Federal Law Review最新文献

{"title":"Twin Peaks 2.0: Avoiding Influence Over an Australian Financial Regulator Assessment Authority","authors":"A. Schmulow, Paul Mazzola, Daniel de Zilva","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211039888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211039888","url":null,"abstract":"Globally, financial system regulators are susceptible to deliberate and inadvertent influence by the industry that they oversee and, hence, are also susceptible to acting to benefit the industry rather than the public interest – a phenomenon known as ‘regulatory capture’. Australia, arguably, has an optimal model of financial system regulation (a ‘Twin Peaks’ model) comprising separate regulators for prudential soundness on the one hand, and market conduct and consumer protection on the other. However, the current design of the Twin Peaks model has not been sufficient to prevent and address prolonged and systemic misconduct that culminated in a public Royal Commission of Inquiry into misconduct in the industry. Subsequent to the Royal Commission and other inquiries, the Department of Treasury has proposed legislation to establish an Assessment Authority to assess the effectiveness of the Twin Peaks regulators. The proposal includes enquiries by an Assessment Authority into the regulators’ independence, so as to identify instances of, and thereby mitigate, their capture. As with all financial system regulators, the Assessment Authority itself may be susceptible to regulatory capture, either by the Twin Peaks regulators, or by the financial industry. Thus, this paper poses the question: how can the new Assessment Authority be optimally constituted by legislation, and operated, to effectively oversee the effectiveness of the regulators, but itself remain insulated from the influence of the regulators and industry? We analyse the primary sources of influence over financial system regulators that the Assessment Authority will likely face and recommend ways in which a robust design of the Assessment Authority can mitigate those sources of influence. In doing so, we adopt an inter-disciplinary approach, drawing upon not only regulatory theory but also for the first time in relation to this question, organisational psychology. Our findings address gaps in the proposed legislation currently before Federal Parliament and propose methods by which those gaps may be filled, in order to ensure that this important reform to Australia’s financial regulatory regime has the greatest chance of success.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"505 - 527"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42037035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Does the Common Law Conform to the Constitution?","authors":"Joshua Sheppard","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211039889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211039889","url":null,"abstract":"The High Court has often said that the common law must conform to the Constitution. The High Court has not completely explained why this is so. This requirement is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the Constitution itself. A number of scholars have suggested possible answers. One is that the Constitution is the supreme law and binding on everyone. Another suggestion has been that the common law must conform because the Constitution constrains ‘state action’: something more than just an exercise of constitutionally conferred power. This latter explanation appears to deviate from the High Court's exposition of the common law's relationship with the Constitution in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission. This article suggests that the Constitution has a broader application to the common law, in that it constrains all uses of judicial power, not just those that are considered to be ‘state action’. It contends that it is implicit in s 71 of the Constitution that the power to develop the common law yields to constitutional imperatives. This theory is more descriptively consistent with the High Court's practice and observations about the relationship between the common law and the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"569 - 593"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42286663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Reception of Structured Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Law","authors":"Murray Wesson","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211016581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211016581","url":null,"abstract":"A majority of the High Court has incorporated a test of structured proportionality into its implied freedom of political communication case law. Structured proportionality developed in the context of constitutional rights adjudication and requires courts to engage in substantive, values-based reasoning. The Australian Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights and the High Court is known for its commitment to legalism and textualism. Against this background, one might think that the High Court would interpret the elements of structured proportionality so that they assume a highly distinctive form in Australian constitutional law. However, a close reading of recent implied freedom of political communication case law demonstrates that generally this is not the case. Admittedly, the High Court’s approach to the necessity and balancing stages departs from the case law of the Federal German Constitutional Court. However, once a broader comparative perspective is adopted, it becomes apparent that the High Court’s approach is not unusual, especially for courts that are new to applying structured proportionality. By adopting structured proportionality, the High Court may have aligned the implied freedom of political communication with a global model of constitutional rights enforcement. The Australian constitutional context may also be less distinctive than is sometimes supposed.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"352 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X211016581","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43222003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Multi-Stakeholder Frameworks for Rectification of Non-Compliance in Cleaning Supply Chains: The Case of the Cleaning Accountability Framework","authors":"M. Rawling, Sarah Kaine, Emmanuel Josserand, M. Boersma","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211016575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211016575","url":null,"abstract":"There is now an expanding body of literature on the significant problem of business non-compliance with minimum labour standards including ‘wage theft’. Extended liability regulation beyond the direct employer is seen as one solution to this non-compliance in fragmented but hierarchically organised industries—such as the cleaning industry. This article uses empirical evidence to assess the effectiveness of one such regulatory scheme, the Cleaning Accountability Framework (CAF), in addressing non-compliance with minimum labour standards (including provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and the Cleaning Services Award 2020). We find that CAF has been successful in identifying and rectifying certain non-compliance, improving working conditions for some cleaners involved in the scheme. We synthesise the key success factors of CAF in view of envisioning the adoption of such co-regulation frameworks in other industries. We also propose legal reforms that will support change across the cleaning industry.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"438 - 464"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X211016575","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42755409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can I Leave the House? A Coded Analysis of the Interpretation of the Reasonable Excuse Provision by NSW Police During the COVID-19 Lockdown","authors":"B. Mostyn, Niamh Kinchin","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211016576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211016576","url":null,"abstract":"This article looks at the recent Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order 2020, which was in force in New South Wales from 31 March 2020 to 14 May 2020. The order allowed police to fine people who left their houses without a ‘reasonable excuse’. This article considers the confusion around the order in the community and upper levels of the government. Publicly available information about the fines issued by the police is analysed and it is argued that an overly narrow application of the order by police meant that its application was not reasonably proportionate to the authorising legislation, the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW). It is concluded that if future lockdowns are required, care will need to be taken to ensure that Ministerial orders are crafted in line with the legislation and that police officers clearly understand their operation.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"465 - 495"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X211016576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43867024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Legal Exclusions: Émigré Lawyers, Admissions to Legal Practice and the Cultural Transformation of the Australian Legal Profession","authors":"S. Dehm","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211016574","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211016574","url":null,"abstract":"Legal histories of Australia have largely overlooked the exclusion of European émigré lawyers from legal practice in Australia. This article recovers part of this forgotten history by tracing the drawn-out legal admission bids of two Jewish émigré lawyers in the mid-20th century: German-born Rudolf Kahn and Austrian-born Edward Korten. In examining their legal lives and doctrinal legacies, this article demonstrates the changing role and requirement of British subjecthood in the historical constitution and slow cultural transformation of the Australian legal profession. This article suggests that contemporary efforts to promoting cultural diversity in the Australian legal profession are enriched by paying attention to this long and difficult history of legal exclusions.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"327 - 351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X211016574","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42712342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"From Stepping-Stones to Throwing Stones: Officers’ Liability for Corporate Compliance Failures after Cassimatis","authors":"Pamela Hanrahan, T. Bednall","doi":"10.1177/0067205X211016573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X211016573","url":null,"abstract":"Australian corporate law allows for significant civil penalties to be imposed by a court on negligent corporate officers, including directors. For more than a decade, Australian Securities and Investments Commission used civil prosecutions for negligence exclusively in situations where an officer is alleged to have exposed their corporation to foreseeable risk of harm that would flow from a contravention by the corporation of a regulatory or disclosure obligation. This enforcement strategy—known as ‘stepping-stones’—has been strongly criticised, including by Rares J in his 2020 dissenting opinion in the Cassimatis appeal. This article explains how stepping-stones works as an enforcement strategy in the context of corporate compliance failures, explores the various criticisms of it, and argues for reform. It proposes a legislative alternative that rebalances individual officer liability, to reflect contemporary governance practices and encourage better management and oversight of non-financial risk in corporations.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"380 - 409"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X211016573","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47788860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rethinking Richardson: Sexual Harassment Damages in the #MeToo Era","authors":"M. Castles, Tom Hvala, Kieran Pender","doi":"10.1177/0067205X21993146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X21993146","url":null,"abstract":"The 2014 judgment in Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (‘Richardson’) had a seismic effect on workplace sexual harassment claims in Australia. Overnight, the ‘general range’ of damages awarded for non-economic loss in such cases increased from between $12 000 and $20 000 to $100 000 and above. The judgment has made Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) litigation considerably more attractive for plaintiffs and resulted in greater judicial recognition of the pain and suffering experienced by sexual harassment survivors. Richardson’s impact has also been felt beyond that immediate context, with the judgment cited in support of higher damages in discrimination cases and employment disputes. However, six years and over 40 judicial citations later, Richardson’s broader significance remains unclear—particularly following the emergence of the #MeToo movement. Drawing on a doctrinal analysis of subsequent case law and qualitative interviews with prominent Australian legal practitioners, this article evaluates Richardson’s legacy and considers how sexual harassment litigation may further evolve to reflect changing societal norms.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"231 - 271"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X21993146","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43426761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Shield for the Tip of the Spear","authors":"S. White","doi":"10.1177/0067205X21993147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X21993147","url":null,"abstract":"The defence of superior orders is not new. However, within Australia, its statutory codification is lamentably underexplored. The 2018 Amendments to Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) provides a neat catalyst to expand the defence and look at possible manners in which it can be constructed. Utilising a theoretical case study of Australian Defence Force members killing a possible terrorist, ‘this article addresses’ the key elements of the defence—what an order is, when can it be constructed as being manifestly unlawful and what does reasonable and necessary force mean for Australian Defence Force members.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"210 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X21993147","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42991932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Erasing the Vision Splendid? Unpacking the Formative Responses of the Federal Courts to the Fast Track Processing Regime and the ‘Limited Review’ of the Immigration Assessment Authority","authors":"J. Townsend, Hollie Kerwin","doi":"10.1177/0067205X21993158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X21993158","url":null,"abstract":"The establishment of the Immigration Assessment Authority (‘IAA’) and the Fast Track Processing Regime for certain asylum seekers has posed new and important questions for Australian administrative law, especially in respect of the place, scope and effect of merits review. This article considers the early and formative jurisprudence of the federal courts in relation to ‘Fast Track decisions’ made by the IAA. It concludes that the Fast Track process represents a novel development in Australian public law: a partial review process which is not sufficient to correct the errors of the decision-maker at first instance but which appeared for a time capable of immunising elements of the decision from appeal or direct judicial review. It is, in its intention and current operation, more than a ‘targeted tinkering’ with the mechanics of merits review and of migration law in Australia. It deserves attention as it commences its journey through superior courts and as the regime settles into the Australian administrative law landscape.","PeriodicalId":37273,"journal":{"name":"Federal Law Review","volume":"49 1","pages":"185 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0067205X21993158","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47063563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}