{"title":"Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement","authors":"Irene Lo, V. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, A. Shameli","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3802628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3802628","url":null,"abstract":"Volunteer crowdsourcing platforms, such as food recovery organizations, match volunteers with tasks which are often recurring. To ensure completion of such tasks, platforms frequently use a commitment lever known as \"adoption.\" Despite being effective in reducing match uncertainty, high levels of adoption reduce match availability for volunteers which in turn can suppress future engagement. We study how platforms should balance these two opposing factors. Our research is motivated by a collaboration with Food Rescue U.S. (FRUS), a volunteer-based food recovery organization active in over 33 locations across the U.S. For platforms such as FRUS, success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. Consequently, effectively utilizing non-monetary levers, such as adoption, is critical. Based on our analysis of fine-grained FRUS data, we develop a model for a repeated two-sided matching market consisting of tasks (prearranged donations) and volunteers. Our model incorporates the uncertainty in match compatibility as well as the negative impact of failing to match on future engagement. We study the platform's optimal policy for setting the adoption level to maximize the total discounted number of matches. Our analysis reveals that the optimal myopic policy is either full or no adoption. For sufficiently thick markets, we show that such a myopic policy is also optimal in the long run. In thinner markets, even though a static policy of full or no adoption can be suboptimal, we show it achieves a constant-factor approximation where the factor improves with market thickness. Using our analytical and empirical results, we revisit the current design of the FRUS platform and make location-specific policy recommendations. More broadly, our work sheds light on how other two-sided platforms can control the double-edged impacts that commitment levers have on growth and engagement.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127140350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Constandina Koki, Stefanos Leonardos, C. Melolidakis
{"title":"Comparative Statics via Stochastic Orderings in a Two-Echelon Market with Upstream Demand Uncertainty","authors":"Constandina Koki, Stefanos Leonardos, C. Melolidakis","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00473-6_36","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125908519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge","authors":"J. Lang","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.251","url":null,"abstract":"This volume consists of papers presented at the Sixteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK) held at the University of Liverpool, UK, from July 24 to 26, 2017. \u0000TARK conferences bring together researchers from a wide variety of fields, including Computer Science (especially, Artificial Intelligence, Cryptography, Distributed Computing), Economics (especially, Decision Theory, Game Theory, Social Choice Theory), Linguistics, Philosophy (especially, Philosophical Logic), and Cognitive Psychology, in order to further understand the issues involving reasoning about rationality and knowledge.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121119050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Evolutionary Stable Strategies in Games with Fuzzy Payoffs","authors":"Haozhen Situ","doi":"10.37256/AIE.122020420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.37256/AIE.122020420","url":null,"abstract":"Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in symmetric two player games with fuzzy payoffs. Particularly, every strategy is assigned a fuzzy membership that describes to what degree it is an ESS in presence of uncertainty. The fuzzy set of ESS characterize the nature of ESS. The proposed approach avoids loss of any information that happens by the defuzzification method in games and handles uncertainty of payoffs through all steps of finding an ESS. We use the satisfaction function to compare fuzzy payoffs, and adopts the fuzzy decision rule to obtain the membership function of the fuzzy set of ESS. The theorem shows the relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash quilibrium. The numerical results illustrate the proposed method is an appropriate generalization of ESS to fuzzy payoff games.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133016015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings Fifth International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics and Formal Verification","authors":"A. Peron, C. Piazza","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.161","url":null,"abstract":"This volume contains the proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logic and Formal Verification (GandALF 2014). The symposium took place in Verona, Italy, from 10th to 12th of September 2014. The proceedings of the symposium contain the abstracts of three invited talks and 19 papers that were accepted after a careful evaluation for presentation at the conference. The topics of the accepted papers range over a wide spectrum, including algorithmic and behavioral game theory, game semantics, formal languages and automata theory, modal and temporal logics, software verification, hybrid systems.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116965111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Time and Parallelizability Results for Parity Games with Bounded Tree and DAG Width","authors":"John Fearnley, S. Schewe","doi":"10.2168/LMCS-9(2:6)2013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2168/LMCS-9(2:6)2013","url":null,"abstract":"Parity games are a much researched class of games in NP intersect CoNP that are not known to be in P. Consequently, researchers have considered specialised algorithms for the case where certain graph parameters are small. In this paper, we study parity games on graphs with bounded treewidth, and graphs with bounded DAG width. We show that parity games with bounded DAG width can be solved in O(n^(k+3) k^(k + 2) (d + 1)^(3k + 2)) time, where n, k, and d are the size, treewidth, and number of priorities in the parity game. This is an improvement over the previous best algorithm, given by Berwanger et al., which runs in n^O(k^2) time. We also show that, if a tree decomposition is provided, then parity games with bounded treewidth can be solved in O(n k^(k + 5) (d + 1)^(3k + 5)) time. This improves over previous best algorithm, given by Obdrzalek, which runs in O(n d^(2(k+1)^2)) time. Our techniques can also be adapted to show that the problem of solving parity games with bounded treewidth lies in the complexity class NC^2, which is the class of problems that can be efficiently parallelized. This is in stark contrast to the general parity game problem, which is known to be P-hard, and thus unlikely to be contained in NC.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131843725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Proceedings Second International Workshop on Interactions, Games and Protocols","authors":"J. Reich, B. Finkbeiner","doi":"10.4204/EPTCS.50","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.50","url":null,"abstract":"The focus of the iWIGP workshop is the interrelation between interactions, games and protocols. How does computer science deal with nondeterministic interactions where the actions a system takes are not (completely) determined by the interactions the system is involved in? In computer science, nondeterministic interactions are usually described by protocols. However, these interactions can also be viewed as games. As to be expected, games have become an increasingly important modeling tool wherever nondeterministic interactions are involved -- from foundations in game semantics and reactive systems to applications in communication protocols and electronic business applications. The goal of this workshop has been to bring researchers from industry and academia together and to explore how a better understanding of the interrelation between interactions, games and protocols leads to better-designed and more reliable nondeterministic interacting systems. \u0000iWIGP 2011 was collocated with ETAPS 2011 in Saarbruecken, Germany. The programme consisted of three invited talks, by Kim Larsen, Marielle Stoelinga and Viktor Kuncak, and five refereed papers, selected by a strong programme committee of international reputation. The refereed papers are contained in this volume.","PeriodicalId":369328,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115448488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}