志愿者众包平台的承诺:对增长和参与的影响

Irene Lo, V. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, A. Shameli
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引用次数: 2

摘要

志愿者众包平台,如食物回收组织,将志愿者与经常重复出现的任务相匹配。为了确保这些任务的完成,平台经常使用被称为“采用”的承诺杠杆。尽管在减少比赛不确定性方面是有效的,但高水平的采用降低了志愿者的比赛可用性,这反过来又会抑制未来的参与度。我们研究平台应该如何平衡这两个相反的因素。我们的研究是由与美国食品救援组织(FRUS)的合作推动的,FRUS是一个以志愿者为基础的食品回收组织,活跃在美国超过33个地点。对于FRUS这样的平台来说,成功关键取决于志愿者的有效利用和参与。因此,有效地利用非货币杠杆,如采用,是至关重要的。基于我们对细粒度FRUS数据的分析,我们开发了一个由任务(预先安排的捐赠)和志愿者组成的重复双边匹配市场模型。我们的模型结合了匹配兼容性的不确定性,以及不匹配对未来参与度的负面影响。我们研究了平台设置采用水平的最优策略,以最大化匹配的总折扣数。我们的分析表明,最优的近视政策要么是完全采用,要么是不采用。对于足够厚的市场,我们表明,从长远来看,这种短视政策也是最优的。在较薄的市场中,即使完全采用或不采用静态策略可能是次优的,我们也表明它实现了常数因子近似,其中因子随市场厚度而提高。利用我们的分析和实证结果,我们重新审视了FRUS平台的当前设计,并提出了针对具体地区的政策建议。更广泛地说,我们的工作揭示了其他双边平台如何控制承诺杠杆对增长和参与度的双刃剑影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Commitment on Volunteer Crowdsourcing Platforms: Implications for Growth and Engagement
Volunteer crowdsourcing platforms, such as food recovery organizations, match volunteers with tasks which are often recurring. To ensure completion of such tasks, platforms frequently use a commitment lever known as "adoption." Despite being effective in reducing match uncertainty, high levels of adoption reduce match availability for volunteers which in turn can suppress future engagement. We study how platforms should balance these two opposing factors. Our research is motivated by a collaboration with Food Rescue U.S. (FRUS), a volunteer-based food recovery organization active in over 33 locations across the U.S. For platforms such as FRUS, success crucially depends on efficient volunteer utilization and engagement. Consequently, effectively utilizing non-monetary levers, such as adoption, is critical. Based on our analysis of fine-grained FRUS data, we develop a model for a repeated two-sided matching market consisting of tasks (prearranged donations) and volunteers. Our model incorporates the uncertainty in match compatibility as well as the negative impact of failing to match on future engagement. We study the platform's optimal policy for setting the adoption level to maximize the total discounted number of matches. Our analysis reveals that the optimal myopic policy is either full or no adoption. For sufficiently thick markets, we show that such a myopic policy is also optimal in the long run. In thinner markets, even though a static policy of full or no adoption can be suboptimal, we show it achieves a constant-factor approximation where the factor improves with market thickness. Using our analytical and empirical results, we revisit the current design of the FRUS platform and make location-specific policy recommendations. More broadly, our work sheds light on how other two-sided platforms can control the double-edged impacts that commitment levers have on growth and engagement.
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