over safety-device mandates, Part II builds a model composed of high-annual-miles Taney cars and low-annual-miles Marshall cars, which traditional insurance would not differentiate. But pooling cars driven different annual miles overwhelms safety-device savings from reduced risk per mile. Although Calabresi uncritically identifies insurance as a cost of car owning, the model shows why decisions instead must be guided by two interdependent variables that together would make insurance an operating cost. One is the continuous odometer-mile exposure unit variable for measuring individually how much each car is operated. The other is the cents-per-mile risk rate variable for measuring by category how cars are operated, e.g., driver-age and safety-device categories. To explain why insurers shun cents-per-odometer-mile prices, Part III reviews marketing decisions to disregard categories that would raise premiums for some high-annual-miles cars. The essential first step toward redeeming Calabresi's free-market approach to automobile accidents is to acknowledge that insurance charged as a cost of car owning produces nothing but wrong incentives for optimizing the costs of accidents.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"176 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115421445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Cueing Transition in Sovereign Debt Contracts: Network Effects, Coordination Games, and Focal Points in the Choice of Mandate Versus Contract 主权债务契约中的线索转换:网络效应、协调博弈和委托与契约选择中的焦点
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2004-02-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.503542
Robert B. Ahdieh
{"title":"Cueing Transition in Sovereign Debt Contracts: Network Effects, Coordination Games, and Focal Points in the Choice of Mandate Versus Contract","authors":"Robert B. Ahdieh","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.503542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.503542","url":null,"abstract":"In the face of dramatic recent changes in the norms of sovereign debt restructuring - the substitution of collective action clauses for unanimous action requirements in bond contracts - academics and policymakers alike have raised questions about the underlying dynamics of the drafting and adoption of sovereign debt contracts. How, over less than a year, could the market of sovereign debt issues under New York law have completely abandoned the longstanding constraint of unanimous consent to restructuring, and replaced it with the far more forgiving standard of majority action? I attempt a preliminary response, grounded in the microeconomics of network effects and an analysis of \"coordination games,\" an inadequately explored corner of game theory. Neither network effects nor coordination games has been treated in the sovereign debt literature to date, but collectively, they favor what I term a \"cueing theory\" of the recent transition in sovereign debt contracts. A cueing perspective, in turn, has important implications for the further development of sovereign debt practice and convention, and suggests that the conventional dichotomy of mandate versus contract in the efficient transformation of such practice and convention may overlook public entities' true role in such development.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114165546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis 击落更多的枪支,更少的犯罪假设
Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic) Pub Date : 2002-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.343781
I. Ayres, J. Donohue
{"title":"Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis","authors":"I. Ayres, J. Donohue","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.343781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.343781","url":null,"abstract":"John Lott and David Mustard have used regression analysis to argue forcefully that 'shall-issue' laws (which give citizens an unimpeded right to secure permits for concealed weapons) reduce violent crime. While certain facially plausible statistical models appear to generate this conclusion, more refined analyses of more recent state and county data undermine the more guns, less crime hypothesis. The most robust finding on the state data is that certain property crimes rise with passage of shall- issue laws, although the absence of any clear theory as to why this would be the case tends to undercut any strong conclusions. Estimating more statistically preferred disaggregated models on more complete county data, we show that in most states shall- issue laws have been associated with more crime and that the apparent stimulus to crime tends to be especially strong for those states that adopted in the last decade. While there are substantial concerns about model reliability and robustness, we present estimates based on disaggregated county data models that on net the passage of the law in 24 jurisdictions has increased the annual cost of crime slightly -- somewhere on the order of half a billion dollars. We also provide an illustration of how our jurisdiction-specific regression model has the capacity to generate more nuanced assessments concerning which states might profit from or be harmed by a particular legal intervention.","PeriodicalId":374378,"journal":{"name":"Law & Economics: Public Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129922167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 215
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